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Showing contexts for: effect of mutation in S Tirupathi Rao vs M Lingamaiah on 22 July, 2024Matching Fragments
IX. On 05th March, 2009, a Single Judge of the High Court vide a common order disposed of both the writ petitions at the admission stage itself, with the following order:
“A partial final decree was passed by this Court on 26.12.2003 in Application No.1409 of 2003 in C.S. No. 7 of 1958, directing several steps. One of the steps is that the names of the decree holders be mutated in respect of the property mentioned in the decree. It appears that the persons, who have purchased part of the property from the parties to the decree, have also approached the respondents for mutation of their names. Having regard to the fact that there was a specific direction in the decree, Acviving (sic, requiring) authorities first to implement the decree by effecting mutation in the only (sic) after the initial step is complied with.
XII. In view of the Tahsildar’s inaction in effecting mutation, as ordered, the first respondent instituted Contempt Case 217/20148 before the High Court on 10th February, 2014.
XIII. The Single Judge, vide order dated 04th October, 2017, allowed the contempt petition. The State’s contention that the petition was barred by limitation was rejected on the ground that the Tahsildar’s failure to obey the order of the Court, till mutation was effected, would constitute a continuing wrong. Consequently, the Tahsildar was directed to mutate the name of the first respondent in terms of the final decree, and was also sentenced to simple imprisonment for a term of two months, together with a fine of Rs 1500/- (Rupees fifteen hundred only).
57. Having thus held, we move on to examine the objection as to maintainability of the contempt action initiated by the first respondent upon the inaction of the appellant in effecting mutation of the decretal property in his favour in the revenue records and also as to whether a case of “continuing wrong/breach/ offence” was at all shown by the first respondent in the contempt petition.
58. To recapitulate, the Single Judge had allowed the writ petition of the first respondent on 05th March, 2009 with a direction to the Tahsildar to effect the necessary mutation in the revenue records in accordance with the final decree dated 26th December, 2003. Pertinently, the direction issued to the appellant vide the order of disposal of the writ petition did not specifically mention a time-frame within which the order was to be implemented.
What makes a wrong, a wrong of a continuing nature is the breach of a duty which has not ceased but which continues to subsist. The breach of such a duty creates a continuing wrong and hence a defence to a plea of limitation.” (emphasis ours)
78. The order on the writ petition directed the appellant to effect mutation in the revenue records in favour of the first respondent, in accordance with the final decree. The direction for mutation having been issued on 05th March, 2009, the appellant had a period of 2 (two) months therefrom to effect such mutation, as stipulated by the Writ Rules, which we shall assume the appellant failed or neglected to comply without just reason. From 04th May, 2009, i.e., the starting point for the limitation period for initiation of contempt action to commence, till 10th February, 2014, i.e., the date of the filing of the contempt petition, the appellant failed to effect mutation, as ordered by the Single Judge. Could it be said that every day thereafter that the appellant did not effect mutation gave rise to a fresh cause of action so as to constitute a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”? To our minds, the answer is a clear and unequivocal ‘NO’. Upon application of the test laid down by this Court in Balkrishna Savalram Pujari (supra) and M. Siddiq (supra), it is evident that when, by 04th May, 2009, the appellant failed to implement the direction of the High Court, the act of disobedience was complete as on that date itself. Every day thenceforth, the name of the first respondent continued to be absent from the revenue records but such absence could not be characterised as the injury or wrongful act itself; it was merely the damage which flowed from the standalone act of breach committed by the appellant – that of not effecting the mutation. The injury was not repetitive or in other words, did not arise de die in diem, but rather, it was the effect of the injury which continued till the date the first respondent presented the contempt petition on 10th February, 2014.