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The de-facto complainant in Crime No.1020 of 2016 on the file of Banjara Hills Police Station, Hyderabad, filed the present criminal petition under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C r/w Section 482 Cr.P.C, claiming multiple reliefs viz., to set-aside/quash/cancel the order passed by the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, In-Charge Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for Trail of Communal Offices Cases-cum-VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad dated 05.12.2017, granting anticipatory bail to Respondent No.2/Accused No.11 passed under Section 438 Crl.P.C in Crl.M.P.No.3726 of 2017 in the above crime, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471 r/w Section 34 & 120B of IPC.

The second respondent/A-11 did not file any counter. During hearing, learned Senior Counsel Sri V. Ravi Kiran Rao appearing for the petitioner reiterated the grounds raised in the grounds of petition, while relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar , Maruti Nivrutti Navale v. State of Maharashtra to contend that the Sessions Judge totally ignored the principles while granting pre-arrest bail. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner drawn attention of this Court to Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan where the Apex Court pointed out as to whether bail can be cancelled by exercising power under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also brought to the notice of this Court, judgment of the Apex Court in Abdul Basit alias Raju and others v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary and another where the Apex Court drew the distinction line between review/recall/quashment from cancellation of bail order. Finally, Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that filing of successive bail applications without any changed circumstances and obtaining pre-arrest bail from the in-charge officer would amount to bench haunting and placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jagmohan Bahl and another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another . On the strength of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above judgments, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner sought to set-aside/quash/cancel the impugned order.

ii) The provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.

viii) An interim bail order can be passed under Section 438 of the Code without notice to the Public Prosecutor but notice should be issued to the Public Prosecutor or to the Government advocate forthwith and the question of bail should be re-examined in the light of respective contentions of the parties. The ad-interim order too must conform to the requirements of the Section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant even at that stage.

Thus, the Sessions Judge passed the impugned order without following the guidelines issued by the Apex Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia case (referred supra) and Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre vs State Of Maharashtra (referred supra), and by totalling ignoring the guidelines, passed the present impregnable order, which is sought to be annulled by exercising power under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C, directing the second respondent/A-11 to surrender before the police.

Section 439(2) Cr.P.C did not specify the circumstances under which the Court can issue such direction. In the absence of any such circumstances for exercising such power under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C, this Court has no option except to fall back on the law declared by various Courts. Hence, this order is only a deductive or order a priori, but not inferential.