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9. Learned counsel for the accused submit that the judgment in V.C.Shukla (supra) has no application to the present cases since it was rendered in the context of Section 11 SCA which is not, according to them, in pari materia Section 19 (3) (c) PCA. Likewise, it is submitted that the wording of Section 34 POTA is different. It bars appeals and revisions against interlocutory orders as understood in the context of the POTA. It is submitted that as far as the PCA is concerned, Section 19 deals essentially with the grant of sanction to prosecute and the remedy available to a person aggrieved by an order granting sanction. Thus, the scope of Section 19 (3) (c) PCA cannot be expanded to cover all orders passed by the trial court at the various stages of the trial. Referring to Section 22 and 27 of the PCA, it is submitted that each of these provisions has to be given full effect and the revision petition is, therefore, maintainable against an order on charge or an order framing charges passed by the Special Court under the PCA.

10. Counsel for the petitioners submit that in any event an order on charge or an order framing charge passed by the Special Court under the PCA is not an interlocutory order. Since the provisions of the CrPC apply to the Special Court Crl.Rev.P.Nos.340/08, 371/08, 380/08, 456/08 under the PCA, the nature of the order on charge has to be understood in the context of the CrPC. Such an order passed by the criminal court under the CrPC has been held by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 to be a final order that is revisable under Section 397 CrPC. It is submitted that Section 19 (3) (c) PCA is not intended to curtail the revisional power of the High Court, which in any event has been preserved by Section 27 PCA. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgments in Jarnail Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1992 Cr LJ 810 and two judgments of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in State v. Mrs. Renukadevi 1999 Crl LJ 2955 and V.R. Nedunchezhian v. State 2000 Crl LJ 976.

12. A bare perusal of the above provisions reveals their apparent similarity.

While Section 11 SCA and Section 34 POTA bar appeals against an interlocutory order of the trial court, Section 19 (3) (c) PCA prohibits the entertaining of revision petitions by the High Court against interlocutory orders of the Special Court. The second similarity is that each of the provisions begins with the non obstante clause „Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure.‟ Clearly the said provision will prevail over any contrary or inconsistent provision in the CrPC. A look at Section 27 PCA shows that it is a provision concerning the revisional power of the High Court and it has been made „subject to the other provisions of the Act‟. Therefore Section 27 PCA is subject to Section 19 (3) PCA which in turn is unaffected by any contrary provision in the CrPC. The third similarity is that in none of the statutes is there a definition of the words `interlocutory order.‟ The said words are not defined Crl.Rev.P.Nos.340/08, 371/08, 380/08, 456/08 even under the CrPC. This Court is therefore unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the accused that Section 11 SCA and Section 34 POTA are not in pari materia Section 19 (3) PCA.

43.11 The matter can be looked at from another angle as well. The petitioners have been charged with the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. Under Section 3 PCA, the Special Judge is empowered to try not only "any offence punishable under this Code" but under Section 3(1)(b) "any conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit or any abetment of the offences specified in clause (1)."

43.12 Under Section 40 IPC, it has been mentioned that in Chapter VA and in Sections 109, 110 IPC the word "offence" denotes a thing punishable under this Code, or under any special or local law as hereinafter defined." Under Section 41 IPC, a special law has been defined as "a law applicable to a particular subject." Therefore, in terms of Sections 40 and 41 IPC, the PCA would be a special law. The offence under Section 120B in Chapter VA IPC would therefore also become punishable under the PCA which is a special enactment for that purpose. Once the sanction under Section 19 PCA has been obtained, there is no need to obtain a separate sanction under Section 197 CrPC for prosecuting the petitioners for the offence under Section 120B IPC. 43.13 The learned counsel for the CBI has made a reference to the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated 25th January 2006 passed in Crl. Rev. (P) No. 2282/04 (titled Neera Yadav v. CBI) where the Court negatived the contention of the accused in those cases that the sanction both under Section 197 CrPC as well as under Section 19 PCA was necessary for Crl.Rev.P.Nos.340/08, 371/08, 380/08, 456/08 prosecuting them under Section 13 PCA. A reference was made by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Harihar Prasad v. State of Bihar 1972 (3) SCC 89 and Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa AIR 1998 SC 2595.