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4. The petitioner then preferred Special Civil Application No. 5981 of 1999 on 11th August, 1999 challenging the validity of the aforesaid 1998 order i.e. Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel (Regulation of Supply and Distribution and Prevention of Malpractices) Order, 1998. In that petition, the notice was issued on 12th August, 1999 and thereafter, Rule was issued on 30th September, 1999 after hearing the respondents and by the very same order while issuing Rule, the interim relief was also granted in the terms saying that until further orders, there shall be ad-interim relief to the effect that coercive measures in connection with Patrex for the alleged violation of the provisions of Essential Commodities Act and of the Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel (Regulation of Supply and Distribution and Prevention of Malpractices) Order, 1998 shall be confined to the goods in question and that no coercive measures shall be taken against the petitioner or his dealers. While passing this order on 30th September, 1999, the Court noticed the submission that, the product 'Patrex' which is manufactured by the petitioner is not covered by the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as it is not a petroleum product. The Court also noticed the reliance placed on the appellate order passed by the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies Department of the Govt. of Gujarat dated 31st August, 1998 holding that the Patrex is not a petroleum product and not an essential commodity, and is therefore, not covered under the Gujarat Essential Commodities (Licence, Distribution and Stock) Order, 1991 and that no licence is required to be obtained to manufacture and sell 'Patrex'. The interim orders passed by the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 751 of 1999 and by the High Court of Karnataka in Writ Petition No. 24445 of 1999 were also referred whereby the respondents to that Special Civil Application No. 5981 of 1999 including the Union of India had been directed not to interfere with the business of the petitioner and the dealers dealing in 'Patrex' in respect of the States. The Court also noticed the contentions which had been raised on behalf of the Union of India, and the State of Gujarat that the major ingredient of Patrex was Naphtha and it was a petroleum product, and therefore, it was an essential commodity covered by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The submission was also noticed that the Central Government had issued Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel (Regulation of Supply and Distribution and Prevention of Malpractices) Order, 1998 and Clause 3(5) thereof was also taken note of. The submission was made on behalf of the respondents on the strength of the Order of 1998 that the Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel could be sold only through dealers who are appointed by the Oil Companies and the said order forbids unauthorised exchange which means transfer or receipt of the product from dealer or consumer or to another dealer or consumer to any other persons in contravention of the directions issued by the State Government or Oil Companies which is punishable under the Order. On behalf of the respondents it was also submitted in the above proceedings that the test conducted by the P.C.R.A. and B.P.C.L., had found that the product had failed to meet IS : 2796 specification in one respect or the other and the contention that the intention of the Central Government is not only to prevent the petitioner from indulging in unfair business practices and save the interest of the common man, but, petroleum products are covered under the Administered Pricing Mechanism and are over -priced to provide subsidy for kerosene supplied in the economically weaker sections of the society under Public Distribution System as well as domestic L.P.G., sold by the Public Sector Oil Companies. In case the petitioner's product is permitted to be sold, apart from violation of law, supply of kerosene to economically weaker sections of the society and the supply of L.P.G., a clear fuel at subsidised rates to the general public will also be adversely affected. So far as this Special Civil Application No. 5981 of 1999 is concerned, the same has been heard and the judgment thereon is to be completed to-day. In the aforesaid Special Civil Application No. 5981 of 1999, a Civil Application No. 2703 of 2000 had been moved seeking an amendment and yet another Civil Application No. 1926 of 2000 had also been moved to get the date fixed for hearing and yet another Misc. Civil Application No. 1175 of 2000 had also been moved seeking to challenge certain seizure orders which had been passed during the pendency of the petition and confiscation orders dated 27th June, 2000 with allied prayers. It was also given out by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 30lh September 1999 as had been passed by the Court in Special Civil Application No. 5981 of 1999 whereby Rule was issued and the interim relief was granted was made a subject-matter of challenge before the Division Bench by way of Letters Patent Appeal No. 1525 of 1999 by the petitioner and Letters Patent Appeal No. 54 of 2000 by the Union of India, but both these Letters Patent Appeals were dismissed on 25th February, 2000 and no interference was made by the Division Bench with the order dated 30th September, 1999. However, the petitioner was granted liberty to move for early hearing of the main petition.

