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36. The question as to whether against an award of the Claims Tribunal, an insurer ran. under any circumstances, challenge an award under Articles 226 and/or 227 or whether this constitutional remedy is completely barred so far as the insurers are concerned, was. again, considered in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gauri Roy (Deb) reported in 2005 (1) GLT 569, by single Bench.

37. The questions, raised in Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), were noted by one of us, at paragraph No. 7, as under:

1. Against an award rendered by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which is appealable under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1988 (hereinafter as "the M.V. Act", whether an insurer can invoke revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter as "the Code") on the grounds beyond those, which are available to an insurer under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act? 2. Against an award rendered by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which is appealable under Section 173 of the M.V. Act, whether an insurer can, under any circumstance, impugn an award in an application under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India or whether this constitutional remedy is completely barred so far as an insurer is concerned? 3. Whether the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India and power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution form part of the basic structure of the Constitution and whether the powers, so given to the High Courts, can be taken away by amendment of the Constitution or by any piece of legislation?

51. We are unable to locate, in the decision of Sadhana Lodh (supra), any observation made by the Supreme Court to the effect that in view of the limited right of appeal provided to an insurer under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act, 1988. interference with such an award by invoking Articles 226 and/or 227, is impermissible even if recognized principles for interference with such an award exists; for instance, when the Claims Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or in flagrant disregard of law or rules or procedure or in violation of the principles of natural justice occasioning failure of justice. Undoubtedly, a mere wrong decision by a Tribunal, which has the jurisdiction to decide, cannot be a ground for interference under Article 226 and/or 227. The Apex Court observed, in Sadhana Lodh (supra), that a mere wrong decision without anything more' is not enough to attract jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The expression without anything more', used in Sadhana Lodh (supra), is, to our mind, of greatest significance. The decision, in Sadhana Lodh (supra), has to be read in the background of the authorities, which lay down the parameters of exercise of writ jurisdiction by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and when read in this light, it clearly follows that what the Apex Court has laid down, in Sadhana Lodh (supra), is that a writ Court cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal and thereby enlarge the limited grounds on which an award can be impugned in the appeal by an insurer. Sadhana Lodh (supra), nowhere, lays down that a decision or award of a Claims Tribunal is immune from judicial review or even when, in a given case, well-accepted norms for exercise of writ jurisdiction and present, such exercise of power under Articles 226/227 is not possible, because of the limitations imposed by Section 149(2). We are of the view that if the conditions precedent for exercise of powers Under Article 226/227 exist, the same cannot be ignored merely because the State has not provided an unlimited right of appeal, for, doing so would amount to accepting a proposition that by providing a right of appeal, limited or otherwise, the Legislature can take away the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and/or 227. No doubt, the writ jurisdiction shall be exercised, as laid down in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India , to effectuate the rule of law and not to abrogate it and while the powers under Article 226 cannot be circumscribed by any enactment, the legislative intent, as evidenced by the enactment, must be given due regard and the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be consistent with the provisions of the enactment and not contrary thereto. In short, thus, when the M.V. Act, 1988, prescribes a complete scheme for the relief of granting of compensation and lays down, with the help of the provisions, such as, Section 149(2), the conditions subject to which an insurer can exercise right of appeal, the High Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227, convert itself into a Court of appeal and determine the correctness of the decision; but when the Claims Tribunal oversteps its jurisdiction or indulges in arbitrariness in granting compensation or it acts in denial of the principles of natural justice or acts without jurisdiction or in flagrant disregard of the law or the procedure occasioning thereby failure of justice, interference in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction will not only be possible, but would become imperative, for, non-interference even in such cases, where the exercise of powers under Article 226 and/or 227 is warranted, will amount to abdicating by the High Court its authority under Article 226/227, which forms the basic structure of the Constitution. Such a course, as appears to have been suggested by the Division Bench decision in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati, (FTC No. 1) (2006 AIHC 2947) would be contrary to the established principles governing exercise of writ jurisdiction and cannot, in any way, be described to be in tune with what Sadhana Lodh (supra) lays down.

