8. Way back in the year 1983, in the matter of Cotton Corporation of
India Limited v. United Industrial Bank Limited and others 1,
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that
winding-up petition is not a recognized mode for recovery of debt
and if the company is shown to be solvent and the debt is bona
fide disputed, the Court should not admit the petition, and held as
under: -
Insofar as the
decisions of the Madras High Court in B.
Mohamed Yousuff (supra) and the Delhi High
Court in Data Infosys Limited and Others
(supra) are concerned, the respondents
contend that the ratio of the said
judgments are not in consonance with the
true purport and effect of the legislative
scheme and therefore this Court may
conclusively and authoritatively decide the
issue.
5. Way back in the year 1983, in the matter of Cotton Corporation of
India Limited v. United Industrial Bank Limited and others 1, Their
Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that winding-up petition is
not a recognized mode for recovery of debt and if the company is shown to
be solvent and the debt is bona fide disputed, the Court should not admit the
petition, and held as under: -
the reliance has been placed on the judgment of Apex Court
in Cotton Corporation of India Limited versus United
Industrial Bank Limited and Others, (1983) 4
Supreme Court Cases 625. As a matter of fact, the point
in issue in that case and as considered by a Division Bench of
Hon'ble Apex Court, was that temporary injunction under
Order 39 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
restraining thereby a person from instituting any proceedings
which he/she is otherwise entitled to institute in a Court not
subordinate to that from which the injunction was sought,
should be granted or not. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been
pleased to decide the question so raised before it in negative
with the observation that the Court has no jurisdiction either
under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act or under its
inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to restrain a person
from instituting any proceeding which such person is
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otherwise entitled to institute in a Court of law not
subordinate to the Court from which the injunction was
.
Fifthly, Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act does not
permit a plaintiff to file a suit for perpetual injunction until
11
and unless the plaintiff pleads that there was an obligation
imposed by law upon the defendant, and the defendant has
breached the said obligation, therefore, the plaintiff is
entitled to a perpetual injunction in his/ her favour.
However, in the present civil suit, the plaintiff has not
sought any relief qua himself; he has sought the reliefs in
favour of the University and the Sponsoring Body. However,
as he has not been authorized properly to file the suit on
behalf of the University. As he has filed the suit on his own
behalf, the relief prayed by the plaintiff in favour of the
University and the Sponsoring Body cannot be granted.
Relying on the case of Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v
United Industrial Bank Limited and Ors [(1983) 4 SCC
625], the learned Senior Counsel has argued that since the
main relief cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiff, the
temporary injunction could also not be granted by the
learned Trial Court. Thus, the learned Civil Judge has erred
in granting the temporary injunction in favour of the
plaintiff.
Insofar as the
decisions of the Madras High Court in B.
Mohamed Yousuff (supra) and the Delhi High
Court in Data Infosys Limited and Others
(supra) are concerned, the respondents
contend that the ratio of the said
judgments are not in consonance with the
true purport and effect of the legislative
scheme and therefore this Court may
conclusively and authoritatively decide the
issue.
13. Similarly, in a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in
the matter of Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc.4, the Supreme Court while noticing the
above-stated Constitution Bench decision and dealing with the
matters of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has followed
the earlier decisions of Madan Gopal Rungta's case (supra),
2 (1983) 4 SCC 625
3 (2012) 1 SCC 321
4 (2012) 9 SCC 552
Arb. Appeal No.29/2017 Page 8 of 10
Cotton Corporation of India (supra) and Ashok Kumar Lingala
(supra) with approval and the principles laid down therein have
been held to be applicable in a proceeding before the Arbitral
Tribunal also, and held that interim relief of injunction can be
granted only during the pendency of civil suit claimed upon the
subject in dispute and interim relief itself must be a part of the
substantive relief to which the plaintiff's cause of action entitled
him. The Constitution Bench further held that no interim relief can
be granted unless it is in aid of and ancillary to main relief that may
be available to party on final determination of rights in the suit
which must be based on a cause of action.
Mr.Rahman, learned counsel for the appellants
in support of the prayer for injunction has emphatically
submitted that once after the finding by the trial court that the
defendant 1st set respondents had no title and possession over
the suit land and there being no appeal or cross objection
against the said finding, the appellate court below has
committed error of jurisdiction in declaring the title of the
defendant 1st set respondents over a part of the suit land which
has subsequently been also sold. The learned counsel for the
appellants has placed reliance upon the decision of the apex
court in the case of Choudhary Sahu (Dead) By LRS. Vs.
State of Bihar,1982 (1) SCC 232 and in the case of Banarsi
Vs.Ramphal, 2003 (9) SCC 606 in support of his further
contention that the provision of Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. could
not have been invoked in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, by the appellate court below to grant the relief to
the defendant 1st set-respondents.