It was then noticed in para 6 of the very judgment i.e. Mohd. Faruk v. State of M.P. (supra) that the notification dated 12th January, 1967 issued by the Governor of the Madhya Pradesh which was impugned was another attempt, though on a restricted scale to circumvent the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi's case (supra) and that the effect of this notification was to prohibit the slaughter of bulls and bullocks within the Municipality of Jabalpur and this cancellation of confirmation of bye-laws imposed a direct restriction upon the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It was then observed in para 10 that the said impugned notification though technically within the competence of the State Government, directly infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g) and may be upheld only if it is established that it seeks to impose reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public and a less drastic restriction will not ensure the interest of the general public. In para 11 of the judgment, the Court has noticed that the sentiments of a section of the people may be hurt by permitting slaughter of bulls and bullocks in premises maintained by a local authority, but a prohibition imposed on the exercise of a fundamental right to carry on an occupation, trade or business will not be regarded as reasonable, if it is imposed not in the interest of the general public, but merely to respect the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of the people whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant. Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the touchstone for deciding the question of reasonable restriction is the interest of the general public and not the sentiments of a section of people according to their way of life, belief or thought. In the instant case, there is no question with regard to susceptibilities and sentiments of any section of the society. The only question is as to whether the Central Government had the competence to provide the aforesaid Clauses (iv) and (v) in the order of 1998 under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act or not and as to whether business of selling such a product could be reasonably restricted only to the Oil Companies or their dealers or agents and as to whether it should be left open for any person to sell or agree to sell any petroleum product in any form under any name, brand or nomenclature so as to be used as fuel in Spark Ignition Engines or Compression Ignition Engines. Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 does clothe the Central Government with the powers to control production, supply, distribution etc. of the essential commodities. Section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act, is reproduced as under :

Section 3(i) provides that the sale and use of Naphtha cannot be undertaken without a licence issued by the State Government or District Magistrate or any other Officer authorised by the Central Government or the State Governments. Clause (ii) provides against the use of Naphtha as against the Motor Spirit, High Speed Diesel and/or any other fuel permitted by the Central Government in any automobile and Clause (iii) provides that no person shall either adulterate or help in any manner adulterate any Motor Spirit or High Speed Diesel with Naphtha, i.e., a provision to check the adulteration of Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel with Naphtha; Clauses (iv) and (v) provide for the procedure to be followed by those who are engaged in the sale and trading or actual use of Naphtha. It, therefore, cannot be said that there is a total ban either with regard to the Solvent or with regard to Naphtha and the only requirement is that the licence has to be obtained and the same cannot be said to be unreasonable or without competence. The Central Government had the power to issue these orders under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. The challenge thrown on behalf of the petitioner is that the Government cannot dictate the users not to go in for a particular item or product. This Court does not find that there is any such dictate. It is a reasonable restriction which has been sought to be imposed and the requirement is that the licence has to be obtained. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also argued that the Essential Commodities Act had been enacted to ensure that there is no adulteration, and therefore, such orders could not have been issued as there is no adulteration in the case of the petitioner's product. In the opinion of this Court, this argument is wholly misconceived. What is sought to be provided for is the regulation of the product and for that purpose, such orders can certainly be issued by the Government so as to take care of the possible mischief with regard to the essential commodities and once a commodity is covered under the Essential Commodities Act, for the purpose of regulating, maintenance and supply of such product, such orders can certainly be made. May be that the Essential Commodities Act was enacted to deal more effectively with persons indulging in anti-social activities like hoarding and black-marketing and the evil of vicious inflationary prices, but no exception can be taken if a provision has been made by issuing an order under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act against the possible mischiefs with the use of any item, sale and use of which is regulated on the basis of a licence. Thus, the grounds of challenge against the notifications Exh. M and Exh. N also fail.

