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The main thrust of the argument of Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner revolves around mainly three aspects: (1) R.C. Singh was not a Gazetted Officer of Enforcement and therefore statements recorded by him had no evidentiary value and thus they could not form the basis upon which the satisfaction of the detaining authority could be reached. (2) There was total nonapplica- tion of mind by the detaining authority to several factual misstatements as detailed in entries 'A to F' in the grounds of detention which vitiated the impugned order of detention. And (3) The failure of the Sponsoring authority to forward the account books seized during the course of search at the residential premises of Subhash Gadia shows that the detain- ing authority proceeded to make the impugned order of deten- tion without due application of mind. According to the learned counsel, if there is one principle more firmly settled than any other in this field of jurisprudence relat- ing to preventive detention, it is that even if one of the grounds or reasons which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is non-existent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid since it is not possible to predicate as to whether the detaining authority would have made all order for detention even in the absence of non-existent or irrelevant ground. His con- tention is that the principle enunciated by this Court some 30 years ago in Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [1954] SCR 418 and in Dr. Ram Manonar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1966] 1 SCR 709 which it reiter- ated later m Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal, [1969] 2 SCR 635 still holds good despite the change in the law brought about by the introduction of s. 5A of the Act that though one or more of the grounds of detention were found to be vague, non-existent, not relevant, not connect- ed, irrational or invalid for any other reason whatsoever, the detention could be sustained on the remaining grounds. He seeks to draw sustenance from the decision of the Consti- tution Bench of this Court in Mohd. Shakeel Wahid Ahmed v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1983] 2 SCR 614. We are afraid, the contention cannot prevail. The decision in Mohd. Shakeel's case is clearly distinguishable. In Mohd. Shakeel's case, three of the four grounds of deten- tion on which the appellant was detained were held by the High Court to be bad for one reason or another but it held that the remaining ground did not suffer from any defect and was enough to sustain the order of detention. On appeal, Shri Jethmalani, learned counsel for the detenu, sought to challenge the constitutional validity of s. 5A of the Act and the case was therefore referred to a Constitution Bench. At the hearing, Shri Jethmalani confined his submission to an altogether different point which ultimately prevailed, namely, that the remaining ground of detention was also bad for the reason that there was failure on the part of the State Government to place before the detaining authority the opinion which the Advisory Board had recorded in favour of another detenu Shamsi who was also detained for his involve- ment in the same transaction on an identical ground based on similar'and identical facts. It was held that although the opinion of the Advisory Board that there was no sufficient cause for Shamsi's detention may not have been binding on the detaining authority which ordered the detention of the detenu, but the opinion of the Advisory Board in Shamsi case was an important consideration which should and ought to have been taken into account by the detaining authority before passing the order of detention in that case. It was observed that the Court could not exclude a reasonable probability that since the Advisory Board had not sustained Shamsi's detention on a ground which was common to him and the detenu, the detaining authority would have. if at all, passed the order of detention against the detenu on the three remaining grounds which had been held to be bad. The decision is Shamsi's case turned on its own facts and certainly is not an authority for the proposition con- tended for. So also in Ashadevi v.K. Shiveraj, Addl. Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat & Anr., [1979] 2 SCR 2 15 on which reliance was placed there was failure on the part of the State Government to apprise the detaining au- thority of the fact that the detenu's request to have the presence of and consultation with his counsel had been refused, and that the confessional statement upon which the detaining authority had relied, had been retracted while he was in judicial custody, rendered the impugned order of detention invalid and illegal because there was complete non-application of mind by the detaining authority to the most material and vital facts. The other decision in Kurjib- hai,Dhanjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1985] 1 Scale 964 is also distinguishable. In that case, there was failure on the part of the sponsoring authority in not furnishing the relevant material to the detaining authority, namely, the reply of the detenu to the show cause notice issued in the adjudication proceedings undertaken by the Customs authorities which was held to be the most relevant material which ought to have been placed before it. It was held that the question was not whether the material which was withheld from the detaining authority formed part of any separate or independent proceedings like the adjudication proceedings as held by the High Court, but the real question was whether the material was relevant and would have influ- enced the mind of the detaining authority. In the counter- affidavit filed by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance it had been averred that the representation of the detenu along with his reply to the show cause had been considered by the Advisory Board and after considering all the facts it was of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for detention. It was held that such ex post facto consideration of the detenu's reply to the show cause could not fill up the lacuna of non-consider- ation thereof by the detaining authority before passing the order of detention. Both these decisions proceed on the well-settled principle that if material and vital facts which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order are not placed, it would vitiate its subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order ille- gal. We fail to see the relevance of these decisions to the present case.

