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Showing contexts for: harassment defination in Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakraborti vs Vaneeta Patnaik & Ors on 23 December, 2024Matching Fragments
Thus the only issue involved in the instant appeal is whether the Local Complaint Committee was justified in rejecting the complaint on the ground of limitation without taking into account the composite meaning of sexual harassment defined in Section 2(n) and the other following circumstances contemplated under Section 3 of the POSH Act.
In order to determine the aforesaid point, the salient facts emanating from the record of the instant case are required to be adumbrated. Admittedly, the respondent was appointed as a teaching assistant in National University of Juridical Sciences in the year 2003 and since then was associated with the affairs and the functioning of the said educational institute. The appellant was appointed as a Vice-Chancellor on 3 rd July, 2019. It is alleged that in September, 2019 the respondent was called in the office of the appellant and was communicated that the respondent being a hard working teacher, should do well in her career and he would personally take steps to ensure the advancement in career and advise the respondent to make an application under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS). On such advice having extended, the respondent made an application under the CAS and was called for an interview to be held on September 27, 2019 before the Selection Committee. It is further alleged that the respondent was called by the appellant to his office and inform that her applications have been screened by the competent authority and an instruction is given by him to the Registrar to issue a letter for interview before the Selection Committee. It is further alleged that immediately after divulging the aforesaid facts, she was offered to go for a dinner which she was declined as she considered herself to be judged on the basis of her merit. She further alleged that after the interview she was again called to percolate a message that she has done well in the interview and further insisted to go out for dinner with sly insinuation to develop a personal friendship which would greatly benefit in future. She alleged that on such date the appellant touched her hand which she feels extremely uncomfortable which led her to leave office of the appellant. In the middle of the month of October, 2019, she was again called in the office of the appellant and asked her opinion about developing such personal relationship and on refusal the appellant got angry and agitated and threatened the respondent that he would sabotage her career. It is alleged that since thereafter she realized the vindictive and aggressive attitude of the appellant which was corroborated by a factum of lodging an E-Mail complaint on October 25, 2019 by one of the then Associate Professor alleging the submission of the certificate of participation in GIAN Course along with her application under the Career Advancement Scheme which appears to be fraudulent. On the basis of the said complaint, a resolution was passed in 70th Executive Council Meeting held on December 21, 2019 to put on hold the promotion of the respondent as recommended by the Selection Committee and a one man enquiry committee was formed. She participated in the one man enquiry committee so constituted but alleged that the report of the said committee was never disclosed to her. Subsequently a show cause notice dated July 2, 2021 was issued to the respondent on the above issue which she duly replied to on July 16, 2021. It is alleged that because of her refusal to the offer of the appellant, she was constantly pressurized. She wrote a letter to the Executive Council through E-mail on February 25, 2022. Subsequently, by a resolution taken in 81st Meeting held on April 2, 2022, the recommendation of the Selection Committee in extending the promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme was accepted and the promotion was given to her with retrospective effect on May 1, 2018. She further alleged that in the month of April, 2023 she was called in the office of the appellant and offered to go on a trip which she flatly refused but she received a threat from the appellant that her career would be seriously affected resulting into a deterioration in the professional relationship. She further disclosed in the writ petition that a project titled "Corporate Governance, Merger and Acquisition" was undertaken in the year 2012 under the supervision of the respondent and the fund was duly approved by the National Foundation for Corporate Governance. An initial payment of Rs. 1 Lakh was made over by the NFCG to NUJS but the same remained unutilized for a long time and an E-Mail was issued by the said NFCG to the Registrar of NUJS for submission of the final report within two weeks failing which to refund the said amount. It is alleged that in a resolution taken in 91st Executive Council Meeting held on September 7, 2023 two separate and independent issues were clubbed together in a single agenda with an intent to misled the Executive Council and a resolution was passed to appoint the one man enquiry commission for preliminary enquiry in misutilisation of the grant and the refund of the sum of Rs. 1 Lakh. The respondent made several allegations pertaining to not uploading the resolution of the Executive Council but received several letters for furnishing the documents. She thereafter lodged a complaint to the Local Complaint Committee on December 26, 2023 and was called on for hearing and ultimately, the Local Complaint Committee rejected the said complaint on the ground of limitation.
