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11. We are of the considered opinion that there is a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent-company to circumvent the orders made by the statutory authorities i.e., BIFR and AAIFR and RCC 26 of 1998 pending before the Company Court in filing the writ petition. As noticed above, the relief sought in the writ petition and the relief sought before the statutory authorities constituted under the Act are substantially similar. It is trite to state that except the Act, there is no other law, which provides for revival or rehabilitation of industries which have become sick. In other words, but for the mechanism provided under the Act, the revival and rehabilitation of sick industries would not arise and that no Court and direct the banks and the financial institutions to revive or rehabilitate such sick industries by providing financial assistance. Sickness in industries is a universal phenomenon. Sickness in industries is of very vast magnitude both in terms of the quantum of the funds blocked and the number of units. The Government realizing the sickness in industries as the primary cause in arresting the financial growth and development of the country and recognizing its ill-effects, felt it necessary to rehabilitate the sick or potentially sick units by enacting a law. By enacting such law, the Government wanted to achieve three main objectives, viz., (i) to revive and rehabilitate the sick or potentially sick industries; (ii) to realize the dues of the banks and the financial institutions; and (iii) to sustain employment opportunities. This thought on the part of the Government resulted in the enactment of the Act in the year 1985. As stated by the Supreme Court in Navanit R. Kamini v. R.R. Kamini, 1989 (66) Company Cases 132, the Act has been enacted with the end in view to (i) afford maximum protection of employment; (ii) optimize the use of the funds, etc,; (iii) salvage the production assets; (iv) realize the amounts due to the banks; and (v) to replace the existing time consuming and inadequate machinery by efficient machinery for expeditious determination by a body of experts like BIFR and AAIFR. In other words, the Act has been enacted to safeguard the economy of the Nation and to protect visible sick industries. Thus, the Act exclusively provides for mechanisms and forums aimed at reviving and rehabilitating the sick industries. The preamble of the Act reads:

13. In the light of the above historical background that led to the enactment of the Act and the salient features of the Act, it is appropriate to first decide whether the respondent-company is entitled in law to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking substantially the similar relief which it sought before the statutory authorities i.e., the BIFR and the AAIFR without questioning the validity and legality of the orders passed by the said statutory authorities and that too when the RCC 26 of 1998 referred to by the BIFR for winding up of the Company is pending before the Company Court.

14. Before proceeding to deal with the specific question, it needs to be emphasized that the respondent-company became sick as far back as in 1987 and it was referred to BIFR in the year 1989. Even assuming that the banks and the financial institutions, as alleged by the respondent-company, did not perform their obligations under the agreements in the matter of disbursement of the sanctioned loans in time during the years anterior to 1987 or at the most upto 1989, that question cannot be gone into by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, if not for any reason, atleast for the reason that such a claim of the company relating to the period prior to 1987 is hopelessly barred by laches. In addition, it also needs to be comphasized that even assuming that the financial institutions and the banks committed omissions and commissions in the matter of disbursement of different loans i.e., first loans, bridge loans, second loans in breach of the terms of the agreement, the respondent-company is not entitled to make any grievance in that regard in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution and the only appropriate remedy for it is to workout its legal remedies by approaching jurisdictional civil Court. The brach alleged by the respondent-company against the financial institutions is with regard to a purely civil contract not supported by any statute. This point need not be dilated further because, quite understandably, Sri K. Pratap Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-company would not rest his argument in support of the company only on the basis of the alleged omissions and commissions of the banks and financial institutions stated to have been committed by them before the matter was referred to BIFR in the year 1989. The emphasis of the arguments of the learned senior Counsel is that the banks and financial institutions though came forward to extend the necessary financial support to revive and rehabilitate the respondent-company in the course of the proceedings before the BIFR, they did not stand by their promise and they backed out defeating the sincere efforts made by the promoters of the company to revive and rehabilitate it. When it was pointed out to the learned senior Counsel that if that is the fact, it should have been urged before the BIFR and the AAIFR and the company should have taken steps to enforce the promises made by the banks and financial institutions before the BIFR, the learned senior Counsel would maintain that under the Act, the BIFR is not armed with the power to enforce the promises made by the banks and the financial institutions and those premises can be enforced by this Court only under Article 226 of the Constitution or by approaching the competent civil Court, and that is why the respondent-company had to file the writ petition seeking the relief to rehabilitate the petitioner's sick unit despite the fact that the relief of rehabilitation sought before the statutory authorities was negatived by those authorities and the matter has been referred to the Company Court for winding up of the company. The above submission of the learned senior Counsel is not well founded and does not merit our acceptance. A careful reading of the provisions of Sub-sections (3), (3A), (3B) of Section 19 of the Act make it very clear that the scheme framed by the BIFR becomes binding on all concerned under Sub-section (3); a duty is cast on the financial institutions and the banks designated under Sub-section (3A) to release the financial assistance to the sick industrial company in fulfilment of the requirements in that regard. Even assuming that there was a breach on the part of the financial institutions and the banks in releasing the financial assistance, as mandated under Sub-section (3B) of Section 19 of the Act, even then, that could not be a justifiable circumstance for the respondent-company to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to indirectly circumvent the orders of the statutory authorities. If the allegation of the respondent-company that there is a breach of promise or commitment on the part of the financial institutions and banks and they did not release the financial assistance as provided under Sub-section (3B) of the Act, is true, certainly, that point can be urged before the Company Court in the pending winding up proceeding and it is not that the Company Court is bound by the recommendation of the BIFR or AAIFR, and if the Company Court finds that BIFR has recommended winding up of the company without properly exploring the possibilities of reviving and rehabilitation of the company, it may refuse to wind up the company. Therefore, it is always open for the respondent-company to advance its grievances against the proceedings taken before the BIFR and AAIFR before the Company Judge in the pending RCC 26 of 1998.

