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10. Mr. Vakil's argument then was that the term 'impotency' used in Section 12(1) of the Act has not been defined in the Act, and since this Act is intended to codify the existing law relating to marriage amongst Hindus, it is necessary to find out its meaning as understood by Hindus, under their personal law that prevailed prior to this Act came in force in 1955. According to him, in the Hindu Scriptures the marriage was said to be not only for the highest conjugal happiness but also for procreation of children. It was pointed out that one can go into those scriptures-on the basis of which law regarding marriage amongst the Hindus was evolved, and in fact the Legislature has attempted to bring in various matters in different provisions of this Act. Section 5 Clause (4) of the Act prohibits marriage between parties who are within degrees of prohibited relationship, unless custom or usage permits. Clause 5 thereof, prohibits marriage between parties who are Sapindas of each other unless custom permits the same. It is also true that under Section 7(1) a Hindu marriage is to be solemnised in accordance with customary rites and ceremonies of either party. Those rites and ceremonies include the Saptapadi (that is taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire) and it is then that the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken as contemplated in Clause 2 of Section 7. It was thus urged that when the term impotency is not defined or explained anywhere in the Act, one need not go to what is meant thereby in western countries or in other communities, but adopt a meaning as understood in Hindu Law as governing the Hindus. A reference to Verse 19 from Narad Smriti (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 33, Chapter 12, P. 169) was made to show that women are created for the sake of propagation. The verse runs this:

11. Now it is true that law relating to marriage amongst Hindus is codified under this Act, and while doing so, the Legislature has incorporated all that was proper and necessary from the old law governing marriage amongst Hindus. Besides, one of the purposes behind marriage may have been to procreate children in old times, but absence of achieving the same-with marriage solemnised amongst Hindus, at no time entitled the husband to have his marriage dissolved much less annulled. The marriage then was a sacrament-SansKara-and it remained, and it was only invalid, if any of them lacked physical capacity to cohabit with the other. In A. v. B. 54 B.L.R. p. 725, it has been observed that any marriage, under any system of law, postulates that the parties who go through the ceremony of marriage have the physical capacity to get married, the initial purpose being cohabitation. Apart from this, we have Section 4 of the Act, which has the overriding effect over the texts, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act. In other words, all that ceases to have any application with respect of any matter relating to marriage for which provision is made in this Act. If what Mr. Vakil urges, were intended to convey by the term "impotent" occurring in Section 12(a) of the Act, it would have been so defined and made clear. As I said above, not only no such law prevailed before-as to enable a husband to get divorce in case she were not able to beget children by reason of such absence of uterus, but no annulment of marriage on that account was ever suggested. No such ground for divorce is also made available to the husband under the present Act. When that is so, impotency meant not incapacity to beget children by reason of absence of uterus, but meant capacity to give physical sexual satisfaction to her husband. The term has to be given its meaning as we find in English Dictionaries-or in the decisions of different Courts-interpreting or explaining the use of this term under any such Act.

12. Now the term 'impotent' has been described in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 12, at page 228, to be such a state of mental or physical condition which makes consummation of the marriage a practical impossibility. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 42, at page 410, it is stated that the term 'impotent' has been held synonymous with "incapacity for copulation, or sexual intercourse. " In other words, the incapacity for sexual intercourse is an essential ingredient of impotency. Such an inability may arise from a variety of causes including the mental and physical disability. In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 20, at page 284, it has been stated that want of power for copulation is impotence, but mere sterility is not. 'Impotency' thus means incapacity to perform the act of sexual intercourse that is to say, inability to copulate. In the case of Jagdish Kumar v. Sita Devi A.I.R. 1963 Punjab 114, it was held that incapacity of sexual intercourse is an essential ingredient of impotency under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. In another case of Jadishlal v. Smt. Syama Madan and Ors. , the term 'impotent' used in Section 12(1)(a) of the Act, was held to be meaning incapacity for accomplishing act of sexual intercourse, and in this context it means not partial or imperfect, but a normal and complete coitus. It was then observed that impotency has to be distinguished from sterility which may in cases accompany impotency, but is not necessarily associated with it. A person may be incapable of accomplishing sexual act, yet be capable of procreating; conversely also a person may be incapable of procreating, and yet be capable of accomplishing sexual act. The case before us, is of this latter type-as of one who cannot procreate, but can give sexual satisfaction to her husband. Thus sterility is not impotency in a woman, and that is no ground for annulment of marriage under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act.

15. In the case before us, as already stated above, it is clearly established that she did not lack that capacity to consummate marriage with her husband after she under-went operations in September 1960. Much though, therefore, she was not capable of 'procreating' she having no uterus or cervix, that does not render her 'impotent' under Section 12(1)(a)of the Act. She was thus not impotent at the time of instituting the proceedings under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. Therefore, the learned Judge was perfectly right in disallowing the relief sought for annulment of the marriage under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act.