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B. Narasimha Reddy, Chairman, ... vs State Of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. By Its ... on 1 May, 2007

In Dr. D.C. Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. and Gurudevdatta VKSS Maryadit and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (60 supra), it was pointed out that the power conferred on the Governor to issue Ordinances is in the nature of an emergency power which is vested with the Governor for taking immediate action where such action may become necessary at a time when the Legislature is not in session. The power to promulgate an Ordinance was stated to be essentially a power to be used to meet an extraordinary situation and to be an emergent power to meet the emergency.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 125 - Cited by 2 - G S Singhvi - Full Document

Telangana State Road Transport ... vs P.Ramesh

(ii) If the literal construction of the language used in the statute reduces its intendment to absurdity and prevents manifest legislative purpose from being carried out, the method of purposive interpretation needs to be necessarily adopted by the Courts [Babu Manmohan Das Shah v. Bishun Das (25 supra), Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil Corporation (26 supra), Forest Range Officer v. P. Mohammed Ali (27 supra), M/s. Giridhari Lal and Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur (28 supra), Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra (29 supra), Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. C.I.T. (30 supra), K.P. Varghese v. I.T.O. (33 supra) and N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose (34 supra)].
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 77 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ramvilas Bajaj vs Ashok Kumar And Anr. on 30 April, 2007

67. It is true that extending the protection of amended Section 32(c), to cases where decrees for eviction or recovery of possession have already been passed and appeal/revisions are pending thereagainst, would inevitably result in all pending actions, in which landlords have applied for possession of their buildings let out to tenants, being set at naught on the ground that the civil Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to try the suits or entertain petitions for execution of decrees. In this context, it is well to remember yet another rule of construction that, when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. (Guruddevdatta's case (supra)).
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 152 - Cited by 9 - G S Singhvi - Full Document

M/S.Showtech Stone International Pvt. ... vs The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer-I, ... on 28 August, 2014

in Section 27 of the A.P. VAT Act inapposite surplusage. Courts have adhered to the principle that effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute, as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra , Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand ; and Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabhinda Bose ). A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 49 - Cited by 1 - R Ranganathan - Full Document

M/S. Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd vs M/S. Sujana Universal Industries ... on 28 July, 2015

Courts have adhered to the principle that effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute, as being inapposite surplussage, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra , Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand ). When the legislative intent is found specific mention and expression in the provisions of the Act itself, the same cannot be whittled down or curtailed and rendered nugatory.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 67 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Dated 02-06-2016 vs M/S. Madhucon Projects Limited Rep., By ...

If, as is now contended before us by Sri Jalakam Satyaram, Learned Standing Counsel for Central Excise, that the intention of the legislature was to bar the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission being invoked again on a penalty being imposed earlier by the Commission for concealment of duty liability before the Central Excise Officer, insertion of the Explanation to Section 32-O(1)(i) was unnecessary, and must be held to be a mere surplussage for, even without the Explanation, Section 32-O(1)(i) should be held to have conveyed the same meaning. Courts have adhered to the principle that effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature, and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra ; Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand ; Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabhinda Bose ). A construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" must be avoided.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 79 - Cited by 0 - R Ranganathan - Full Document

M/S.Vertex Stock & Shares Pvt. Ltd., (In ... vs 1) Sri Vemuri Venkatewara Rao, Ex. ... on 27 September, 2018

Construing the mere making of a default, in complying with any of the requirements of Section 454, an offence as it would then render the words "without reasonable excuse" redundant. (B.K. Bedi1). It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplussage, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the Statute. (Gurudevdatta v. State ; Justice Chandrashekaraiah v. Janejere ; Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand ; Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabhinda Bose ). Any interpretation which leads to addition/deletion of words in a statute or as rendering any statutory provision redundant or a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a dead letter should be avoided. When the legislative intent is found specific mention and expression in the provisions of the Act itself, the same cannot be whittled down or curtailed and rendered nugatory.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 89 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

M/S.Raj Kumar Engineering Pvt. Ltd vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh Rep. By Its ... on 24 September, 2014

Accepting the contention of Sri S. Dwarakanath, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the expression charged to tax should be read as charged and collected tax would require this Court to read the words and collected into Section 15(4)(a) of the Act. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural and ordinary sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning. (Gurudevdatta VKSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra ). The legislature may be safely presumed to have intended what the words plainly say.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 28 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Godrej Sara Lee Limited vs Counsel For The on 1 June, 2017

A pesticide formulation is a combination of active and inert ingredients that form an end-use pesticide product. Active ingredients in pure (technical grade) form are not suitable for application, and pesticides are formulated to make them safer or easier to use. Entry 78-A of the I Schedule to the APGST Act brought within its scope technical grade pesticides or pesticides concentrate. Pesticide formulations (including household pesticides) do not fall within its ambit. If Entry 78 were to be read widely, and construed as bringing within its fold all kinds of pesticides, then pesticides concentrate and technical grade pesticides would also fall within the ambit of Entry 78, and it was wholly unnecessary for the legislature to have prescribed a separate entry i.e., Entry 78-A for pesticides concentrate and technical grade pesticides. Such a construction would also have rendered Entry 78-A redundant. Courts have adhered to the principle that effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature, and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra ; Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand ; Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabhinda Bose ). A construction that reduces one of the provisions to a dead letter must be avoided.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 122 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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