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1. The question raised in this special appeal is whether, according to Hindu law, an unchaste mother is entitled to succeed to the properties of a deceased son, it being established that she became unchaste before the succession opened out to her?

2. The District Judge in the lower Appellate Court has answered this question in the affirmative. In this opinion we do not concur. The District Judge relies upon a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court--Musamat Ganga Jati v. Ghasita I.L.R., 1 All., 46. He is also of opinion, upon the authority of the judgments of Mr. Justice Markby and the Chief Justice Sir Barnes Peacock in the case of Matangini Debi v. Joykali Debi 5 B.L.R., 466, that Act XXI of 1850 removed the bar to the succession of an unchaste woman arising from loss of caste.

3. The question raised in the case before the Allahabad High Court was different. It was whether unchastity in a woman does not incapacitate her from inheriting any stridhan property? And the Court held that it did not. But the lower Appellate Court relies upon a portion of the judgment of the Officiating Chief Justice, in which he says that he was a party to a decision holding" that want of chastity in a mother does not defeat her right of inheritance." The case referred to is Musamat Deokee v. Sookhdeo 2 N.W.P.H.C. Rep. 361. The decision in that case is, that a mother, who has already inherited from her son an estate, is not divested of it by reason of her subsequent unchastity. The same view of the law has been taken by the majority of Judges in the case of a widow's inheritance by a Full Bench of this Court in Kery Kolitani v. Moniram Kolita 13 B.L.R., 1. But the question in this case is different. Here the mother is alleged to have become unchaste before the son's death, or, in other words, before the succession to the estate opened out to her. These cases, therefore, do not support the view taken by the lower Appellate Court.

4. Then as regards the effect of Act XXI of 1850, the question becomes material only if the exclusion of the mother from the right of inheritance be based solely upon the ground of the loss of caste arising from unchastity. I shall refer to this question after I deal with the grounds upon which I think that a mother guilty of unchastity before the estate vests in her is precluded from inheritance according to Hindu law.

5. As a general rule females, according to Hindu law, have no right of inheritance. The widow, the daughter, the moth or, the grandmother and the great-grand mother are exceptions to this general rule. But their right of inheritance is subject to certain special rules. These rules have been at some length discussed and enunciated by the author of the Dayabhaga in the chapter on inheritance of the widow. But they are intended to apply to all the individuals of this exceptional class.

Maclean, J.

19. I cannot pretend to add any weight to the exposition of Hindu law as applicable to this case, which has just been delivered by Mr. Justice Mitter. I will, therefore, content myself with saying that I concur with him in holding that the authorities quoted all point in the same direction, and show that the position of a woman in respect of inheritance is the same, whether she be a widow succeeding to her husband, or a mother succeeding her childless son. But I certainly do not consider it satisfactory that we have been called upon to consider a matter which may really be of great importance in what I will call a speculative case. In this case the plaintiff based his claim on the alleged unchastity of the defendant Durga Sundari, and the Subordinate Judge, who went fully into the evidence bearing upon that question, dismissed the suit, on the ground that her unchastity was not proved. The District Judge has not pronounced any opinion upon this point, but has confirmed the Subordinate Judge's decision, on the ground that, even if Durga Sundari became unchaste before succeeding her son, she did not forfeit her right of inheritance. In our opinion, this is not a correct view of the Hindu law applicable to the case, and consequently the question of fact, viz., whether Durga Sundari was unchaste or not, has still to be decided by the Judge. Had the District Judge come to the same conclusion as the Subordinate Judge, the question we now decide need not have been raised at all; and it would have been better that it should not have been raised except under real necessity.