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(e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act entitling him to decree of eviction against the respondents.

The facts are not much in dispute. Respondents case is that Bakerali did not efface himself Completely from the shop premises altogether. He had to retire from the business because of his ill-health and further that he used to come to the shop premises off and on. As far as ill-health of Bakerali is concerned, it does not lend any credence to the case of the respondents as Bakerali continued to be a partner in other business with his other sons in some other premises. His coining to the shop premises off and on is also of no significance as a father may like to visit his sons to see how they are faring in the business. Both partnership deeds dated November 14, 1974 and March 6, 1979 unmistakably show that henceforth Bakerali would have no concern either with the shop premises or with the business being carried on by the new partnership in the shop premises. Respondents contended that the suit premises where business was being carried on under the hew partnership Was, in fact, taken on rent for and on behalf of the family of Bakerali. As Bakerali was the elderly member of the family, the suit premises was taken on lease in his name. It was also pleaded that second and third partnerships were in continuation of the first partnership wherein in clause (7) it was specifically stated that the suit premises shall belong to Bakerali. But then this clause (7) in the first partnership deed dated November 15, 1955 negatives any such contention that suit premises were taken on lease by Bakerali for the benefit of the family. In order to dislodge the case of the appellant, respondents said that rent receipts, as noted above, had always been issued by the appellant in the name of Bakerali though the rent was being paid by one of his sons. Thus, according to respondents, there had been some arrangement regard-ing the affairs of the family assets and Bakerali did not attend to the business because of advanced age and ill-health. They :said this would not amount to any subletting or transfer or assignment of tenancy rights of Bakerali to his sons. It is difficult to appreciate this line of defence by the respondents. It rather shows that Bakerali stopped paying any rent to the appellant landlord after partnership dated November 14, 1974 Was ex-ecuted and rent was being paid by one of his sons who was partner in the new partnership. A necessary inference would be that rent was paid from the business of the new partnership and it is not material that the rent receipts were being issued in the name of Bakerali. These had to be issued in the name of Bakerali otherwise landlord could be said to have accepted the son who was paying the rent or the new partnership as tenant of the suit premises. Documents brought on record do not show that what the respondents contended was a mere arrangement of distribution of family assets. Rather new partnership deeds show that business now carried on by the two partners was independent of any right whatsoever of any other person including Bakerali both as regards the suit premises as Well as the business. It is also difficult to accept the argument that partnership deed dated November 14, 1974 is in continuation of the partnership deed dated November 15, 1955. There is no clause in the partnership deed dated November 14, 1974 that Bakerali will have any right "in .suit, premises or in the business being carried on there under the new partnership. Third partnership deed dated March 6, 1979 destroys the case of the respondents altogether that Bakerali had even any say in the business of the new partnership or in the place of business being the suit premises. One of the partners in the new partnership appeared as the sole witness for the respondents. No document of any nature whatsoever was produced by the respondent in support of any of their contentions. These documents would mean records of the Income-tax Authorities, Sales Tax Authorities, Shop and Establishment Authorities and other authorities under the Drugs Act since the business in the shop premises was that of selling medicines. Witness admitted in his testimony that Bakerali had handed over the suit shop to him and his brother Alibhai in the year 1974 and that Bakerali was hot visiting the shop after handing over the same to partners of the new partnership, though he used to visit the shop premises occasionally. The witness said Bakerali used to come the shop premises "to see as to how we were doing the business".

We have been referred to two judgments of learned single judges of the Gujarat High Court interpreting clause (e) of Section 13(1) of the Act. In Harshachandra Narsibhai Patel and Others v. Ibrahim Haji Khubanbhai, (1984) GLH 965 it was one of the terms of the tenancy that tenant would not sublet, assign or transfer his suit premises to anybody else. After some time the tenant wound up his business and sublet the premises. On the allegation of subletting suit was filed for recovery of possession of the suit premises. It was not in dispute that the tenant was no longer in possession and the suit premises was in possession of a third person. Both the trial court and the appellate court decreed the suit of the landlord. The matter came in revision before the High Court. It was urged that even assuming that possession of the suit premises was transferred by the tenant it cannot be said that the premises was sublet by him as the landlord had failed to prove that the transfer was for some consideration. It was pointed put that neither in the pleading nor in the evidence it was stated by the landlord that suit premises was transferred by the tenant to a third person for some consideration and therefore no case of subletting had been made out. The Court rejected the plea of the petitioners and said :