54. In fact, it was pointed out in Rejina Begum (supra), while analyzing the decision in Sadhana Lodh (supra) this, "If the objections raised on behalf of the respondents that Sadhana Lodh (supra) bars jurisdiction of the High Court completely under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is accepted, the same would not only be contrary to the established law of the land, as has been indicated hereinabove, but also prove disastrous, for such an approach would set at naught the whole object with which Articles 226 and 227 stand embodied in the Constitution. Let me, now, consider some examples in this regard. Let us assume for a moment, that a Tribunal, without giving any notice, in terms of Section 170 of the M.V. Act, to an insurer, determines the amount of compensation and, then, directs the insurer to make payment of the compensation so awarded; such an order, though contrary to the provisions of Section 170 and also in violation of the principles of natural justice, is not appealable under Section 173 of the M.V. Act inasmuch as Section 149(2) makes no mention of the fact that omission to give notice to the insurer can be made a ground to challenge the award. In a situation, such as this, the insurer would be saddled with the liability to indemnify the insured without having been accorded any opportunity of hearing. Such an order would not only be in flagrant disregard of the very scheme of the M.V. Act, but it would also be against the principles of natural justice. Can, in such a factual scenario, the High Court refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226/227 if it is satisfied that what the insurer alleges is correct; the answer to this question has to be an emphatic 'no', for, any affirmative answer to the question so posed would be totally contrary to the law and wholly inconsistent with the authorities cited above. An affirmative answer, in this regard, would amount to allowing the legislature to whittle down the powers of the High Court under Article 226 and/or 227, though the same have been held to form part of the basic structure of Constitution. Assume, for a moment, that an insurer is not allowed to be represented by a lawyer of its own choice before the Tribunal under the M.V. Act. In such a case, though Section 149 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the insurer to challenge the award on the ground of its not having been allowed a lawyer of its choice to represent it before the Tribunal, the fact remains that such a right cannot be denied to an insurer and must, therefore, be interfered with by the High Court, if necessary, by taking resort to Articles 226/227, notwithstanding the fact that the denial of such an opportunity is not provided as a ground for appeal to the insurer under Section 149. It me also assume a situation in which the registered owner of a vehicle, while taking out his car from inside his garage located within his compound, injures one of the inmates of his own house. Though the accident has not taken place on account of the use of the vehicle at a public place, no insurance policy existed for such an accident and no compensation can be awarded in such a situation in terms of the insurance policy, yet if the Tribunal awards compensation in such a case, can the insurer challenge the award on the ground that it is statutorily and contractually not liable to pay compensation in the case. In such a case too, non-interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction would be tantamount to allowing the Tribunal to award compensation in respect of an accident, which was outside the ambit of the M.V. Act itself, though such a violation is not perceived as a ground for appeal under Section 149. Similarly, where the evidence given on record is that a deceased rickshaw-puller used to earn Rs. 1,000/- per month, can the Tribunal arbitrarily hold that the rickshaw-puller must be earning Rs. 10,000/- per month and determine compensation on the basis of such an amount. Though a mere error in computing the compensation may not become a ground for exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, yet if the determination of compensation suffers ex facie from arbitrariness, such arbitrariness cannot be allowed to survive by referring to Section 149(2), for, the rule of law abhors arbitrariness and is anathema to the sense of justice. Let us also take the instance, when a finance of a deceased, who met with an accident, raises a claim for compensation on the ground that she was dependent on the deceased. Though no right of compensation is available under Section 166 of the M.V. Act to a person unless he or she is a legal representative, the Tribunal awards compensation to such a claimant. Can the High Court allow such an award to stand good on record merely on the ground that the legislature has chosen not to allow the insurer the right to impugn the award on the ground that the claimant does not have the locus standi. Allowing ' such an award to stand good on record will amount to putting seal of approval on arbitrariness of the Tribunal or the act of the Tribunal, which is wholly contrary to the scheme of the very enactment under which the Tribunal functions.