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8. Per Contra, the learned counsel for the respondent opposed the insant petition. It is submitted that the cheque in issue was issued by the accused Company, making it the drawer of the cheque, however, the petitioner failed to make the accused Company a party to the complaint and it was only at a subsequent stage that the Company was included in the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act. It is submitted that the Company was a necessary party to the statutory notice as well as the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the NI Act, however, the said notice was not issued to the accused Company in accordance with law. It is submitted that in light of the above facts the complaint filed by the petitioner was not maintainable against the accused Company on the ground that the legal notice was not issued to it and also it was not maintainable against the respondent since he only signed the cheque in question on behalf of the accused Company. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd. (2008) 13 SCC 703, Vijay Power Generators Ltd. vs. Sumit Seth, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2957, Kirshna Texport & Capital Markets Ltd. v. Ila A. Agrawal, (2015) 8 SCC 28, amongst others to give force to his arguments.

9. In rejoinder, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgment of Aneeta Hada (Supra), which the respondent has relied upon, is not applicable since, in the judgment Aneeta Hada was an office bearer in the company and not its director, the cheques issued in the case was against the liability of the company and not against her personal liability and the fact was proved in the trial after leading evidence in the matter, hence, the facts in the judgment and the matter at hand are distinguishable.

15. Further, reference is made to N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663, where the understated has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:-

"22. The High Court failed to appreciate that the liability of the appellant (if any in the context of the facts of the present case) is only statutory because of his legal status as the Director of Dakshin. Every person signing a cheque on behalf of a company on whose account a cheque is drawn does not become the drawer of the cheque. Such a signatory is only a person duly authorised to sign the cheque on behalf of the company/drawer of the cheque. If Dakshin/drawer of the cheque is sought to be summoned for being tried for an offence under Section 138 of the Act beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Act, the appellant cannot be told in view of the law declared by this Court in Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] that he can make no grievance of that fact on the ground that Dakshin did not make any grievance of such summoning. It is always open to Dakshin to raise the defence that the initiation of prosecution against it is barred by limitation. Dakshin need not necessarily challenge the summoning order. It can raise such a defence in the course of trial.
21. This Court in Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] (SCC p. 668, para 1), had an occasion to examine the question "whether an authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for brevity "the Act") without the company being arraigned as an accused" and held as follows : (SCC p. 688, para 59) "59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. ..."