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3. All the parties have had full opportunity of adducing their documentary evidence. No witnesses were cited by any of them. The case was argued at great length on behalf of the various parties. The principal points that formed the subject of contention at the first argument were.

(1) Whether the family of defendants Nos. 1 to 5 is entitled to the exclusive right to trusteeship in the temple and (2) Whether additional trustees should be appointed to put an end to the constant and recurring quarrels and litigation connected with the temple and to put the administration of its affairs on a satisfactory-footing.

4. It was contended by defendants Nos. 1 and 5 to 8 and by the Thathachars that the court had no right to appoint additional trustees for a temple managed by hereditary trustees, that we further had no power to do so in this case as the sanction given by the Collector under Section 539 of the old code of the Civil Procedure for the institution of this suit did not authorise a prayer for the appointment of additional trustees and that, in any event, such appointment was undesirable and unnecessary. At the conclusion of the arguments we intimated our conclusions on these questions. We held that the alleged exclusive right of the family of defendants Nos. 1 and 5 to 8, if it ever existed, was extinguished by the statute of limitation, that we had the power, if we considered it desirable, to appoint additional trustees, but that in the circumstances of the case we considered it both u*necessary and undesirable to appoint any additional trustees, either from amongst the Thengalais or from amongst the Sthalathars. We also stated that in our opinion it was necessary to control the management of the affairs of the temple by the trustees and that we would be prepared to consider any measure that might be proposed for the purpose. As already stated, the vakil for the Thathachars generally admitted that the members for the family did not claim any right to trusteeship on behalf of all the members of the Thathachar families as a body. We invited all the parties concerned to put in draft schemes for the consideration of the court. We also invited the co-operation of the Advocate-General for the settlement of a satisfactory scheme. He was good enough to lend his assistance in the matter and submitted a scheme for the approval of the court. The contending parties also put in schemes of their own. All these schemes were fully considered at several subsequent hearings, the drafts put in by the parties and by the Advocate-General were revised and the matters in dispute were settled. The parties were supplied with the minutes of the court and schemes drawn up by the parties in accordance with thse minutes were again considered and the scheme as finally settled by the court has already been drawn up. We do not propose to make more than a few further observations regarding details of the scheme we have settled. It now remains to give our reasons for the conclusions arrived at by us on the questions argued at the preliminary hearing.

9. The next question for consideration is whether any additional trustees should be appointed. From 1872 there have been 5 trustees appointed by the members of the Thathachar family. The appointment of a Tengalai as trustee is not likely to promote harmony in the management of the temple. One or two Thengalai trustees will not be likely to control the actions of the Vadagalai trustees, while it might lead to constant opposition and quarrels and mutual recrimination. We are also of opinion that it is not desirable to appoint as a trustee any of the Sthalathars, as they are all servants of the institution. It is argued that the Thathachars also are holders of some of the offices in the temple. But that is no reason why we should appoint other people whose position with respect to the temple being merely that of servants makes their appointment undesirable. We have therefore decided not to appoint additional trustees either from amongst Thengalais or the Sthalathars. We shall presently consider the desirability of appointing one or more persons to control the trustees in the discharge of their duties in order to protect the rights of the Thengalais and Sthalathars. In the view we take of the case it is not necessary to decide whether we have power to appoint additional trustees; but we may observe that we are inclined to hold that the Court has the power to do so. The question was really decided in Prayag Doss Ji Varu Mahant v. Tirumala Srirangacharlu Varu (1905) I.L.R. 28 M. 319. The Privy Council, on appeal (1907) I.L.R. 30 M. 138 did not express any dissent from the conclusion arrived at by this Court. It was contended that Section 539 of the old Code followed the provisions of Lord Romily's Act in England and under that Act it was held that the court had no power to appoint additional trustees; but, as pointed out in Tirupati Case (1905) I.L.R. 28 M. 319 the procedure under the English Act was by petition and of a summary charaqter. Section 539 of the Civil Procedure Code was enacted after the Trustee Act had been passed in England and, according to that Act, the court undoubtedly had the power to appoint new trustees and we agree with the learned Judges who decided the Tripati Case that the Indian Courts possess the same power. Besides, the Court of Chancery had, independent of any statute the power to appoint new trustees. See Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. IV, page 255. See also Re. Burnham National Schools (1873) L.R. 17 Eq. 241 at 246 and Re. Browne's Hnspital Stamford 60 L.T. 288. The Indian Courts have also exercised the same extensive powers in the matter of charities as the Chancery Court in England. this Court appointed new trustees in Krishnayya v. Subbayya (1911) 21 M.L.J. 784. See also Kaleswara Gurukkal v. Nataraj Tambiran (1909) 19 M.L.J. 772 at p. 777. The Bombay High Court in Annaji v. Narayan (1896) I.L.R. 21 B. 556 appointed a committee of control to supervise the action of the trustees. Besides, the present suit was tried after the new Act came into force and Section 92 of the Act, which was enacted in the place of Section 539 of the repealed code, has made a change in the language of the old statute and makes it clear that the court has power to appoint new trustees. The suit was no doubt instituted while the old Code was in force but we are of opinion the power of the Court must be regulated by the Code in force at the time when the case was decided. We are also of opinion that the absence of a specific sanction by the Collector of a prayer for the appointment of new trustees is not fatal to the court's exercise of the power. The court in settling a scheme has very wide powers (See Tudor's Charitable Trusts page 596) and we should be inclined to hold that, if we were of opinion that a satisfactory scheme would require the appointment of new trustees, we would have the power to appoint them. If there were no prayer for the settlement of the scheme, then no doubt the sanction of the Collector would be required by the plaintiffs for asking the court to appoint new trustees; but we do not think that the absence of specific sanction would restrict the power of the court to direct the appointment of new trustees as part of the scheme which it thinks should be settled. Neither Syed Hussain Miyan v. Collector of Kaira (1895) I.L.R. 21 B. 250 nor Srinivasa v. Venkata (1887) I.L.R. 11 M.148 helps the contrary contention. The latter case was one under the Religious Endowments Act and the former case decided that when sanction was not obtained for a suit for an account, the court could not pass a decree for an account. Such a decree would not come within the purview of any scheme to be settled by the court. It is, however, unnecessary to decide this point definitely.