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3. For a proper appreciation of the question referred, it would be necessary to mention here what was the law applicable to compromise decrees under the Code before its amendment by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976. Order 23. Rule 3 provided that where it is proved that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the court shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit. Order 43. Rule 1(m) provided that an appeal shall lie from an order under Order 23, Rule 3. recording or refusing to record a compromise. Under Section 96(3) no appeal lay from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. The Privy Council in Znhirul Said v. Lashmi Narayan. AIR 1932 P. C. 251 has held that the proper method for questioning a consent decree is either by review or by regular suit and not by way of appeal. The Supreme Court in K. C. Dora v. G. Annamanaidu. AIR 1974 SC 1069 has held that Order 23, Rule 3 not only permits a partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful agreement, but further gives a mandate to the court to record it and pass a decree in terms of such compromise or adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit. If the compromise agreement was lawful, the decree to the extent it was a consent decree, was not appealable because of the express bar in Section 96(3). Therefore, it appears that the law as it stood before the amendment in 1976 was that a consent decree can be set aside in a Miscellaneous Appeal and not by way of regular appeal under Order 43, Rule l(m) and also by way of a civil suit. Further there was unanimity in the dicisions of the High Courts that a consent decree which is not lawful, i.e. void, can be set aside and an appeal was competent in spite of Section 96(3). However, the minority view was that even if the factum of compromise is in dispute still an appeal will be barred in view of Section 96(3). The Madras, Lahore, Patna, Calcutta and Travancore & Cochin High Courts have taken the view that even if the compromise is resiled by one of the parties, still no appeal will be competent in view of Section 96(3). Govindaswami v. Kaliaperumal, AIR 1921 Mad 696 Gurchaman Singh v. Shibdev Singh, AIR 1922 Lahore 309, Sabitri Thakurain v. Mrs. F. A. Savi, AIR 1933 Pat 306, Mahammad Mia v. Osman Ali, AIR 1935 Cal 239 and B. Meerakutty v. K. Meerakutty, AIR 1952 Trav Co. 91. However, this court in Renuka v. Onkar, AIR 1918 Nag 129 has held that the right of appeal generally given against all decrees by Section 96, Sub-sections (1) and (2) Civil P. C., is only withheld by Sub-section (3) in the case of decree passed with the consent of parties. Sub-section (3) is limited to cases where the parties invite the court to pass a particular decree and the court acts accordingly. A decree based on a finding arrived at by the Court against the consent of one party, to the effect that the matter in dispute has been compromised, is not a decree passed with the consent of parties and Section 96(3) has therefore no application to it. The same view has been taken in Mt. Ummakulsum v. Ghulam Rasul, AIR 1929 Sind 32 that Section 96(3) does not bar a right of appeal by a person who denies that he was a party to the alleged compromise. Majority of the decisions were to the effect that when challenge to the compromise decree which is not altogether void but only voidable, i.e. entered into by fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation, then the matter is not within the ambit of Rule 3 of Order 23 and must be left to be decided by a separate suit. An appeal was provided under Order 43, Rule l(m) against recording or non-recording of the compromise. Therefore, the law as it stood, apart from filing an appeal under Order 43, Rule l(m), recourse can be had against the compromise decree by way of filing a separate suit.