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D.P.Wadhwa. J.

Leave granted.

There are 4 appellants. All are employees of the respondent Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), a body constituted under the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 (for short, the 'Act'). They were, however, dismissed from service by order dated January 13, 1996. They approached the Punjab and Haryaba High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. High Court, by the impugned judgment dated April 18, 1998, refused to grant any relief to them and rather told them to avail alternative remedy provided under Section 1.42 of the Act by filing appeal against the orders of dismissal to the Sikh Gurdwara Judicial Commission. Aggrieved these four employees have approached this Court.

(3) The Board or any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Commission under the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (20 may, within ninety days of the orders, appeal to the High Court."

Executive Committee of the Board in exercise of its powers has framed Service Rules for the employees of SGPC prescribing their service conditions which include their appointment and removal from service. Rules 4 and 5 provided for dismissal and termination of services of the employees of the SGPC and they are as under :

A mere reading of various provisions of the Act and Rules set out above unmistakably show that SGPC is a creation of the statute and Service Rules framed by it exercise of its statutory power have force of law. Any violation of the provision of the Act and the Rules will certainly make SGPC amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution. We do not find any basis for the SGPC to contend that no writ can be issued against it even if its action is contrary to the provision of law and the Rules framed thereunder. SGPC is a creation of the statute. It has to act within the four corners of the law constituting it and the rules framed by it under the powers conferred upon it under the Act. We do not think any discussion is needed to dispel this argument by the SGPC that it is immune from the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Language of Article 226 does not admit of any limitation on the powers of the High Court for the exercise of its jurisdiction thereunder. Subba Rao, J. in Dwarkanath vs. ITO 1965 (3) SCR 536) said that Article 226 "is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against who it can be exercised."

We have examined the provisions of Section 142. It does not provide any alternative remedy to an employee of the SGPC, who has been dismissed or whose services have been terminated. Section 142 does not cover any such type of case. In our view High Court in Ajaib Singh case rightly held that Section 142 of the Act was inapplicable in the case and that petitioner therein could not seek remedy under Section 142, which does not provide any alternative remedy.

In the impugned judgment we find that unfortunately High Court side tracked the issues raised before it which were fully covered by its earlier decision in Ajaib Singh case. High Court in Ajaib Singh case had said that writ did lie against SGPC in case where its employee was dismissed in violation of the service rules and further that Section 142 did not provide any alternative remedy. In spite of this clear statement of law laid by the earlier Bench High Court dismissed the writ petition by the impugned judgment and asked the appellants to seek alternative remedy under Section 142 of the Act. High Court, in our view, was unnecessarily swayed by irrelevant consideration while interpreting statutory provisions. Impugned judgment of the High Court, therefore, does not stand any further scrutiny and is liable to be set aside.