While defining the "sexual harassment" as an unwelcome act or behavior whether directly or by implication either by physical contact and advances; or a demand or request for sexual favours; or making sexually coloured remarks; or showing pornography; or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature, it encompasses any act or behavior in the nature of implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in her employment or implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment in her employment or implied or explicit threat over her present of future employment status or interference with her work or creating an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment for her or humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or safety. Both the Sections i.e. Section 2 and 3 of the POSH Act cannot be read in isolation but compliments the very notion of the sexual harassment as it is of varied form. In order to harmonize both the aforementioned Sections, the legislative intention is manifest that any act or the behavior which impedes or touches upon her employment or affecting the health or the safety in the employment must be in furtherance of the sexual harassment so defined. It would frustrate the legislative intent to treat the incidents referred to Section 2 and 3 in isolation when the composite allegation in this regard is projected in the complaint lodged by the employee. Any other interpretation would be opposed to the mandate given in the POSH Act and would also act contrary to the expression "in relation to or connected with any act or behavior of sexual harassment" appearing in Section 3 of the said Act. The composite allegation has to be read in conjunction with the acts or behavior of a sexual harassment and expanded its horizon to a further act in relation to or connected with it, in the event the circumstances enumerated in Section 3 is prima facie found to exist.
As indicated above, the action taken by the executive council in the administrative field does not appear to be correlated with the act of sexual harassment and therefore, the LCC arrived at the conclusion that incidents narrated in several paragraphs relating to the administrative steps having taken against the respondent is not in relation to a sexual harassment defined under Section 2 (n) of the said Act.
It now led to a core issue relating to limitation provided under Section 9 of the POSH Act which was applied by the LCC in dismissing the complaint. Section 9 of the POSH Act provides a limitation period of 3 months from the date of the incident and in case of series of incidents, the complaint should also be filed within 3 months from the date of the last incident. The moment the limitation is provided in the Act the authorities conferred with the power cannot determine the cause, in the event, the complaint is filed beyond the said limitation period. The purpose of putting a limitation period for any action before the authority, be it quasi judicial or otherwise, it has to be applied with rigour provided the legislators confers power to extend the same without keeping any outer cap. The proviso to Section 9 though confers power upon the LCC to extend the time limit but not exceeding 3 months provided the LCC is satisfied that the circumstances which prevented the complainant to lodge the complaint for the normal period of limitation was beyond her control. While extending the time it is obligatory on the part of the LCC to record reasons in writing. It is no longer res integra that putting a time limit within which the action is to be initiated does not destroy the right but disentitles the person to get relief from the authority. The object for putting a time limit is to ensure a timely approach and to eradicate any stale claim nor to resurrect the claim. At times, the time limit put forth in the statutory provisions may act harshly upon the seeker of the justice but the moment it is so incorporated, it partakes the character of the law and to be accepted. In this regard, the legal maxim dura lex sed lex can be gainfully applied meaning thereby the law is hard but it is the law. The Apex Court in Popat Bahiru Govardhane & Ors. (supra) recognized the said legal maxim in the following:
The plea taken by the respondent would have been accepted provided the circumstances contemplated under Section 3 of the POSH Act is related to or connected with the sexual harassment defined under Section 2 (n) of the said Act. As we do not find those circumstances relatable to the sexual harassment but unconnected with it for the reason that such decision were taken by an executive council collectively and not by the appellant alone; even if the appellant being one of the constituent of the executive council but the decisions are taken by the majority and looking upon the constitution of the executive council consisting of notable academicians and the jurists including the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court, it is improbable that the appellant would exert his position and would manipulate the decision taken by the executive council. Since the last incident of the sexual harassment is alleged in the complaint to have taken place in the Month of April, 2023 and admittedly the complaint was filed on 26th December, 2023 much beyond the normal period of limitation or for argument sake if the period is extended. Therefore there is no infirmity in the decision of the LCC in dismissing the said complaint. The Single Bench has committed error in setting aside the order of the LCC without adverting to the proposition of law as discussed above.