10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the Order of 1998 as well as Exh. M and Exh. N are inconsistent and beyond the scope of Sec, 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and the Central Government under Section 3 has no power to issue such orders and the same arc inconsistent. That nothing could be provided for in the Order of 1998 with regard to the malpractices or adulteration because Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act only provides for penalties and by issuing such orders, Section 3 could not be sought to be amended in an indirect manner. It is not possible to even comprehend the misplaced import of this argument inasmuch as Section 3 provides for penalties for contravention of any order made under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and the contravention of any order made under Section 3 has been made punishable under Section 7. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that by issuing these orders, Section 3 is sought to be amended in an indirect manner, While the argument is incomprehensible, learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited the case of V. Sudeer v. Bar Council of India & Anr., reported in AIR 1999 SC 1167 : 1999 (3) GLR 2135 (SC). That was a case with regard to the Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995 under the Advocates Act, 1961. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the validity of the Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995 as amended by resolution of Bar Council of India in its meeting on 18th July, 1998 relating to training to entrants of legal profession and found that it was ultra vires of the Rule making power under Advocates Act. The Training Rules provided certain pre-conditions to be complied with by an applicant to be enrolled on the roll of the State Bar Council. The Rules were promulgated in exercise of the Bar Council of India's Rule making powers under Section 24(3)(d) of the Act. It was provided, through Rule 2 that no person shall be entitled to be enrolled as an Advocate unless he is eligible to be enrolled as such under Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and had undergone training as prescribed under these Rules. Rule 2 further amended upto 19th July, 1998 provided that while undergoing the training, the trainees shall be enrolled provisionally as "Trainee Advocates" after approval of name of their guides by the Slate Bar Council and the State Bar Council shall issue identity card to said provisionally enrolled "Trainee Advocates" for their identification. For this purpose, a detailed procedure had been laid down as to how a trainee Advocate has to function during the period of training. These Rules had been framed by the Bar Council of India in exercise of its statutory power under Section 24(3)(d) of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 24 starting with a non-obstante clause provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a person mentioned in categories (a), (aa), (c) and (d) may be admitted as an Advocate on a State roll if he applies as laid down in Clause (1) and fulfils the conditions specified in Clauses (a), (b), (e) and (f) of sub-section (1). The Court found that the Bar Council of India as a Rule making authority, could not by exercise of such rule making power, add to the conditions of enrolment as expressly laid down by Section 24(1) for the simple reason that Section 24 itself contemplates the qualifications of a person who seeks admission as an Advocate on the State roll; granting of admission for being enrolled as an Advocate under the Act is a statutory function of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India has no role to play on this aspect. All it has to do is to approve any Rules framed by the State Bar Council under Section 24(1) laying down further qualifications for a person to be enrolled by it on the State roll as an Advocate. The Rule making power mentioned under Section 24(1) was read conjointly with the Rule making power of the State Bar Council as provided under Section 28(1) especially Clause 2(d). It was found that once the statutory conditions laid down by Section 24 sub-section (1) were satisfied, there was no question of imposing further condition of disability of otherwise eligible candidates to be enrolled and it is this beneficial and enabling power for bringing in the sweep of Section 24(1); those who would have otherwise been out of it could not be extended to put any additional requirement. I do not find that this case is of any avail to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of this case as I find that neither the Order of 1998 nor the notifications dated 5th June, 2000 at Exh. M and Exh. N are in any way beyond the scope of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act as it is clear that the Central Government has been clothed with the power to frame and pass such orders under Section 3 for the purpose of control, production, supply and distribution of the essential commodities and it has already been held in the earlier part of this order that for maintaining or regulating supply of essential commodities or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, such orders could be issued and through sub-section (2) of Section 3, even other items may be provided for without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), through an order made thereunder. In the case of Ganpat Shantaram More v. Lingappa Balappa Gatade & Anr., reported in AIR 1962 Bom. 104, which was a case under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Supreme Court observed that the Rules made under any Act can never be intended to override the specific provisions of the Act itself and that the purpose of the Rules is to provide for procedural matters or matters which are subsidiary to the provisions of the Act, but no Rules can ever be construed to override the specific provisions of the Act itself. Since it has been found that the orders as have been issued do not override the provisions of Section 3 nor they are inconsistent and beyond the scope of Section 3, this decision is of no avail to the petitioner.