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"But, of course, if there is an alternative remedy which is provided in the law under which a particular action taken or an order is made, it is necessary that first that alternative remedy should be exhausted ..." (Underlining supplied).

This alternative remedy, therefore, could never be the general remedy of a civil suit which is by way of a collateral attack and which would be available in every case for ultra vires orders unless it is specifically excluded. The amplitude Of this fetter is made dependent on the existence of the other effective alternative remedy which is in terms provided whether by the specific law or under the subordinate legislation of such law. One thing is certain that such alternative remedy must be specifically provided for Therefore, the amplitude of the fetter would depend on the amplitude of such alternative remedy which is provided ford direct attack by or under the other law in question and not on any general remedy of a civil suit by way of a collateral attack.

12. Mr. Vakharia vehemently argued that the distinction between a real and a purported order could not exist in the context of this amendment under Article 226(3) because the fetter is all comprehensive once -any kind of remedy is shown to exist whether by way of the statutory appeal, revision etc., directly or even by a collateral attack in a civil Court. We cannot agree to that contention for the simple reason that although the writ jurisdiction has been restricted by specifying the particular purpose in Cls. (b) and (c) for which now the writ jurisdiction could: be exercised, the grounds for such supervisory writ jurisdiction are still contraventions of constitutional or other provisions of law including orders, rules, regulations, bye-laws or other instruments made there under or the illegalities committed by the authorities acting under those provisions. Even this new ground would show that the distinction between a real,: and a purported order which is an ultra vires order substantively or procedurally by not remaining within the limited bounds or the mandated area or because of non-compliance of fundamental essential provisions of law or principles of natural justice which would make such orders nullities or ex facie without jurisdiction would be all the more material. If in England where the Parliament was supreme and where it had introduced non-certiorari clauses in the Act of the Parliament, this distinction had been adopted by the House of Lords in the decision in Anosmatic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 1 All ER 208 so that statutory tribunals and authorities would be kept within their limited bounds or the mandated area and would not become absolute, the same material distinction between a real and a purported order must be adopted when our constitutional amendment under Art. 226(3) has not introduced the no certiorari clause but has only introduced a mere fetter as to the stage at which the writ jurisdiction should be exercised after exhausting the alternative efficacious normal remedy under the law.

26. Even in H. P. M. Trivedi v. V. B. Raju, AIR 1973 SC 2602 at pp. 2607-8, such wide amplitude was held to be of the election laws in question for preparation of electoral rolls and an intention was inferred to withhold judicial review by treating even the question of ordinary residence for the purpose of entering -a person's name in the electoral roll as a decision on a jurisdictional fact within the exclusive jurisdiction of the registering officers and the appellate authorities so that there would be no question of any judicial review by any collateral attack either in a civil Court or even before an election tribunal. in that decision the distinction was noted of cases even in election matters as in Baidyanath Panjiar v. Sita Ram Mahto, AIR 1970 SC 314 which took the view that violation of S. 23 (3) of 1950 Act in entering or deleting the names of persons in the electoral rolls after the last date for deleting the name relates to lack of power. Such exceptional cases where the Act is made a complete Code so that the authority is conferred a wide jurisdiction by making all activities as falling within its jurisdiction and not as collateral, even such purported orders would not be nullities and they would be subject to direct challenge under the normal remedy under the Act and that is why there would be no scope of challenge by collateral attack in a civil Court or in writ jurisdiction without exhausting the wide obligatory normal remedy provided under the Act. On the other 'hand in cases like the present one, under S. 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act. 1944. where appeal provided by the person aggrieved only against decision or order passed by a Central Excise Officer under the Act or the Rules made there under, the amplitude of the appeal remedy would not 'be widened because the appeal remedy is obligatory for decisions or orders passed under the Act and not against purported orders which would be nullities and which could not be cured in appeal as only a nullity would be confirmed in appeal.