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2. During the hearing of the writ petitions, however, learned Counsel for the petitioners challenged the legality of the impugned notices only on the ground that reasons have not been assigned therein as required by Section 25F of the Act.

3. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been taken to the maintainability of these petitions on the ground that the petitioners have an alternative remedy by way of raising an industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act and consequently these petitions are not maintainable in view of Clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution as amended by the 42nd Constitution (Amendment) Act. In support of the contention, learned Counsel representing the respondents has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the Divisional Engineer, Headquarters, Northern Railway, Lucknow v. Durgesh Kumar (Special Appeal No. 29 of 1975 reported in 1976 All W.C. 617, connected with Special Appeal No. 58 of 1975, decided by Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) and Prem Prakash, J. on 27th April, 1976). In Writ Petition No. 683 of 1974 (giving rise to Special Appeal No. 29 of 1975), the writ-petitioner Durgesh Kumar, who had completed more than three years' service as an "unskilled staff" in the Railway Workshop, challenged the order terminating his services, made in purported exercise of the power under RULE 149 of the Code read with Section 25F of the Act on the ground that, in substance, it being "retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act and the Railway Administration having not fulfilled the conditions postulated by Section 25F, he was entitled to continue in service and to the accrued salaries and allowances. The Railway Administration contested the claim taking, inter alia, the plea that the petitioner was not entitled to the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution which he could obtain by invoking the machinery under the Act. The learned single Judge, who decided the writ petition, upon a scrutiny of the affidavits exchanged between the parties, held that the petitioner being a "workman" and the Railway Establishment an "industry" within the meaning of the Act, since no retrenchment compensation had been paid to the petitioner, the order terminating his services was invalid. The plea of alternative remedy being available under the Act was repelled on the ground that "on the mere possibility that some other remedy was available to the petitioner, the Court under Article 226 ought not to drive him out (of) Court". In the result, the learned single Judge quashed the impugned order and the petitioner was declared to have continued in the service of the Railway Administration. The Divisional Engineer, Northern Railway, appealed against the decision of the learned single Judge and in the special appeal it was contended on behalf of the Railway Administration that since the dispute raised by the petitioner was an "industrial dispute" it was to be settled by the machinery provided for by the Act and, therefore, the petitioner should be required to pursue that remedy and not allowed to invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a high prerogative writ. Learned Counsel for the respondent in the special appeal, on the other hand, urged that there being infraction of a legal right by the employers' non-fulfilment of the conditions under Section 25F of the Act, and, at any rate, the remedy under the Act being not convenient and efficacious, and the High Court having admitted the petitions for hearing and issued the rule, recourse to exhaustion of the remedies under the Act should not be insisted upon in the case. The Division Bench hearing the special appeal, after a review of certain decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the English Courts, held that since the right sought to be enforced by the petitioner was a right created under the Act, the remedy for its enforcement is by way of raising an Industrial Dispute which the appropriate Government had the power to refer under Section 10(1) of the Act to the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case might be. Since in the view of the Division Bench the petitioner had an equally efficacious alternative remedy available to him under the Act, its disagreeing with the learned single Judge allowed the Special Appeal and dismissed the writ petition giving rise to the appeal.

9. We are not, in the instant case, concerned with the question as to whether civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain claims of the nature asserted and are called upon only to decide as to whether the petitioners had an alternative remedy under the Act so as to oust the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as provided for by Clause (3) thereof as it stands after the coming into force of the 42nd Constitution (Amendment) Act and have no hesitation in holding that the petitioners have an alternative remedy by way of raising a dispute referable by the Government under Section 10(1) of the Act.

10. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda, Lucknow (Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 6582 of 1974, decided by a Division Bench of this Court on 8th February, 1977) a preliminary objection was raised to the effect that in view of the provisions of Section 58 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, the petition had abated as the petitioner had, within the meaning of Clause (3) of the amended Article 226 of the Constitution, an alternative remedy for getting the dispute adjudicated through a reference made under Section 10 of the Act. The preliminary objection was com bated by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, who contended that under Section 10 of the Act the appropriate Government had discretion either to make a reference or not to do so and conse quently it could not be said that the petitioner had an alternative remedy within the meaning of Clause (3) of the new Article 226 of the Constitution. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke (1975) L.IC 1651 (supra), the Bench held that the remedy provided under the Act was an alternative remedy for the petitioner, and in the result the writ petition was rendered to have abated under Section 58 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 and was dismissed. It was observed that it was open to the petitioner to seek his remedy under the provisions of the Act, if so advised.

12. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Nand Lal v. Union of India (Writ Petition No. 1368 of 1976 decided on 28-4-1978): (reported in (1978) L.I.C. 1267 (All) and Union of India v. Bishwa Nath (1978) All Civ. J 81 and some single Judge decisions in which notices identical to those challenged in these writ petitions were quashed on the ground that they had been issued in disregard of the requirements of Section Section 58 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 of the Act. In these cases the question as to whether the writ petitioners had an alternative remedy available under the Act or not and as to whether the writ petitions were maintainable in view of Article 226(3) of the Constitution as it stands was not raised or considered. In Hardayal v. Union of India (Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 7552 of 1974 decided on 8-3-1976): reported in (1976) L.I.C. 1426 (All) by a learned single Judge of this Court no doubt the contention raised on behalf of the Railway Administra tion that this Court should not interfere in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution as the petitioners had an alternative remedy available to them under the Act was repelled and the decision of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobile Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shan taram Wadke (supra) distinguished on the ground that in the above-mentioned decision the Supreme Court was concerned not with the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but with the jurisdiction of the civil Court and it was observed that it is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is much wider than that of the civil Court and even matters arising out of an industrial dispute are amenable to challenge in this Court, but the judgment in that case was delivered on the 8th March, 1976, i.e., before the coming into force of the 42nd Constitution (Amendment) Act. The learned single Judge in Hardayal v. Union of India (supra) did not hold that a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act is not an alternative remedy. After the amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution by the 42nd Constitution (Amendment) Act, since the petitioners have an alternative remedy under the Act itself for enforcement of the rights made available to them by that Act and the infraction of which they allege, this Court has ceased to have any jurisdiction to grant any relief to the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution, even though, the notices terminating their services may be in violation of the requirements of Section Section 58 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 of the Act.