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4. Mr. Seshadri, -learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3, has divided his arguments under two leads, those that are-.in the. nature of pie-liminary objections to the maintainability of the Writ Petition and those bearing on the merits of the case. It will be convenient first to deal with-the arguments in the nature of preliminary objections.

5. Analysing the prayers made in the petition. Mr. Seshadri points out that the writs sought are those in the nature of quo warranto, mandamus-or certiorari and that in the circumstances of the case, none of these writs would lie or could issue at the instance of the petitioner. It is contended that quo warranto cannot lie because the post of Professor or Reader in a University is not a public office in respect of which alone a writ of quo warranto could issue, that a, writ "of mandamus, cannot lie because neither the University nor that Board of Appointments can be said to be performing or required to perform a mandatory duty in relation to the petitioner or in relation to any right claimable by the petitioner to insist upon the performance of any such duty, and that a writ of certiorari cannot lie because in selecting persons for appointment or appointing persons a" University Professors or Readers, neither the University nor the Board of appointments nor any other University authority can be said to perform-a judicial or a quasi-judicial function. Apparently to ensure that the preliminary objection is rendered" complete and effective, Mr. Seshadri made two further propositions. He contended firstly that, even the power or jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution must be read-as limited to the issue of writs of the type enumerated in the Article, viz., writs of habeas corpus* mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and ceatiorari in the same way and subject to the same-limitations as govern the issue of similar writs by Courts in England. Secondly or alternatively he contended that even if a High Court could issue a writ of a, nature different from any one of the enumerated writs or any other type of order or direction under Article 226; the power or jurisdiction to issue any such writ, order or direction, could be invoked only by a petitioner who is aggrieved by the order or action challenged in the Writ Petition and who seeks protection by the High Court of a legal right vested in him.

9. Correctly understood therefore this Writ Petition is essentially one for the issue of a writ in the nature of quo warranto or other appropriate writ to remove the contesting respondents from the posts they are holding on the allegation that they have no due authority of law to hold the same. No question therefore in relation to either certiorari or mandamus can or does arise in this case. The only questions therefore whether by way of preliminary objections or on the merits of the case which need be considered are those that are relevant to the prayer for the issue of a writ of quo warranto or other appropriate writ, direction or order having the ultimate result of removing the contesting respondents from the posts they are holding by virtue of the University's order of appointment dated 16th February, 1961. Those questions are: -

(1) Whether the nature of the posts held by the contesting respondents is such that a writ of quo warranto can be asked for to remove them from those posts, and
2. Whether the petitioner is competent to move this Court for the issue of such a writ.

10. Although we have stated the questions as two different ones, they are essentially interlated, because to a large extent the competence of the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution depends upon the question whether the relief that he is entitled to is a writ of quo warranto strictly so called or some other type of writ, direction or order. The question of locus Standi of persons seeking the issue of a writ has been the subject of many decisions, both in England and in India. In England the question has been considered from the point of view whether the writ asked for is what is called a writ of right Or merely a discretionary writ. In the former category the view taken is that the petitioner will he entitled to a writ ex debito justitiae as soon as he establishes conditions or circumstances entitling him to such a writ. In India it may be difficult to assert that there is anything like' a writ of right because, as already observed, the issue of any type of writ, order or direction under Article 226 is clearly a matter of discretion with the Court. The question therefore whether the petitioner has or has no locus standi to make the petition to seek the issue of a writ appropriate to the facts of his case is necessarily related to the nature of the relief he seeks. Thus, for example, if he seeks the issue of a writ of mandamus to a statutory body functionary 01 other authority to do or to forbear from doing a particular act, he has necessarily to make out that he has a certain right by virtue of which he is entitled to a particular act being done by that body, functionary or authority or to require that the said body, functionary or authority shall not do a thing which may prejudicially affect his right. In the case of a writ of certiorari, he should ordinarily be a person who is adversely affected by the order sought to be quashed. Whether the distinction made in England to the effect that a writ of certiorari will issue ex debito justice in the case of persons directly affected by the impugned order or proceedings but only as a matter of discretion in the case of strangers to those proceedings 01 orders is also available in India is a matter which it is now unnecessary for us to examine. In the case of a writ of habeas corpus there may be circumstances which may make the question of locus standi of the petitioner wholly immaterial. In the case of a writ of quo, warranto, the petitioner is hardly even an aggrieved person but is really in the nature of an informer. In fact, in England the petitioner in such circumstances is not called a petitioner at all but only a realtor, i.e., one who relates facts on the basis of which the Court itself takes action in .the name of the King.. The only general proposition therefore which can be stated on the question of locus standi of petitioners in writ petitions or petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution is that ordinarily a petitioner will have to make out some personal interest which the law recognises as sufficient, unless having regard to the nature of the relief and particular facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner is merely in the position of an informer or a realtor and the situation is such that it becomes the duty of the Court to act in public interest or to uphold the Constitution.

11. The peculiar characteristics of the writ of quo warranto and the history of its development in England are found discussed in the leading case of The King v. Speyer, (1916) I KB 593. Lord Reading, C. J., points out that originally a writ of quo warranto was available only for use by the King against encroachment of royal prerogative or of rights, franchise or liberties of the Crown but that later it gave place to the practice of filing information's by the Attorney General on the strength of which the Court enquired into the authority whereby the respondent held any public position. Later still, the King's coroner commenced the practice of exhibiting the information of quo warranto at. the instance of even private persons. To prevent the abuse of this practice statutes were subsequently passed during the reign of the King William and Queen Mary, after which the practice of coroner filing information wan stopped. Another statute was passed during the reign of Queen Anne' making the issue of a writ of quo warranto subject to the. discretion of the Court to grant or refuse the same upon the infor-