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adduced to show that the plaintiff in the earlier suit O.S. 186 of 1891 died in the morning of 8.9.1891 and the suit was taken up, heard and disposed of after her death. It was alleged in the subsequent suit that the decree is therefore a nullity and not a bar to the subsequent suit. Considering the issue, it was held at page 169 as follows:

"In America, " the great preponderance of authority is to the effect that, where the Court has acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter and the persons during the lifetime of a party, a judgment rendered against him after his death is, although erroneous and liable to be set aside, not void nor open to collateral attack." "Black on Judgments", section 200, page 294. At the case of a judgment for a deceased plaintiff, it is said, "cannot be distinguished in principle from that of a defendant dying while the action is pending, where, as already shown (section 200) the great preponderance of authority sustains the rule that the judgment is at least impervious to collateral attack and must be vacated or reversed by proper proceedings." Section 204, page 300. "

30. In Corpus Juris Secondum, Vol.50 at page 66, it is observed as follows:

"514. - Death of party before judgments A judgment rendered for or against a party after his death generally is not subject to a collateral attack, except where the action was commenced after the party had died.

Ordinarily, where jurisdiction of the parties to an action has duly attached, the fact that one of them died before the rendition of the judgment for or against him does not make the judgment absolutely void, as discussed supra $ 30, and, therefore, it is not open to impeachment in a collateral proceeding. According to some decisions, however, a judgment rendered under such circumstances is absolutely void, as discussed supra $30,m and therefore is subject to collateral attack.

Even where the party was dead before the institution of the suit, it has been held that this does not make the judgment a mere nullity, within the meaning of the rule against collateral impeachment, but it generally has been held that a judgment rendered in an action begun after the death of defendant therein is null and void and may be attacked collaterally."

O.P.(C).783/2013.

31. The issue as to whether a judgment in favour of a dead person is dealt with in American Jurisprudence 2d at page 376 - Note 91 as follows:

32. In the decision in Mabel R. Noyes v. Bankers Indemnity Insurance Company (307 Mass. 567) , it was held as follows:

O.P.(C).783/2013.

"A domestic judgment rendered by a court of common law jurisdiction is valid between the parties as long as it stands, and cannot be attacked collaterally. The reason for the rule has been said to be the existence of a remedy by writ or error in cases in which judgments have been erroneously entered, although there are instances where relief has been afforded in equity against the enforcement of a judgment obtained by fraud. Where the court has acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, it may render a judgment for or against one of the parties after his death and, although such a judgment is erroneous and liable to be set aside, it is not void or open to collateral attack. To avoid the entry of a judgment liable to be reversed upon a writ of error, it has become the practice at common law and under the statute where, after a verdict or a finding has been made decisive of he rights of the parties, one of them dies pending a decision on some question of law, to enter the judgment nunc pro tunc as of a date before the death of the party."