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ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against award of compensation of Rs.4 lakhs under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 (1989 Act).

2. The respondent filed claim for compensation for death of her husband Jatan Gope in an ‘untoward incident’ on 20 th August, 2002. Her case is that the deceased had purchased a ticket of second class for Karauta to Khusrupur by train No.532. He fell down from the train due to rush of passengers and died on the  spot. One Kailash Gope who witnessed the deceased purchasing the ticket and boarding the train filed an affidavit stating these facts. He was not cross-examined. Case of the respondent is that the ticket was not recovered from possession of the deceased as it may have been lost somewhere.

15.3. Learned amicus has referred to judgments of this Court in Raman Iron Foundry (supra) and Kesoram Industries (supra) to submit that quantum of compensation applicable is to be as on the award of the Tribunal as the amount due is only on that day and not earlier. In Kesoram Industries (supra), the question was when for purposes of calculating ‘net wealth’ under the Wealth Tax 32 Para 26 Act, 1957 provision for payment of tax could be treated as ‘debt owed’ within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the said Act. This Court held that ‘debt’ was obligation to pay. The sum payable on a contingency, however, does not become ‘debt’ until the said contingency happens. The liability to pay tax arises on such tax being quantified. But when the rate of tax is ascertainable, the amount can be treated as debt for the year for which the tax is due for purposes of valuation during the accounting year in question. There is no conflict in the ratio of this judgment with the principle propounded in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi (supra) that in the present context right to compensation arises on the date of the accident. In Raman Iron Foundry (supra), the question was whether a claim for unliquidated damages does not give rise to ‘a debt’ till the liability is determined. It was held that no debt arises from a claim for unliquidated damages until the liability is adjudicated. Even from this judgment it is not possible to hold that the liability for compensation, in the present context, arises only on determination thereof and not on the date of accident. Since it has been held that interest is required to be paid, the premise on which Rathi Menon (supra) is based has changed. We are of the view that law in the present context should be taken to be that the  liability will accrue on the date of the accident and the amount applicable as on that date will be the amount recoverable but the claimant will get interest from the date of accident till the payment at such rate as may be considered just and fair from time to time. In this context, rate of interest applicable in motor accident claim cases can be held to be reasonable and fair. Once concept of interest has been introduced, principles of Workmen Compensation Act can certainly be applied and judgment of 4-Judge Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) will fully apply. Wherever it is found that the revised amount of applicable compensation as on the date of award of the Tribunal is less than the prescribed amount of compensation as on the date of accident with interest, higher of the two amounts ought to be awarded on the principle of beneficial legislation. Present legislation is certainly a piece of beneficent legislation.33 15.4 Accordingly, we conclude that compensation will be payable as applicable on the date of the accident with interest as may be considered reasonable from time to time on the same pattern as in accident claim cases. If the amount so calculated is less than the amount prescribed as on the date of the award of the 33 Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (supra) Para 12 Tribunal, the claimant will be entitled to higher of the two amounts. This order will not affect the awards which have already become final and where limitation for challenging such awards has expired, this order will not by itself be a ground for condonation of delay. Seeming conflict in Rathi Menon (supra) and Kalandi Charan Sahoo (supra) stands explained accordingly. The 4-Judge Bench judgment in Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) holds the field on the subject and squarely applies to the present situation. Compensation as applicable on the date of the accident has to be given with reasonable interest and to give effect to the mandate of beneficial legislation, if compensation as provided on the date of award of the Tribunal is higher than unrevised amount with interest, the higher of the two amounts has to be given. Re: (ii) Application of Principle of Strict Liabillity – Concept of Self Inflicted Injury 16.1 From the judgments cited at the Bar we do not see any conflict on the applicability of the principle of strict liability. Sections 124 and Section 124A provide that compensation is payable whether or not there has been wrongful act, neglect or fault on the part of the railway administration in the case of an accident or in the case of an ‘untoward incident’. Only exceptions are those provided under proviso to Section 124A. In Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (supra) it was held that Section 124A lays down strict liability or no fault liability in case of railway accidents. Where principle of strict liability applies, proof of negligence is not required. This principle has been reiterated in Jameela (supra).

16.2 Coming to the proviso to Section 124A to the effect that no compensation is payable if passenger dies or suffers injury due to the situations mentioned therein, there is no difficulty as regards suicide or attempted suicide in which case no compensation may be payable. Conflict of opinions in High Courts has arisen on understanding the expression ‘self inflicted injury’ in the proviso. In some decisions it has been held that injury or death because of negligence of the victim was at par with self inflicted injury. We may refer to the decisions of High Courts of Kerala in Joseph PT (supra), Bombay in Pushpa (supra) and Delhi in Shayam Narayan (supra) on this point.

“Therefore, the two limbs of the Proviso should be construed to have two different objectives to be achieved. We can understand the meaning of the term "self-inflicted injury" not only from the sources provided by the dictionaries, but also from the context in which it is used in the statute. The term "self-inflicted injury" used in the statute can be deduced as one which a person suffers on account of one's own action, which is something more than a rash or negligent act But it shall not be an intentional act of attempted suicide. While there may be cases where there is intention to inflict oneself with injury amounting to self-inflicted injury, which falls short of an attempt to commit suicide, there can also be cases where, irrespective of intention, a person may act with total recklessness, in that, he may throw all norms of caution to the wind and regardless to his age, circumstances, etc. act to his detriment. Facts of this case show that the appellant attempted to board a moving train from the off side unmindful of his age and fully aware of the positional disadvantageous and dangers of boarding a train from a level lower than the footboard of the train. It is common knowledge that the footboard and handrails at the doors of the compartment are designed to suit the convenience of the passengers for boarding from and alighting to the platform. And at the same time, when a person is trying to board the train from the non- platform side, he will be standing on the heap of rubbles kept beneath the track and that too in a lower level. Further more, he will have to stretch himself to catch the handrails and struggle to climb up through the footboard hanging beneath the bogie. The probability of danger is increased in arithmetic progression when the train is moving. Visualising all these things in mind, it can only be held that the act of the appellant was the height of carelessness, imprudence and foolhardiness. It is indisputable that the purpose of Section 124A of the Act is to provide a speedy remedy to an injured passenger or to the dependants of a deceased passenger involved in an untoward incident. Section 124A of the Act provides for compensation to a passenger or his dependants who suffers injury or death, as the case may be, in an untoward incident even where the untoward incident is not the consequence of any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the Railway Administration. To this extent, it can be said to be a no-fault liability. Even though the provisions relating to payment of compensation in the Act can be said to be a piece of beneficial legislation, it cannot be stretched too much to reward a person who acts callously, unwisely or imprudently. There is no provision of law brought to our notice permitting the passengers to entrain from the non-platform side of the railway track. However, the counsel for the respondent did not show any provision of law prohibiting the same. The question whether an act by which a passenger sustains injury while boarding a train through the off side, is a self- inflicted injury or not depends on the facts of each case. Merely because a person suffered injury in the process of getting into the train through the off side, it may not be sufficient to term it as a self- inflicted injury, unless the facts and circumstances  show that his act was totally imprudent, irrational, callous and unmindful of the consequences. All the facts and circumstances established in this case would show that the act of the appellant was with full knowledge of the imminent possibility of dangering his life or limb and therefore, it squarely comes within the term "self-inflicted injury" defined in Section 124A Proviso (b) of the Act.” 16.4 In Pushpa (supra) a hawker died in the course of boarding a train. It was held that he was not entitled to compensation as it was a case of ‘self inflicted injury’. The relevant observations are :