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14. In that case a claim for payment of minimum wages was made under the Payment of Wages Act before the authority prescribed under that Act. The claim for wages was covered both by the Minimum Wages Act and the Payment of Wages Act. The contention raised on behalf of the employer before the Division Bench was that the jurisdiction of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act to grant relief to the workers who claimed the statutory wage fixed by the Minimum Wages Act was ousted by the jurisdiction of the authority created under the Minimum Wages Act to grant the same relief. The Division Bench examined the provisions of the two Acts so as to the mode of recovery and the relief that should be granted under each Act. The employers there also relied on the well-known canon of construction, namely, that where a special right is created by a special statute and a specific statutory remedy is also provided by that statute, the special remedy is the only remedy to be resorted to. The Division Bench has observed in Para. 18 of the judgment that the mere fact that the Act provides an inexpensive and expeditious machinery to enable the workers to realize the benefits conferred by the Act did not by itself imply that the benefits granted by the Act were necessary confined to the remedy provided therein. With reference to the bar to the jurisdiction of the civil Court under S. 24 of the Minimum Wages Act, the Division Bench has observed that if the contention regarding exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of the authority under the Minimum Wages Act were to be accepted, S. 24 itself would be unnecessary and jurisdiction of ordinary Courts of law would have been barred to entertain any claim made in the application under the Minimum Wages Act. The Court held that if S. 24 had not provided the bar to the filing of the suit, the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts of law to entertain suits for recovery of minimum wages would not have been affected by the mere fact that an expeditious and inexpensive remedy is provided by the Minimum Wages Act. It was further pointed out that even though jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred under S. 24, no such bar in respect of authority under the Payment of Wages Act was constituted under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. With respect, not only we are bound by this decision so far as the principle is concerned, but we agree that the mere fact that the special statute operates rights and provides a remedy for inexpensive and speedy enforcement of that right will not ordinarily bar the jurisdiction of other authorities to give the same relief. But, what is more important to be noticed in the instant case is that the remedy provided by Ss. 33C(1) and 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act came to be included in the statute book for the first time in 1956. The legislative history of this section has been elaborately considered in the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India, Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan [1963 - II L.L.J. 89 at pp, 93-94]. When this section was introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act in 1956, the Parliament was fully aware of the provisions both of the Minimum Wages Act and the Payment of Wages Act. That of these Acts provides remedies to the workers for recovery of amounts due to them or benefits accruing to them was known to the legislature. In spite of the provisions in these Acts, Ss. 33C(1) and 33C(2) have been incorporated in the most general terms. Whereas Sub-section (1) of of S. 33C provides for recovery of money due to a workman under settlement or award, or under the provisions of Chap. V-A, the ambit of jurisdiction of the labour court to give relief to a workman entitled to receive from his employer any benefit is obviously much wider. We may here notice that S. 33C(2), as it was originally incorporated in 1956, did not in terms refer to a claim for money in addition to benefit. This has been added by Act 36 of 1964, i.e., Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1964. In fact, relying on this amendment the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that but for this amendment, a claim in the nature of a money claim, whether for wages or otherwise, could not be the subject-matter of enquiry or decision under S. 33C(2) by a labour court. We do not think such a contention is tenable. But we will the have occasion to deal with this question a little later. What we are at present concerned is the objection raised on behalf of the petitioner that S. 33C(2) is not available to a workman when his claim is in effect a claim which could be legitimately made to an authority under the Minimum Wages Act. It is undoubtedly true that in the present case what the respondent-workers are claiming is a difference between the wage paid and the minimum rate of wages fixed by the Government per bidi-roller. It is also true that such a claim could be properly enquired into and decided under S. 20(3) of the Minimum Wages Act. But we do not see how merely because a remedy, and certainly a cheap and expeditious remedy, is provided under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, that would ipso facto exclude the jurisdiction of other authorities such as the labour court under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, for entertaining similar claims. It is also true that there is some difference in the procedure and the consequences of the enquiry and finding according as a claim is made to the authority under the Minimum Wages Act or to a labour court under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The authority under the Minimum Wages Act is empowered to direct not only payment of the minimum rate of wages but also to grant compensation up to a certain maximum. The mode of recovery of the amount is through a magistrate as if the amount directed to be paid were a fine imposed by a magistrate. There is no appeal provided against the decision of the authority. If the application before the authority succeeds, the person responsible for payment of wages is required to pay a certain amount of court-fee, and the amount of such court-fee is liable to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. On the other hand, if a labour court entertains such claims under S. 33C(2), the mode of recovery is the same as is provided under S. 33C(1), and that mode is by issue of a certificate for the amount to the Collector who can proceed to recover the same in the same manner as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Against the decision of the labour court also there is no right of appeal.

15. In our opinion, when the object of incorporating a provision like Ss. 33C(1) and 33C(2) in the Industrial Disputes Act by the Amendment Act of 1956 was to provide an easy and inexpensive remedy for an individual workman, emphasis being on the rights of an individual workman, we do not see any cogent reasons why recourse to the labour court should be considered excluded by implication from the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. The principle that the special excludes the general will also not be applicable in this case for the simple reason that when the Minimum Wages Act was put on the statute book there was no such provision like S. 33C(1) or 33C(2) in its present form in any other statute. The history of industrial relations in this country shows that various aspects of giving protection to workers and making provisions for enforcement of the privileges granted to industrial workers are attempted in different legislations both by the Central and the State Governments. But the distinguishing feature of a provision like Ss. 33C(1) and 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act passed by the Parliament is that it covers the case of every workman against his employer irrespective of the provision of law under which the right arises or is claimed. We are not, therefore, impressed with the argument that the remedy provided by S. 33C(2) is impliedly barred because provision has been made for enforcement of the right before the authority under the Minimum Wages Act.