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Showing contexts for: section 23 of DV in Ritesh Grover vs Dipika Malhotra on 9 October, 2024Matching Fragments
I) That by way of impugned order, Ld. Trial Court was pleased to dispose off the interim application filed by the complainant wife under Section 23(2) of DV Act for grant of interim maintenance.
However, it is a matter of record that no such separate application was filed by the complainant and the relief qua maintenance is only sought by her in terms of prayer clause (d) of the petition under Section 12 of DV Act seeking interim maintenance Rs. 3,00,000/- from respondent husband. Ld. Trial Court observed in the impugned order dated 06.09.2022 that complainant was seeking interim maintenance @ Rs. 65,000/- per month which was never claimed by the complainant in her original petition CA No. 1552023 Deepika Malhotra Vs Ritesh Grover CA No. 2902022 Ritesh Grover Vs Deepika Malhotra under Section 12 DV Act nor any application under Section 23 (2) DV Act was filed by her. This amount of Rs. 65,000/- per month finds mentions only in the first income affidavit filed by the complainant wife as per Kusum Sharma's judgment on 02.09.2019. However, subsequently, the complainant had filed second income affidavit as per Rajnesh's Judgment raising a claim of interim maintenance @ Rs. 95,000/- Per month. Thus, Ld. Trial Court had proceeded on a completely non-existent assumption while passing the impugned order that there was an application under Section 23(2) of DV Act filed by the complainant and that in the said application, she had made a prayer of interim maintenance @ Rs. 65,000/- per month.
14. The first objection of respondent husband to the impugned CA No. 1552023 Deepika Malhotra Vs Ritesh Grover CA No. 2902022 Ritesh Grover Vs Deepika Malhotra order is that the impugned order mentions disposal of interim application filed by the petitioner/applicant/complainant wife under Section 23(2) of DV Act for grant of interim maintenance for herself, however, no such application has been filed by the complainant before Ld. Trial Court. It is submitted that since no such application was in existence, it could not have been decided by Ld. Trial Court. Accordingly, the impugned order is perverse and infirm as it mentions disposal of a non-existent application. Per contra, it is submitted by Ld. Counsel for the complainant that merely because an application for interim maintenance under Section 23(2) DV Act is not filed, there is no legal bar to grant interim maintenance in favour of the complainant. Merely because there is typographical error in the impugned order dated 06.09.2022 to the effect that it mentions disposal of application under Section 23(2) of DV Act in place of just mentioning grant of interim maintenance in favour of the complainant, it is not sufficient to set aside the complete impugned order which has been passed on the basis of arguments of both the parties.
15. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by both the parties on this aspect. Section 12 DV Act provides for filing of an application by Magistrate by an aggrieved person. An aggrieved person filing a petition under Section 12 DV Act can seek protection order under Section 18, Residence order under Section 19; Monetary reliefs under Section 20; Custody order under Section 21 and Compensation Order under Section 22 of DV Act. In the present case, the complainant has sought Residence order under Section 19, Monetory relief under Section 20, Compensation order under Section 22 as well as interim relief under Section 23 of DV Act CA No. 1552023 Deepika Malhotra Vs Ritesh Grover CA No. 2902022 Ritesh Grover Vs Deepika Malhotra in her petition under Section 12 DV Act. Section 23 DV Act deals with the power to grant interim and ex-parte orders. Section 23(1) DV Act provides that in any proceedings before him under the Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim orders as he deems just and proper. Section 23(2) DV Act on the other hand provides for the relief of ex-parte order which can be granted if the Magistrate is satisfied on an application filed by the complainant duly supported by an affidavit in the prescribed form III attached with the Act. Rule 7 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 specifically provides that every affidavit for obtaining ex-parte order under Section 23(2) DV Act shall be filed in form III. However, there is neither any provision nor any rule which provides filing of a separate application for obtaining interim relief as provided under Section 23(1) DV Act. Accordingly, though no ex-parte ad interim orders can be passed without proper application along with affidavit under Section 23(2) r/w Form III of DV Act, however, there is no specific provisions in the entire scheme of DV Act which provides that any interim relief cannot be passed in favour of the complainant except on a separate application supported by an affidavit.
17. It is also correct that the impugned order dated 06.09.2022 mentions that it shall dispose of the interim application filed by the complainant under Section 23(2) DV Act for grant of interim maintenance for herself. However, it is also correct that the impugned order has been passed after considering the pleadings of both the parties, documents filed by them and hearing arguments from both the sides. Thus, technically it is an order under Section 23(1) DV Act which did not require any separate application. Since, the impugned order date 06.09.2022 is a detailed order considering the pleadings, documents and arguments of both the sides, I do not deem it appropriate to set it aside merely on a technical ground that it mentions disposal of application under Section 23(2) DV Act which is not the case. This is more so, as even if the first paragraph of the impugned order dated 06.09.2022 is removed from the order and replaced by "consideration of grant of interim maintenance as prayed by the complainant" it will make no difference to the reasoning given by Ld. Trial Court. Accordingly, I find no merit in the argument of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that the impugned order is perverse or infirm on account of mentioning that it shall dispose off an interim application filed by the complainant under Section 23(2) DV Act. No ground is made out for setting aside the impugned order dated 06.09.2022 on this sole technical ground.