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40. The next dispute, which follows from the dispute dealt with in the preceding paragraph, is that, according to the society, since the transaction was not of sale, Chapter XX-A, as it stood on the relevant date, had no application to the facts of the case. Prior to its amendment by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1981, with effect from 1-7-1982, Section 269A(d) defined 'fair market value' merely with reference to an immovable property transferred by sale. It had no reference to a transfer by any other mode than a sale. It was only after the amendment of Section 269A(d) that the transfers, by way of leases, were covered by the provisions of Chapter XX-A. On behalf of the competent authority, it is stoutly maintained that since the transaction was sale, and nothing but sale, this agrument was not available to the society. In the circumstances, the main question that will have to be answered by us is, whether the instrument dated 14-7-1972, brought about a sale of the property, or whether it was merely an assignment of lease. We have already answered this question in the preceding paragraph to the effect that the deed dated 14-7-1972 merely evidenced an assignment of lease, since on the relevant date, i.e., 14-7-1972, i.e., the date of the deed, or even on the date on which it was registered with the Registrar, i.e., on 1-11-1976, the assignment of lease was not within the purview of Chapter XX-A. The assignment of leases came within the scope of this Chapter only after 1-7-1982. Therefore, in our opinion, the competent authority could not have invested himself with jurisdiction to assail this transaction under Chapter XX-A. The entire proceedings suffer from lack of jurisdiction.