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13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that overhead cranes cannot operate, but on gantry. A crane, is not a crane until it is affixed to a gantry, as it cannot function till then. I regret, I have some difficulty in accepting this submission. A crane is a distinct identifiable object in the commercial world. It is true that it works on a gantry, but it is well known that gantry is no part of a crane. A "crane" is a machine for raising, lowering and moving heavy weights. A "gantry" is a frame or platform for carrying a crane or similar structure (See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). It is thus obvious that a "gantry" is only the track on which a crane operates. Nevertheless, a crane is an object distinct from a gantry. A train moves on rails and yet a train is a distinct item even if they are not put on rails. Rails are no part of train. It must be accepted that the cranes before being supplied to the main unit had a "trial run" at the Machine Shop at Adityapur. One does not know whether there was gantry or not. For aught one knows the cranes may have been tried and tested on gantries set up in the Machine Shop itself. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that no crane was assembled at the Adityapur Unit of the petitioner. After they had been assembled at Adityapur unit, they were removed to the petitioner's site. That could have been done only in knocked down condition.

I regret, the reliance placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court is misplaced. What binds is the ratio of a decision and not the logical extensions therefrom. The point falling for consideration in that decision was clearly different from the controversy before us. The question which fell for consideration in that case was whether fabrication and erection of an electrical overhead travelling crane was a contract for work and labour or a contract for sale. It may be recalled that the Supreme Court held in the case of The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd., AIR 1958 S.C. 560 that where a contract of work involves labour as well as supply of materials, the supply aspect cannot be separated from the work and, therefore, the supply of material was not exigible to sales tax. Again in Sentinel Rolling Shutters & Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1978] 42 STC 409 the same matter came up for consideration. Before the Supreme Court, in the case of Ram Singh and Sons (supra), the assessee was a firm carrying on business of manufacturing and erection, of cranes. The question arose whether the assessment to sales tax of Rs. 1,34,500 received by the assessee under contract with M/s. Kamlapat Moti Lal Sugar Mills and of Rs. 2,38,000 received under contract with M/s. Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. formed part of the turnover of the assessee liable to sales tax. The answer to the question depended upon whether the contracts were contracts for sale or contracts for work and labour. The observations of the Supreme Court must be understood in the light of this background. Their Lordships in order to resolve that question held that erection of overhead travelling crane was a fundamental and integral part of the contract because without it the 3-motion electrical overhead travelling crane cannot operate. Mark the observations of their Lordships at page 202, quoted above, that the transaction is no different than one for fabrication and erection of an open godown or shed with asbestos or tin sheets fixed on columns. Their Lordships laid down that there could be no doubt that the contract was a contract for work and labour and not a contract for sale. That was the ration of that case. Their Lordships were not deciding what is crane and what is not so. Their Lordships were not deciding whether a crane is a crane or not until it is put on a gantry. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides and not the logical extensions therefrom. In the Regional Manager and Anr. v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, AIR 1976 S.C. 1766 it was laid down that ratio decidendi is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. So also in C.I.T. Bihar, Patna v. Sheo Kumari Devi, 1986 BLJR 825. It is not necessary to multiply decisions on this aspect of the matter. I am clearly of the view that the case of Ram Singh and Sons (supra) does not lay down that a crane is not a crane until it is affixed to a gantry. Reliance placed by Mr. Chatterji for the petitioner is clearly misplaced and must be rejected.

20. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Collector was not justified in reading the works orders by the petitioner to the Growth Shop as repository of stipulation in a contract. As there was only one party, there could be no contract. I regret, this submission is fallacious. It is not a question of a contract being interpreted, but it it only trying to appreciate the facts in proper perspective. We have to see what did the petitioner intend to buy. The works orders are pointer to the idea conveyed by the works orders. No one says that the works order was a contract nor were the contents thereof stipulations in a contract, but the wordings can certainly be read to appreciate what was intended to be conveyed. If the works order was to assemble complete crane, I do not see why it cannot be read as implying that the crane as a whole was to be assembled at Adityapur.

21. Mr. Chatterji for the petitioner conceded that if the works orders were given literal construction, it will certainly give the impression that a complete crane was to be assembled, but according to him, a literal construction would not be apt and that what was, in fact, done was the real issue. I regret, I am unable to appreciate why the wordings of the works orders should not be given literal construction. The first rule of interpretation of a document is to give it a literal construction. Other rules of interpretation are attracted only when the literal construction does not bring out the idea correctly and fully and that there is some ambiguity left in it. In giving a literal construction there is no ambiguity. I do not think why it should not be given a literal construction.