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19. The third ground that the learned Counsel for the respondent, urged is that the plaintiff society is a registered cooperative society engaged in formation of layout and using the land for non-agricultural purpose, it cannot hold an agricultural land in view of the provisions of Sections 79B and 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (in short referred to as 'Act') and submitted that there is a clear legal bar to hold the agricultural land by a person who is not an agriculturist and further submitted that the plaintiff being a society and not engaged in agricultural activity is not entitled to hold agricultural land. It is further submitted that, what is agreed to be sold is an agricultural land and is not liable to be transferred in favour of the plaintiff as the plaintiff is barred to hold land in view of the provisions of Sections 79B and 80 of the Act. In this connection, he relied on the judgment reported in AIR 2001 GUJARAT 90 in the case of Ashwinkumar Manilal Shah and Ors. v. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Ors. and submitted that the agreement becomes invalid in view of the provisions of Sections 79B and 80 of the Act. Similarly, he relied on the judgment in the case of V. Gunda Reddy v. The Secretary Department Of Revenue and Ors. and submitted that Sections 79B and 109 bar the holding of the agricultural lands by the society.

24. As against the ready and willingness, the learned senior counsel submitted that he has already made submission and in addition to that he submitted that when the defendant No. 2 in his written statement admits that there was a legal bar for execution of the sale deeds, now defendants cannot be allowed to urge that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As against the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent, that the contract is violative of Section 79B and 80 of the Act, learned senior counsel referred to Sections 79B and 80 of the Act and further he referred to Section 132 of the Act and pointed out that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether transaction under the agreement of sale is in violation of Sections 79B and 80 of the Act. It is the exclusive domain of the statutory authority under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and he further submitted that this issue cannot be agitated in this appeal or in the suit and further he pointed out that there is no Pleading or issue raised before the trial Court. He referred to Section 32, which reads thus:

No civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by, the Deputy Commissioner, an authority under Sub clause (1) of Section 77, Assistant Commissioner, prescribed authority under Section 83, the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, Karnataka Appellate Tribunal or the State Government in exercise of their power of control

25. He submitted that any dispute relating to violation of Sections 79B and 80, which is required to be adjudicated under Section 83 are required to be dealt with only by the statutory authorities under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and not by the Civil Court. In this connection, he relied on the judgment reported in ILR 1973 KAR 211 in the case of Rangarao v. Raghavendracarya and pointed out that the question whether the transaction is contrary to any of the provisions of the Act (Mysore Land Reforms Act) has to be decided by the prescribed authority under Section 83 and not by any other authority. The Civil Court cannot decide whether the transaction is void or not. He further submitted that in view of the exclusive power having been conferred on the statutory authority, it is the said authority alone which can exercise that power and not he Civil Court. Civil Court can only decide whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree for specific performance or not. He also relied on another judgment of this Court in the case of Kanvihalu Cmnnappa v. Tiqari Shivappa and Ors. a case arising under the provisions of Sections 79B and 80 of the Act and submitted that the question whether the sale is in contravention of Sections 79B and 80 would arise only when the sale is completed and not before. The provisions of Sections 79B and 80 of the Act would be attracted only after the execution of the sale deed and not before the same. He also submitted that the violation arises when there is a transfer of the agricultural land by registered sale deed and not before the actual transfer of the same. Learned senior counsel also relied on the another judgment reported in 1987(1) KLJ 16 in the case of Jose v. Anantha Bhat and submitted that the Civil Court is not competent to decide the issues covered under Section 132 of the Act. The question as to the legality or illegality of such transaction cannot by itself create bar to enforce the contract on plausible result of such enquiry under Section 83 of the Act and further submitted that such a contention is not taken either in this appeal or in the suit. He also pointed out that the grant of decree for specific performance of contract does not attract the provisions of Section 79B or Section 80 of the Act. In this regard, he also referred to another decision in the case of Yogambika v. Narsingh and pointed out that even in case where there is a bar of transfer of land for a period of 10 years, this Court has held that such non-alienation clause of 10 years would not bar for granting decree of specific performance of the contract. He also relied on another judgment mentioned supra and referred to paragraph-4 to 6:

By reading of the provisions of Section 132, it makes it clear that it is not for the Civil Court to decide as to whether there is a contravention of the provisions of Sections 79B or 80 of the Act, when such a power is conferred exclusively on the authority prescribed under Section 83. In this regard it is useful to refer to the decision in the matter of State Of Karnataka v. Krjshnaji Srintvas Kulkarni and Ors. , wherein it. is held that the questions which are required to be decided by the authorities under the Act, the Civil Court, is not conferred with the jurisdiction to decide the same. In this case undisputedly, the question raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents requires to be decided only by the authority prescribed under Section 83 of the Act. In the similar circumstances, the Apex Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1986 SC 1912 in the case of Rojasara Ramjibhai Dahyabhai v. Jani Narottamdas Lallubhai, (Dead By Lr has held that the decree for specific performance of the contract cannot be denied on the ground of the non-fulfilment of the conditions of procuring necessary sanction from the Collector and it also held that there is no legal impediment in the way of executing the sale deed. This aspect of the matter is also further fortified by a judgment in Kanvihalli Chinnappa v. Tigari Shivappa and Ors. wherein this Court interpreting the provisions of Sections 79B and 80 of the Act has held: