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The State of Punjab and Inspector General of Police, Punjab, on the one hand and the direct recruits on the other contested the writ petition, inter alia, contending that the quota applies at the stage of initial recruitment and not at the time of confirmation and there is no allegation that the quota rule was violated at the time of initial recruitment. It was further contended that no one can claim to be confirmed as a matter of right and, therefore, the writ petition is misconceived. Direct recruits to the post of Dy. Superintendent of Police, appellants and respondents 5 to 8 further contended that the petitioners were promoted on officiating basis against temporary posts and as there were no permanent posts available, they could not be confirmed till substantive vacancies in the permanent strength of the cadre were available and till confirmation their seniority having to be reckoned from the date of confirmation, they cannot claim to be senior to the direct recruits on the principle of continuous officiation.

Mr. G. L. Sanghi learned counsel for the interveners and the promotees contended that the framers of the rule could not have intended to accord such a discriminatory treatment to the promotees in whose favour the quota is as big as 80% of the total strength.

Where recruitment to a cadre is from two sources and the Service Rules prescribe quota for recruitment for both sources a question would always arise whether the quota rule would apply at the initial stage of recruitment or also at the stage of confirmation. Ordinarily, if quota is prescribed for recruitment to a cadre, the quota rule will have to be observed at the recruitment stage. The quota would then be co-related to vacancies to be filled in by recruitment but after recruitment is made from two different sources they will have to be integrated into a common cadre and while so doing, the question of their inter se seniority would surface. Seniority is ordinarily determined from the date of entry into cadre on the principle of continuous officiation. Confirmation in a post would ordinarily depend upon such circumstances as satisfactory completion of probationary period, efficiency in the discharge of duty, capacity to discharge functions of the post, availability of permanent vacancy, etc. Now, if seniority is to be determined according to the date of confirmation and the quota rule is not made relatable to confirmation in various posts falling vacant in the cadre it would directly impinge upon the seniority of members of the service. In a slightly different form this question came before this Court in S. B. Patwardhan & Ors. etc. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (1) in which vires of rule 8(iii) of 1960 Rules were questioned. Rule 8(iii) of the 1960 Rules provided that probationers recruited directly to the Bombay Service of Engineers Class II Cadre in any year shall, in a bunch, be placed senior to promotees confirmed during that year. Striking down this rule as violative of Article 16 this Court held that the rule leaves the valuable right of seniority to depend upon the mere accident of confirmation.

The recruitment to Punjab Police Service is from two sources. Recruits from both the sources have to be on probation. Adopting the construction as canvassed for and on behalf of direct recruits that the proviso to rule 8(b) permitting a maximum period of probation of three years at the end of which the direct recruit automatically be confirmed unless his services are dispensed with simultaneously enjoying seniority from the date of such automatic confirmation without applying quota rule at the time of confirmation, would put the promotee to an unintended disadvantage who may be continued in an officiating capacity without confirming him and consequently denying or relegating him down in seniority for years as has happened in the case of respondents 1 and 2. Appellants who were recruited to the Service after respondents 1 and 2, came to be confirmed at the end of two years' period of probation while respondents 1 and 2 were not confirmed after more than 11 years of officiating service and there it not the slightest suggestion that the services of respondents 1 and 2 were not satisfactory and that the confirmation was denied on any such ground thereby directly affecting their place in the seniority list. Such an approach would be wholly unreasonable.

Now, if the other view is taken that the quota rule would apply both at the time of recruitment and at the time of confirmation, rule 10 which provides for seniority according to the date of confirmation would certainly be save from the vice of unreasonableness. Is such a construction possible ? One need not stretch the language to bring about the desired result but in this case upon a harmonious reading of rules 3, 6, 8 and 10, the conclusion is inescapable that quota rule is operative both at the time of initial recruitment and at the time of confirmation. If the rule of seniority were one otherwise than according to date of confirmation it would not have become necessary to apply the quota rule at the stage of confirmation but in this case the quota rule is linked up with the seniority rule and unless the quota rule is strictly observed in practice it will be difficult to hold that the seniority rule is not unreasonable and does not offend Article 16 (see S. G. Jaisinghani's case (supra) at pp. 717 and 718). Quota rule is linked up with seniority rule because, not the date of entry in service determines the seniority but the date of confirmation determines seniority and, therefore, quota rule is inextricably intertwined with the seniority rule and any delinking would render the seniority rule wholly unreasonable. Any other view would lead to the most undesirable result wholly unintended by the framers of the rule. It must be remembered that after recruitment, members of the service, though drawn from two different sources- direct recruits and promotees-constitute a single integrated cadre. They discharge identical functions, bear similar responsibilities and acquire an equal amount of experience in the respective assignments. In this background in S. B. Patwardhan's case (supra) this Court held that if the promotees are treated with an evil eye and an unequal hand in the matter of seniority as was done under rule 8(iii), the rule would suffer from the vice of unreasonableness and would offend Article 16 and it was actually struck down. An exactly identical situation would follow here if quota rule is applied at the stage of initial recruitment and wholly ignored at the time of confirmation because in that event while direct recruits will get confirmation automatically, the promotees would hang out for years as has happened in the case of respondents 1 and 2 and if they are not confirmed they would never get seniority and their chances of being considered for promotion to the higher post would be wholly jeopardised. To avoid this utterly unconsciounable outcome the construction we have put on rule 8 would be in consonance with justice and reason.