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10. The defendants answered the issue No. 1(a) and 1(b) corresponding to point No. (ii) at first. According to them, the eviction was claimed under the notice dated 16th May, 1988 on two grounds. One is Section 13(i)(j) and another is Section 13(i) (k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act by which if a tenant subsequent to creation of tenancy makes a premise to quit, vacate and deliver up the premises in question and fail to do so, the eviction will be enforceable. Admittedly the lease agreement was executed in between the plaintiff and the President of India which after the expiry of he lease hold period become monthly tenancy in between the self-same parties as per the aforesaid Act. Therefore, when contractual relationship exist between the parties governed under the Article 299 of the Constitution of India admittedly the notice as aforesaid cannot confirm the mandate of such Article.

"We have nothing on the record to disclose whether the Superintending Engineer, though he acted under oral instructions of the Minister, was authorised by the Governor or under relevant rules to enter into such a contract."

So far as the aforesaid second judgment is concerned there also the Supreme Court held on the factual basis that there was no concluded contract with Union of India and the authority was not authorised for and on behalf of the President of India in terms of Article 299 of the Constitution. He cited two more decisions on this point being (K.P. Chowdhury v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.) its head notes and (The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and Ors.) its paragraph 10. The ratio of the third judgment is that in view of Article 299(1) of the Constitution there can be no implied contract between the Government and any other person. If such implied contract between the Government and any other persons allowed that would, in effect, make Article 299(1) nugatory. If a contract between a Government and another person is not in compliance with Article 299(1), it would be no contract at all and could not be enforced either by the Government or any other person as a contract. In fourth cited judgment it was held that the provision of Article 299 of Constitution is mandatory in character. A contract made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State must satisfy three conditions viz. (i) it must be expressed to be made by the President or the Governor of the State as the case may be (ii) it must be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor as the case may be; (iii) its execution must be by such person and in such manner as the President or Governor may direct or authorise. Failure to comply with these conditions nullifies the contract and renders it void and unenforceable. There is no question of estoppel or ratification in a case where there is contravention of the provision of Article 299(1) of the Constitution.

18. It appears to this Court that there is no dispute in respect of execution of such lease agreement on behalf of the President by the pen of such Public Relation Officer. According to the defendants they had become the tenant immediately after expiry of such lease agreement. If it is so, then the contractual obligation comes to an end and the West Bengal Tenancy Act stepped into the shoes of such contract. A claim of statutory tenancy or so arises when a tenant under a lease or a contractual tenancy, remains in possession without the landlord's assent after the termination of the contractual tenancy. Therefore, such tenancy after the lease period of three years cannot be based on contract as argued by the defendants or at all. If the contract continued after the contractual period by the agreement of the parties then the question may arise that maker of such contract on behalf of the defendants is capable of executing the same on behalf of the President of India or Governor of the Province as provided under Article 299 of the Constitution of India or not. But when the defendants' own contention is that they are statutory tenant under the provision of the local statute there is no question of applicability of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. When the executive at their own risk continued in possession, they will be bound by the statutory provisions made for the same. However, by these analysis I have not decided in merit as yet, that after expiry of the lease or the contractual tenancy whether the defendant/s can be able to retain the possession as a statutory tenant or not. I have only discussed the issue that if one by his own averment says that he is a statutory tenant he cannot claim to be a contractual tenant for the purpose of getting any benefit under Article 299 of the Constitution of India.

22. He also cited another judgment being (Thakur Dan Singh Bisht v. State of Uttar Pradesh) to show that a contract cannot be culled out from the correspondence but it requires execution of formal document.

23. If I peruse Article 77 of the Constitution of India I shall be able to find that all executive actions of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President including orders and instruments made and executed but validity of an order or instrument which is so authorised shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President. In all, it appears to this Court that conduct of business of the Government of India will be taken in the name of the President and similarly with the contracts under Article 299 and in both the cases the President is not personally responsible for the same. There is a reason in saying so because the President is not the beneficiary. There is no existence of any expressed agreement other than the lease agreement on behalf of the President of India. Therefore, Article 299 has no manner of application beyond the period of the expressed contract. At best, a question may raise by the defendant/s about conduct of business of the Government of India by the appropriate Officers of the Income Tax authorities under Article 77 of the same. But I do not find any reason to disbelieve such conduct of the business stated to be operative by the appropriate authority or authorities of the defendants. The names of authorities are definitely changed. But post or position of such person or persons have not been changed. Even thereafter, if the defendant/s want to challenge the authority of the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax then they are challenging their own locus standi to contest the suit by the pen of whom written statement or additional written statement were filed. It appears that the withdrawal letter from surrendering tenancy was also written by he similarly placed Officer i.e. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. Therefore, if I allow the defendant/s to take such stand then I have to allow the double stand of the Income Tax authorities one in merit and other in technicality. Moreover, from the Supreme Court judgment as cited above it is amply clear when and under what circumstances the Court will come to a definite conclusion about the applicability of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. Two conditions have to be fulfilled: (a) There should be existence of an expressed agreement; (b) It has to be signed by the empowered authority under the President of India. So far as the first part is concerned it appears it is restricted only upto the execution of the lease agreement which is a formal one. It cannot proceed beyond the period specified under the agreement admittedly. There is no dispute that the same was not done by an authenticated person, Therefore, this second part has to be governed Article 77 but not Article 299 of the Constitution of India. If it is so, the principles and power of delegation have to be applied in this case. This Court has no manner of doubt that the person concerned who made the correspondence on different occasions and contested the suit by the pen of Deputy Commissioners of Income Tax are the appropriate persons to conduct the business of the Income Tax authorities on behalf of the Union of India in this respect. Therefore, the applicability of Article 299 in this case is a futile attempt on the part of the defendants which cannot be accepted. Thus, I hold the issue Nos. 1(a) and 1 (b) against the defendants and affirmatively in favour of the plaintiff.