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6. The counsel of the petitioner has drawn our attention to some observations in some decisions of the Supreme Court, which, the counsel has claimed, have the effect of laying down that a decree like the one which is sought to be executed in the case before us is a nullity. The first decision is Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass ((1969) 1 SCWR 51), where the Supreme Court was considering Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. Section 13 (1) provided that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises should be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant. Then followed a proviso which provided that nothing in the sub-section should apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court was satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso existed. (The proviso contained several grounds.) Evidently, under this sub-section, the Court gets jurisdiction to pass an order in eviction only if it is satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso exists. What happened in that case was that an award, to which the landlord himself was not a party, was passed, under the Arbitration Act, allowing eviction of the tenant from the premises; and that, on the basis of the award, a decree was also passed. And it was that decree thai was sought to be executed. It is clear that, under Section 13 (1) of the Act, such a decree could not have been passed, because the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree in eviction was only on its bring satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso existed: without considering the grounds, the Court could not have passed a decree in eviction. And this was what was pointed out by the Supreme Court in that rase. The next decision is Smt. Kan-shalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal, (1969) 1 SC WR 50 = (AIR 1970 SC 838). This was also a case under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. In that case, the decree sought to be evented was a compromise decree; and the Supreme Court pointed out that the same reasoning given by it in the earlier decision applied to this case as well, namely, that, without considering the grounds mentioned in the proviso, no decree for eviction could have been passed, lastly, the decision in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal, (1970) 3 SCC 181 = (AIR 1970 SC 791) has also been brought to our notice, which again, we may point out, considered Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. In that case also, tho decree sought to be executed was a compromise decree; and therefore, the reasoning given in the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court applied to that case as well.