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17. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the above provisions of the Punjab Police Rules permitting the opening of history sheet and vesting discretion with the Superintendent of Police for directing the placing of the name of a person whom he considered to be habitual offender in the surveillance register and also the mode of surveillance are unconstitutional as those Rules not only unreasonably curtail that person's right to move freely throughout the territory of India but also infringe his right to privacy which is an essential ingredient of fundamental right of personal liberty. He relied on the decision of the Supreme court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., . He urged that minority view in that case laying down that surveillance by the police was unconstitutional, having been approved as the correct law in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, , the provisions authorising surveillance have now to be held as unconstitutional.

30. After noticing the minority view in Kharak Singh's case (1963-2 Cri LJ 329) (SC) and after reviewing the American case law, Mathew, J. speaking for the Court held thus :-

"The right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development. Thereafter, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterise as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute."

31. The minority view in Kharak Singh's case having been held to be correct law it is no longer necessary to assume that the right to privacy is not a fundamental right. It is now to be presumed that right of privacy is a right which emanates from the three rights namely the freedom of speech, the right to personal liberty and the right to move freely throughout India. That appears to be the settled law. The right of privacy, however, is not absolute as no fundamental right is absolute as no fundamental right is absolute. For compelling interests of the State, in Govind's case (1975 Cri LJ 1111) (supra) the provisions of law, authorising surveillance including the domiciliary visits at night were held to be valid. The principle laid down was :

"As regulation 856 has the force of law it cannot be said that the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 has been violated by the provisions contained in it; for, what is guaranteed under that Article is that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by the procedure established by 'law'. We think that the procedure is reasonable having regard to the provisions of Regulations 853(c) and 857. Even if we hold that Article 19(1)(d) guarantees to a citizen a right to privacy in his movement as an emanation from that Article and is itself a fundamental right, the question will arise whether Regulation 856 is a law imposing reasonable restriction in public interest on the freedom of movement falling within Article 19(5), or, even if it be assumed that Article 19(5) does not apply in terms as the right to privacy of movement cannot be absolute. A law imposing reasonable restriction upon it for compelling interest of State must be upheld as valid".