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Showing contexts for: tevar in Nagalingam Pillai vs Ramachandra Tevar on 4 March, 1901Matching Fragments
1. Those are appeals against decrees made in several suits brought by the plaintiff to recover property alienated by or taken from his late father Kotasamy Tevar. One ground of the plaintiff's claim to recover property so alienated is that the property which is of various kinds was ancestral property in the hands of the plaintiff's father in which accordingly he acquired an interest on birth. The alienations complained of were made after the date of the plaintiff's birth. If the property, which was originally acquired by Kotasamy's father Ponnu-sami Tevar, devolved upon Kotasamy by inheritance, it was unquestionably ancestral property in the hands of the latter. In point of fact, Kotasamy being one of throe sons of Ponnusamy took his share of Ponnusamy's property under his father's wili, but it is argued that, notwithstanding this, the property was still ancestral property in Kotasarny's hands. Now, there can be no doubt that it was fully competent to Ponnusamy to deal as he pleased with his self-acquired property of whatever kind either by gift or by testamentary disposition Bulwant Singh v. Rani Kishori I.L.R. 20 A, 267, Pittapur case. He might therefore have bequeathed his property to a stranger, and his sons could not have called the disposition in question. Any of the observations made in Tarachand v. Reeb Ram 3 M.H.C.E. 50, which conflict with these propositions cannot, I think, be now regarded as good law. As the father is at liberty to make any disposition he pleases or to leave his self-acquired property to descend as ancestral property ; so in making any disposition in favour of his son he is at liberty to preserve for the property the quality of ancestral property. Whether in any given case the property was intended to pass to the son as ancestral property or as self-acquired property must be a question of intention turning on the construction of the instrument of gift. Following the principle laid down in Mollie Mahomed Shamsool v. Sheiwukram L.R. 2. I.A. Appeal 7, I think that if there are no words indicating the contrary intention, the natural inference should be that the father intended his sons to take his property as their ancestral estate.