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Showing contexts for: section 436 in Pawan Kumar Agrawal vs State Of Chhattisgarh 50 Sa/510/2003 ... on 31 January, 2019Matching Fragments
2. The instant revision has been preferred against the order dated 31.10.2018 passed by the Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act (henceforth 'the PC Act')/4 th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur in Special Criminal Case No.186 of 2015, whereby the application filed by the present Applicant under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of default bail has been rejected.
3. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the present Applicant was arrested on 20.3.2015 in connection with Crime No.5 of 2015 registered by the Economic Offences Wing, Chhattisgarh, Camp Bilaspur. On 15.6.2015, a charge-sheet for the offence punishable under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the PC Act and Sections 109, 120B, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code was filed before the Special Court against the present Applicant as well as against the other co-accused persons, namely, Alok Agrawal, Abhish Swami, Radhe Shyam Agrawal, Smt. Pushpa Agrawal and Smt. Alka Agrawal. On 7.10.2016, charges have been framed against the present Applicant and the other co-accused persons by the Trial Court. Against co-accused Alok Agrawal, charges under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the PC Act and Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code have been framed and against the present Applicant and the rest of the co-accused persons charges under Section 12 of the PC Act and Sections 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code have been framed. Regular bail applications under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have already been rejected by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court. Since the charges framed against the present Applicant are under Section 12 of the PC Act and Sections 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code which are punishable by the maximum prescribed sentence of imprisonment for 7 years, on 22.9.2018, an application under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed by the present Applicant for grant of default bail on the ground that he has already remained in custody for more than 3½ years and, therefore, he is entitled to get default bail. A reply to the said application was filed by the prosecution before the Trial Court raising objection that during trial many applications were filed by the present Applicant to cause delay in trial which has resulted into delay in trial and, therefore, the present Applicant is not entitled to get default bail under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also objected that according to the contents of the charges framed against the present Applicant, he is also liable to be charged for the offence punishable under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code, but, inadvertently, that charge is not included in the order framing charges. It was submitted by the prosecution before the Trial Court that they will be filing an application for modification in the order framing charges against the Applicant. Since the offence punishable under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code is punishable with imprisonment for life, the present Applicant is not entitled to get default bail under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
4. The Special Judge, after hearing the parties, vide the impugned order dated 31.10.2018, has rejected the application of the present Applicant moved under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that there is a serious charge of economic offence against the present Applicant and, therefore, he cannot be allowed benefit of default bail.
5. Learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant submits that there is nothing on record to show that the Applicant caused any delay in trial. He further submits that presently, charges under Section 12 of the PC Act and Sections 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code have been framed against the present Applicant. Apart from this, no other charge either under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code or a charge for any other offence has been framed against the Applicant. Though the prosecution had made a submission before the Trial Court that an application will be filed by them for modification in the order framing charges against the present Applicant, no such application has yet been filed by them nor the Trial Court itself has made any modification in its order framing charges against the present Applicant and without there being any modification/change in the order framing charges against the Applicant the trial is still going on. The Trial Court has unnecessarily dealt with the merit of the case while dealing with the application under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While dealing with the application under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of default bail, consideration on merits of the case or on dismissal of the applications for grant of regular bail either by the Court below or by the higher Courts is wholly immaterial. It is true that the present Applicant has been charged with the offence relating to public money, but merely a person has been charged with such offence, it will not take away his right to claim benefit of default bail under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He further submits that rejection of the application under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for default bail only on the ground that the charges framed against the Applicant relate to a serious economic offence and, therefore, the Applicant cannot be allowed benefit of default bail is not in accordance with law. In this case, there are total 302 listed witnesses. As on date, only 42 witnesses have been examined. It is further submitted that the Applicant is in custody since 20.3.2015. He may be admitted to benefit of default bail. Reliance has been placed on (2017) 5 SCC 702 (Hussain v. Union of India), (2016) 3 SCC 700 (Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, in re) and (2015) 13 SCC 605 (Bhim Singh v. Union of India).
Explanation.--In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded."
9. While dealing with the subject issue in Bhim Singh case (supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court as follows:
"5. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the legislative policy engrafted in Section 436A and large number of undertrial prisoners housed in the prisons, we are of the considered view that some order deserves to be passed by us so that the undertrial prisoners do not continue to be detained in prison beyond the maximum period provided under Section 436A.
6. We, accordingly, direct that jurisdictional Magistrate/Chief Judicial Magistrate/Sessions Judge shall hold one sitting in a week in each jail/prison for two months commencing from 1102014 for the purposes of effective implementation of Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In its sittings in jail, the above judicial officers shall identify the undertrial prisoners who have completed half period of the maximum period or maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under the law and after complying with the procedure prescribed under Section 436A pass an appropriate order in jail itself for release of such undertrial prisoners who fulfil the requirement of Section 436A for their release immediately. Such jurisdictional Magistrate/Chief Judicial Magistrate/Sessions Judge shall submit the report of each of such sittings to the Registrar General of the High Court and at the end of two months, the Registrar General of each High Court shall submit the report to the Secretary General of this Court without any delay. To facilitate compliance with the above order, we direct the Jail Superintendent of each jail/prison to provide all necessary facilities for holding the court sitting by the above judicial officers. A copy of this order shall be sent to the Registrar General of each High Court, who in turn will communicate the copy of the order to all Sessions Judges within his State for necessary compliance."