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34. The learned Single Judge, as we have already noticed in paragraph no. 12, has taken the view that this omission on the part of the petitioner is not fatal to maintain the writ petition. Secondly, as we have already noticed, the learned Single Judge has also found that the petitioner has locus standi.

35. As far as demand and refusal, which is the ordinarily rule to maintain a writ of mandamus is concerned, this is a principle, which is insisted upon with a purpose. A cause of action for a writ of mandamus will arise only when a demand is made and either there is refusal or there is inordinate delay. This is to afford an opportunity to the public functionary or even a private person (who is saddled with the public duty). Insisting on this cannot be an idle formality in the ordinary circumstances. If parties come to the Court without making a demand and waiting for the refusal or without waiting for a reasonable time, Courts, which are already burdened with docket explosion, would be faced with the cases, which are filed, where they could get relief before the authorities, if they had approached them. However, it is also true that there can be situations where a mandamus will be an appeal from caesar to caesar's wife. It would be an absolute exercise in futility. For instance, if Government has already enunciated a policy and the officers, under the Government, are expected to abide by the policy and yet Courts insist that the applicant must approach the authority to act contrary to the policy. Thus, as noticed by the learned Single Judge himself, exercises in formality are not insisted upon by Courts and, in such cases, where the demand would be unfruitful, it is always open to the parties to approach the Court seeking a writ of mandamus or direction in the nature thereof without making a demand. Applying the said principles to the facts of this case, actually, we would think that the learned Single Judge may not be justified in taking the view that a demand made to the Government to comply with the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court or to put in place a system was avoidable on the ground that it would have produced no results. We would think that the petitioner should have made an approach to the authorities to put in place reasonable norms for the appointment of the Government Advocates and even when the Hon'ble Apex Court, if according to him, had laid down the law binding on all authorities in India to comply with the same. Therefore, we would think that the reasoning, as such, may not be correct; but, we do not wish to rest our judgment on the said basis alone.