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6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the courts below had clearly exceeded their jurisdiction, they had construed the documents erroneously. While the prayer in the suit was only for permanent injunction, the order passed by the court below was in effect a mandatory injunction and this cannot be granted. For this purpose, reliance was placed upon , (Bihar University V. Rajendra Singh) where it was held that ....."if a mandatory injunction was granted at all on an interlocutory application, it was granted only to restore the status quo and not granted to establish a new stage of things, differing from the state which existed at the date when the suit was instituted...." Reliance was also placed on the pronouncement in 1998 (III) MLJ 708 (Multichannel (India) Ltd., Vs. Kavitalaya Productions Pvt. Ltd., and others), where a Division Bench of this Court held that when the rights under the contract which is sought to be enforced was itself in dispute presumption of prima facie case was not proper. The learned Counsel also referred to JT (2003) 6 S.C., Page 465, (Surya Dev Rai V. Ram Chander Rai) where it was observed that frequently matters may arise before the Supreme Court where the question would arise whether the jurisdiction under Art. 226 and 227 have to be exercised even when the lis is between two private parties and it was held that where the error is manifest, apparent and when grave injustice or gross failure of justice would have occasioned, this court could exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Therefore it was submitted the application for conversion is maintainable. The learned senior counsel for the respondent relied on , (Vishesh Kumar Vs. Shanti Prasad) where it was held that "to recognise a revisional power in the High Court, over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would defeat the object of the Legislative Scheme" and therefore a revision petition under section 115 is separate and distinct from a petition under Art. 227 and one cannot be identified with the other. Reliance was also placed on 2003 (II) CTC (S.C) 122, (Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., and another) where it was held that the High Court ought not to have entertained petition under Art. 227, when the alternative remedy of appeal was available under the Statute. In (Hemi Vishnu Vs. Premier High School) the Supreme Court held that Art. 227 must be sparingly exercised and may be exercised to correct the error of jurisdiction an the like but not to upset the finding of fact which falls in the domain of an Appellate Court only and that the High Court had exercised its jurisdiction vested in it under Art. 227. Therefore it was submitted that Conversion couldn't be ordered.

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43. The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the court. While exercising the discretion the court applies the following tests - (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. Relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial.

Xx xx xx xx xx .........Under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest. These considerations will arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an order of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings.