Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 422 (4.37 seconds)

Shreejikrupa Project Limited vs Telecommunication Consultants India ... on 26 July, 2023

48. Therefore, whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. Even if the term is essential, the employer has the inherent authority to deviate from it provided the deviation is made applicable to all bidders and potential bidders as held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] . However, if the term is held by the employer to be ancillary or subsidiary, even that decision should be respected. The lawfulness of that decision can be questioned on very limited grounds, as mentioned in the various decisions discussed above, but the soundness of the decision cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court would be taking over the function of the tender issuing authority, which it cannot.
Delhi High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 0 - S C Sharma - Full Document

Sushil Kumar vs Central Registrar Of Coop Socy And Ors on 19 July, 2022

"14. We may also like to point out that the aforesaid examination of the issue undertaken by the High Court is keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in a catena of judgments and the tests which are to be applied to arrive at the decision as to whether a particular authority can be termed as "State" or "other authority" within the meaning of Article 12.It took note of the Constitution Bench decision in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258] wherein the following six tests were culled out from its earlier judgment in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489] : (Ajay Hasia case [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258] , SCC p. 737, para 9) "(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by the Government, it would go a long way 22[(2015) 4 SCC 670] W.P. (C) 2942/2020 & W.P.(C) 2059/2021 Page 42 of 55 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:NEHA Signing Date:19.07.2022 13:45:15 towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government.
Delhi High Court Cites 96 - Cited by 7 - Y Varma - Full Document

Air Vice Marshal J.S. Kumar vs Governing Council Of Air Force And Anr. on 2 January, 2006

53. Applying the above principles, which have been laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions (referred to above) to test whether a body is State under Article 12 of the Constitution or not we are of the opinion that the AFSC is clearly not State under Article 12 of the Constitution. There is no deep and pervasive control of the Government over the AFSC. The funds are provided by private contributions. No doubt the Governing body consists of Air Force officers but that, in our opinion, would not make it State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Government Officers may get together and form a club for their recreation but that club will be a private club and will not become State under Article 12 of the Constitution. The AFSC is clearly a private body run by its own Governing Council, which is autonomous, and is not under Government control. Merely because the Government is providing some benefits and facilities like land for the golf course or a concession in liquor would not make it State under Article 12 of the Constitution.
Delhi High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 7 - M Katju - Full Document

S.D. Siddiqui vs University Of Delhi And Ors. on 19 November, 2005

In the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) SCC 111 , a Bench of Seven Judges of this Court, in para 27 of its judgment has noted and quoted with approval in extenso the aforesaid tests propounded in International Airport Authority case and approved in the case of Ajay Hasia 1981(1) SCC 722 for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression "authority" in Article 12 of the Constitution.
Delhi High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 8 - M Katju - Full Document

Chander Mohan vs Airports Authority Of India on 19 September, 1996

(16) MR.CHANDHIOK has compared the facts of the present case to the facts in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra) to reiterate that the petitioner has no real interest in the matter. Therefore, he is not entitled to any relief. The present petition cannot be termed as bona fide as the petitioner is merely acting at the instance of respondent No.3 with a view to helping him to obtain the contract. Therefore, the award of contract in favour of respondent No.4 cannot be set aside at the instance of the petitioner. The position of law is, however, clearly elucidated in paragraph 35 of the judgment which reads as follows: "35.Now, on this view we should have ordinarily set aside the decision of respondent I accepting the tender of respondents 4 and the contract resulting from such acceptance but in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not think it would be a sound exercise of discretion on our part to upset that decision and void the contract. It does appear from the affidavit filed by the parties 'that the appellant has no real interest in the result of the litigation, but has been put up by A.S. Irani for depriving respondents 4 of the benefit of the contract secured by them. We find that a number of proceedings have been instituted for this purpose from time to time by A.S. Irani either personally or by instigating others to take such proceedings. The first salvo in the battle against respondents 4 was fired by K.S. Irani, proprietor of Cafe Excelsior, who filed a suit challenging the decision of respondent I to accept the tender of respondents 4 but in this suit .he failed to obtain an interim injunction and his appeal was dismissed b'y the High Court on October 19, 1977. It is significant that when the tenders were opened in the office of the Airport Director, Cafe Excelsior vyas represented by A.S. Irani, which shows that either Cafe Excelsior was a nominee of A.S. Irani or in any event K.S. Irani, proprietor of Cafe Excelsior was closely connected with A.S. Irani. Moreover, it is interesting to note that though the tender of respondents 4 was accepted as far back as April 19, 1977, K.S. Irani did not adopt any proceedings immediately but filed the suit only after A.S. Irani was informed by the Airport Director on August 22, 1977 that a final order has been received from the Ministry requiring A.S. Irani to immediately close down his restaurant and snack bars.' It is also a circumstance not without significance that A.S. Irani did not immediately take any proceedings for challenging the'acceptance of the tender of respondents 4, but filed a suit in his own name only after the appeal of K.S. irani was dismissed by the High Court on October 19, 1977. These circumstances clearly indicate that the suit was filed by K.S. Irani at the' instance of A.S. Irani or in any event in concert with him and when the suit of K.S. Irani failed to achieve the desired result, A.S. Irani stepped into the arena and filed his own suit. This suit was for a mandatory injunction seeking removal of the two snack bars which had in the meantime been put up by respondents 4 pursuant to the acceptance of their tender by respondent 1. But in this proceeding also A.S. Irani failed to obtain an ad interim injunction. It was only after the failure to obtain interim relief in these two proceedings, one by K.S. Irani and the other by A.S. Irani, that the appellant filed the present writ petition in the High Court of Bombay challenging the decision of respondent I to accept the tender of respondents 4. Now, it appears from the record that the appellant was at the material time conducting a restaurant called Royal Restaurant and Store which was owned in partnership by 'three persons, namely, J.K. Irani, K.M. Irani and G.S. Irani. G.S. Irani is the brother of A.S. Irani and he was managing and looking after the restaurant of A.S. Irani at the airport. It would, therefore, be a fair inference to make that the appellant was well connected with A.S. Irani and from the manner in which proceedings with.a view to thwarting the attempt of respondents 4 to obtain the benefit of their contract, have been adopted one after the other in different names, it does appear that the appellant has filed the writ petition at the instance of A.S. Irani with a view to helping him to obtain the contract for the restaurant and the snack bars. It is difficult to understand why the appellant should have waited until November 8, 1977 to file the writ petition when the tender of respondents 4 was accepted as far back as April 19, 1977. The explanation given by the appellant is that he was not aware of the acceptance of the tender of respondents 4 but that is a rather naive explanation which cannot be easily accepted. It is not possible to believe that the appellant who was so well connected with A.S. Irani and G.S. Irani did not know that A.S. Irani had failed to obtain the contract for running the restaurant and the snack bars and that this contract had been awarded to respondents 4 as a result of which A.S. Irani was being pressed to close down his restaurant and snack bars. We have grave doubts whether this writ petition was commenced by the appellant bona fide with a view to protecting his own interest. Moreover, the writ petition was filed by the appellant more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of respondents 4 and during this period, respondents 4 incurred considerable expenditure aggregating to about Rs-1,25,000 in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bars and in fact set up the snack bars and started running the same. It would now be most inequitous to set aside the contracts of respondents 4 at the instance of the appellant. The position would have been different if the appellant had filed the writ petition immediately after the acceptance of the tender of respondents 4 but the appellant allowed a period of over five months to elapse during which respondents 4 altered their position. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a fit case in which we should interfere and grant relief to the appellant in the exercise of our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution."
Delhi High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next