16. In the writ petition, what actually the respondent-company has sought is the enforcement of the alleged obligations arising out of the contract entered into between the respondent-company and the financial institutions and the banks. It is well settled by the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kulchinder v. Hardayal, , Bihar Co-operative Societies v. Sipahi, , United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, , Achutan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1957 SC 490, Divisional Forest Officer v. Biswanth Tea Company, , Umakant v. State of Bihar, , Lekhraj v. Shah, , that mandamus will not issue to enforce a private contract and the remedy, if any, is in private law e.g., a suit for damages or specific performance. From the same decisions of the Supreme Court, it is also well settled that the State, instrumentalities of the State, and statutory authorities can enter into a contract with a person just as any other person can, and die contract, as such, does not change its legal character merely because the other party to the contract is the State. Thus, mandamus will not issue to compel a public servant to carry out his obligation arising out of a contract of re-appointment of a manager of evacuee property as held by the Supreme Court in Lekhraj v. Shah (supra) or to enforce a right claimed in terms of a contract by a non-statutory body as held in Banchhanidhi v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 843, and Vidya Ram v. Jai Narain College, , or to get rid of contractual obligations arising out of a public auction where the petitioner bade voluntarily, accepting its terms and conditions as held in Har Shankar v. Deputy Excise Commissioner, . In order to enforce contractual obligation by way of writ petition under Article 226, it should be shown that the breach of contract involves the breach of a statutory obligation or where the order complained of was made by a statutory authority in exercise of his statutory power, or in performance of a public duty. In Bareilly D.A. v. Ajai, , the Supreme Court held that after a contract has been validly entered into, the rights of the parties shall be determined only by the terms of the contract, even though one of the parties is a statutory authority and that in the absence of any statutory obligation, it would be a case of breach of contract, pure and simple, for which the remedy is a suit for damages and not a petition under Article 226. In the instant case, the agreements entered into between the respondent company and the financial institutions and the banks to advance loans to the project of the respondent company are ordinary civil contracts and not statutory contracts. Further, these contracts do not involve public law elements. Therefore, no writ will lie to enforce contractual obligations arising out of the alleged commissions and omissions of the financial institutions and the banks in the matter of disbursement of Term Loans. Recall of loan agreements or the alleged default on the part of the financial institutions and the banks to disburse the committed loan amounts in terms of the schedule of disbursement of loans, at the most, if proved, can be treated as breach of ordinary civil contract and the remedy in such situation could be sought only before the competent civil Court and no writ will He to enforce or to get rid of contractual obligations. In FCI v. Jagannath, , the Supreme Court held that the termination of a non-statutory private contract, in respect of which there is no question of obligation to act fairly or deserving natural justice cannot be questioned in a writ petition under Article 226. The Apex Court quite often held and reiterated that writ petition is not the appropriate remedy for impeaching contractual obligations and the writ does not lie to enforce contractual rights if it is no statutory contract. The judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Balvir Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1717, Har Sankar v. Deputy Excise and Customs Commissioner, , Shyamlal v. State of Punjab, , Chet Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1496, Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh, , are the authorities in that regard, to cite a few.