Before touching upon the merits, we wish to make a few observations. It is not suggested at the bar that the grounds for detention do not set out the facts with suffi- cient degree of particularity or that they do not furnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. ]he impugned order of detention was therefore not challenged on the ground that the grounds furnished were not adequate or sufficient for the satisfac- tion of the detaining authority or for the making of an effective representation. Sufficiency of grounds is not for the Court but for the detaining authority for the formation of his subjective satisfaction that the detention of a person under s. 3(1) of the Act is necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the augmentation of foreign exchange. In Mangalbhai Motiram Patel v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1980] 4 SCC 470, it was observed at p. 477 of the Report:

It has long been established that the subjective satis- faction of the detaining authority as regards the factual existence of the condition on which the order of detention can be made i.e. the grounds of detention constitutes the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based. Nor can the Court, on a review of the grounds substitute its own opinion for that of the authority. But this does not imply that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly immune from the power of judicial review. It inferentially follows that the subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power conferred on the executive, the Court can always examine whether the requisite satisfac- tion was arrived at by the authority; if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad. The simplest case is where the authority has not applied its mind at all; in such a case, the authority could not possi- bly be satisfied as regards the fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied. See: Khudi Ram Das v. State of West Bengal & Ors., [1975] 2 SCR 832, following the case of Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR (1943) FC 75.

We do not see any mistake of fact in Item B which re- lates to purchase of a TV 27" and a VCR. There is an entry at p. 338 of SG 6 showing that the detenu's account was debited with these items although the detenu in his state- ment asserted that they were gifted by his brother. That takes us to the effect of the mistake occurring in Item C at p.215 of the seized documents that there is an entry showing that the detenu had a fixed deposit of US $ 2 lakhs. The entry reads: "ML 2 lakhs A/S 11.75 dated 2.6.83". Even assuming that it was a mistake to have introduced the words "also including 20 lakhs $ (dollars)" in paragraph 44 of the grounds that would not by itself without more, vitiate the impugned order of detention or necessarily show nonapplication of mind. Even so, the detaining authority was entitled to act upon the entry. relating to US $ 2 lakhs for the formation of his subjective satisfaction. Significance of these entries shows that the detenu was maintaining the secret account and had large sums of money in fixed deposits abroad. The detaining authority has charged the detenu with keeping US $ 2 lakhs in fixed deposit in Kamal Account which is the capital account of the detenu and his brothers Messrs Greenland Corporation, Japan. The words "also including 20 lakhs $ (dollars)" are no doubt not there in the books of accounts but they crept in the proposal and have been reproduced in paragraph 44 of the grounds. It is somewhat strange that these words should be introduced when they were not there in the books of accounts but the fact remains that there is a typographical error. The High Court rightly observes that a single typographical mistake about making a reference to US $ 20 lakhs would not necessarily show the non-application of mind when the entry of US $ 2 lakhs (dollars) is reflected in various places in the account such as ML Ji Khata P. 175 and Kamal Account P. 226, copies of which were furnished to the detenu. Even assuming that the words "also including 20 lakhs $ (dollars)" were introduced in paragraph 44 of the grounds that would not be a factor vitiating the impugned order of detention. The detaining authority was still enti- tled to act upon the entry relating to fixed deposit of US $ 2 lakhs (dollars) for the formation of his subjective satis- faction.