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The short question that falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under Rule 85 of the Punjab Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (hereinafter called the `Rules') against an order passed by the State or Regional Transport Authority commences from the date of receipt of the said order or the date on which the aggrieved party acquires actual or constructive knowledge about the making thereof. Rule 85 of the Rules reads as under:-

" Before parting with the same, it deserves to be mentioned as it had come to our notice that respondent No.2 is adopting a practice not to inform the persons whose applications have been refused. As noted above, it some times creates a situation which leads to unnecessary litigation. In accordance with the acts and the rules, respondent No.2 should inform the party about the order so passed."

In the course of hearing before us, it was fairly conceded by Mr.Amol Rattan Singh that considerable difficulties had at times arisen for the aggrieved party on account of the neglect and/or apathy of the State or Regional Transport Authorities in the matter of communication of the orders passed by them to the parties concerned. It was urged that while the orders are now being communicated, the Tribunal would get flooded with cases, should this Court hold that the period of limitation would commence only from the date the order refusing to grant of permit is formally communicated to the person, who had applied for the same. It was contended by Mr.Singh that although Rule 85 of the Rules stipulates limitation of 30 days from the date of receipt of the order passed by the State or Regional Transport Authority yet actual or constructive knowledge of such order should also in the absence of any formal communication result in commencement of said period. A litigant, who has either actual or constructive knowledge of an order passed adverse to him cannot, argued Mr.Singh, be allowed to sleep over the matter and wait indefinitely for a formal communication of the order before filing an appeal against the same.

On behalf of the petitioner, it was, on the other hand, contended that the period of limitation ought to start only from the date the order is communicated to the party aggrieved by the same. At any rate limitation can not start running unless it is established that the party concerned had actual or constructive knowledge about the making of the order. Whether or not the party had any such knowledge would, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

" Can a person who knows about the order, can still wait for orders and suddenly come up with the plea that since the order had not been communicated, he would file the appeal giving any date to his convenience as the date of the knowledge of the order."

Relying upon Raja Harish Chandra's case (supra), the Court answered the question in negative and held that since the application made by the petitioner had been rejected and a permit granted to the opposite party in November, 1988 and since the successful party had started plying on the route concerned, it was not possible to believe that the petitioner did not know or could not have had the knowledge of the making of the order for more than two years. When the route was being operated, observed the Court, the petitioner must be presumed to know that permit had been granted to the other party and not to it, thereby giving to the aggrieved party the constructive knowledge about the rejection of his request for a permit. We respectfully approve the reasoning given in the decision rendered by this Court in Banda Bahadur's case (supra) and hold that even in cases where there is no formal communication of the order passed by the State or Regional Transport Authority, the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal would start running from the date the aggrieved party acquires actual or constructive knowledge of the making of the said order. Whether or not the aggrieved party had any such knowledge will, however, be a matter to be seen by the Tribunal in each case depending upon its peculiar facts and circumstances. It will not, therefore, be necessary or proper for us to enumerate exhaustively situations in which such knowledge can be imputed to the party aggrieved, while examining whether or not the appeal is within limitation.