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Documents citing Bai Monghibai vs Bai Nagubai on 11 August, 1922

Trikambhai Jibhai vs Fulabhai Kalidas on 27 September, 1939

6. Mr. Desai has, however, urged an elaborate argument on the second point and that is that the testator has given a power of appointment in favour of the appellant and under that power, he is entitled, if he wishes, to nominate the objects of charity and such power is valid under the Hindu law. He principally relies upon the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bai Motivahu v. Bai Mamubai, but that decision does not apply to the facts of the present case. In that case a Hindu testator devised his immove-able property upon trust for the maintenance of his widow and his daughter and her children, and it was further provided that if there were no children; born to his daughter, the property should devolve upon those whom the daughter might nominate by making her will. In other words, a life estate was given to the daughter, and it was provided further that if she had no issue, she was entitled to make a will and nominate the persons to whom. the property was to go. It was contended in that case that such a power could not be exercised by a Hindu but their Lordships said that the power was not unknown to the Hindu law and did not conflict with any principles of that law. By way of analogy they referred to the English law of powers, and that analogy was mainly with reference to the argument urged before the Board. They, however, make it clear that whilst saying that a Hindu testator had such a power, in their opinion the English law of powers is. not fit to be applied generally to Hindu wills. Now, this decision is to be considered on the particular facts of that case. It is clear that the daughter was given a life estate and therefore the estate did not remain in abeyance. It is well known that under the Hindu law a Hindu cannot devise his property in such a manner that the estate might remain in abeyance for any time. But the facts of the present case are different. The appellant is not given any life estate in the property. He has no personal right to the property during his lifetime.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Rama Raja Thevar vs Papammal And Anr. on 3 February, 1925

9. I agree. The expression "Avaruddha Stree" was used by Vignaneswara not only in Mitakshara, Chapter II, S. I, placitum 28 and in Chapter I, Section 8, placi-tum 22, but also explained in the commentary on verse 290 of Vyayahara Adhyaya of Yagnavalkya. So long as a woman satisfies this interpretation of the term "Ayaruddha Stree" vide Bai Monghibai v. Bai Nagubai (1922) ILR 47 B 401 and satisfies the condition that she remains chaste Anandilal Bhagchand v. Chandra Bai (1923) ILR 48 B 203. I do not see any reason why she should be deprived of her maintenance.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Tukaram Krishna Patil vs Dinkar Nisbat Mahadu on 11 September, 1930

16. Of the points raised by Mr. Thakor on behalf of the appellant only one can be regarded as a point of law. He has contended that the plaintiff-respondent has not the legal status of a dasiputra because his mother Radha had only lived with his father Mahadu for five or six years, (seven or eight years according to the trial Judge), and because their association was in its inception adulterous, Radha's husband Govind being still alive when Radha first began to live with Mahadu. The interesting argument in which Mr. Thakor has developed this point seems only to have disguised the fact that there is no real substance in either of the reasons that have been put forward. There is no authority for the proposition that a man and a woman must have lived together for any particular term of years in order that the woman may be entitled to the privileges of a dasi or avaruddha stri or the offspring of their intercourse to the privileges of a dasiputra. One must be able to say of the woman that she was a permanent or continuing concubine, that she consorted exclusively with the one man during the period of her association with him and that she was openly and avowedly his mistress and dependent. That was laid down by Shah J. in Bai Monghibai v. Bai Nagnbai (1922) 24 Bom.
Bombay High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Tukaram Krishna Patil vs Dinkar Bisbat Mahadu on 11 September, 1930

16. Of the points raised by Mr. Thakor on behalf of the appellant only one can be regarded as a point of law. He has contended that the plaintiff-respondent has not the lagal status of a dasiputra because his mother Radha had only lived with his father Mahadu for five or six years (seven or eight years according to the trial Judge) and because their association was in its inception adulterous, Radha's husband Govind being still alive with Mahadu. The interesting argument in which Mr. Thakor has developed this point seems only to have disguised the fact that there is no real substance in either of the reasons that have been put forward. There is no authority for the proposition that a man and a woman must have lived together for any particular term of years in order that the woman may be entitled to the privileges of a dasi or avaruddha stri or the offspring of their intercourse to the privileges of a dasiputra. One must be able to say of the woman that she was a permanent or continuing concubine, that she consorted exclusively with the one man during the period of her association with him and that she was openly and avowedly his mistress and dependant. That was laid down by Shah, J., in Bai Monghibai v. Bai Nagubai 69 Ind. Cas. 291 : A.I.R. 1923 Bom, 130 : 47 B. 401 : 24 Bom.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Gadadhur Mullick vs The Official Trustee Of Bengal on 16 January, 1940

In Bai Motwahoo v. Bai Mamoobai (1897) L.R.,24 I.A. 93 the judgment of the Board was delivered by Sir Richard Couch, The testator had by his will devised immoveables upon certain trusts during the lifetime of his daughter Mamoo and her children: if there were no children, the property was to go to such persons as she might appoint by will. Farran J. held that the gift to Mamoo was an absolute gift: a division bench (Sargent C.J. and Bayley J.) on appeal rejected this view but upheld the power of appointment as valid at Hindu law provided that it was exercised during the lifetime of the tenaimt for life and that the appointee should have been alive at the death of the testator.
Bombay High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Bishun Singh vs Thakurji Mangla Nain on 17 October, 1944

In the course of the arguments, the learned Counsel drew their Lordships' attention to the decisions in Bai Mativahoo v. Bai Mamoobai (1897) L.R. 24 I.A. 93 and Narsingh Rao v. Mahalakshmi Bal (1928) L.R. 55 I.A. 180 : S.C. 30 Bom. L.R. 1331 and some other cases referred to in the High Court's judgment to show that conferment of power to adopt, of larger power to alienate, etc., on persons holding limited estate are not illegal, but as these cases are admittedly distinguishable on facts, their Lordships do not think it is necessary to discuss them. However, one decision may be referred to as of some interest having regard to its facts.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Bishunath Rai vs Sarju Rai And Ors. on 13 May, 1931

4. Of course, if the defendant at any stage withdraws his objection, whether under a compromise or otherwise the proceeding may become a noncontentious one, in which case the probate will be granted in the common form. The learned advocate for the objector relies on the case of Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapore Zamindari Co. A.I.R. 1919 P.C. 1919 PC. 79. which has been followed in Bai Monghibai v. Bai Ram-bhalaxnii [1920] 59 I.C. 344 and Kamal Kumari Devi v. Narendra Nath Mukerji [1909] 1 I.C. 573 and contends that the proper course was to introduce the agreement in a schedule attached to the probate. The case before their Lordships of the Privy Council was one relating to a regular suit in which the private rights of the parties to it were in dispute. Furthermore, that was a case before the amendment of the Registration Act when in view of the opinion previously expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council a decree of the Court could embody the terms of the compromise relating to properties which were other than the subject matter in suit.
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 3 - Full Document
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