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11. At this juncture, the issue before this Court, which is to be decided, is whether this Court can quash the criminal proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C., after conviction, and during the pendency of the appeal.

12. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the offences under Section 498-A I.P.C. as also under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is not compoundable offence, as is clear from the perusal of the table referred to under Section 320 Cr.P.C. However, this Hon'ble Court having inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can quash the proceeding in cases of non compoundable offence.

28. The Apex Court in the case of Manoj Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Others reported in (2008) 16 SCC 1, has held that the ultimate exercise of discretion under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is with the Court, which has to exercise such jurisdiction in the facts of each case. Said power in no way is limited by the provisions of Section 320 Cr.P.C. It is further held that exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings relating to offences not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. is discretionary. For ready reference, paragraph nos. 22, 23, 26 and 27, which are relevant, read as follows:

"22. Since Section 320 Cr.P.C. has clearly stated which offences are compoundable and which are not, the High Court or even this Court would not ordinarily be justified in doing something indirectly which could not be done directly. Even otherwise, it ordinarily would not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power under Article 22 of the Constitution or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to direct doing something which the Cr.P.C. has expressly prohibited.Section 320(9) Cr.P.C. expressly states that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by that Section. Hence, in my opinion, it would ordinarily not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power to direct compounding of a non-compoundable offence.

"We find no difficulty in recognizing such power as held in Kiran T. Ingale (supra), subject to the limitations as expressed while answering Question (A)."

34. This Court is of the opinion that from perusal of the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma (Supras), which are two Judges' Division Bench and Gian Singh (Supra), which is Three Judges' Full Bench, it is clear that in all the cases, the Apex Court has held that since Section 320 Cr.P.C. does not limit or affect the powers under Sections 482 Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitutions of India, the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings/FIR/complaint. In the case of B.S. Joshi (Supra), Two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court has specifically held that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A in I.P.C. was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife or coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. A hyper technical view would be counterproductive and would act against the interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women for settling earlier. This is not the objective of Chapter-XX-A of I.P.C.