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Bharath Kumar Jain vs Kanta Ben on 4 September, 1997

In the fact of the above decisions of the Supreme Court, which have been followed by this Court, the earlier decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent and also by the lower Court reported in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, ; Thalai Vadiuv Ananda v. Venugopala Chettiar, 1960 (1) MLJ 356; A Krishnaswami v. S.Rasheeda, 1980 (2) MLJ 463; Hajee Abdullah Sait v. Mohandas and others, 1977 (90) LW 573; Chand Basha v. Parai Bi, 1978 (1) MLJ 46; Nanda Rao and others v. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar, 1969 (1) MLJ 153 and B.V.Patankar v. C.C.Sastry, are of no avail and they cannot be relied on. It is also pointed out in 1980 (2) MLJ 179 the reference made to the Full Bench is only on the question whether a tenant inducted into possession by an unufructury mortgagee of non-agricultural property can claim the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as against the mortgager, after the redemption of the mortgage and this question is not the subject matter of the said decision of the Full Bench. However, by way of observation obiter dictum at the end of the Judgment, without reference to Section 30 of the Act, it is generally observed:
Madras High Court Cites 52 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

D. Narayana Gowda And Ors. vs I.N. Krishna Madystha on 30 July, 1975

9. Hence, in the present case, it is not open to the executing Court to hold an investigation and determine whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties to the H. R. C. proceedings as contended on behalf of the judgment-debtor. Mr. Raghavendra Rao, however, relied on decisions in , (B. V. Patankar v. C. G. Sastry) and , (Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal) and contended that it is open to the executing Court to determine this question on an investigation of the facts by recording evidence.
Karnataka High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

East India Corporation Ltd vs Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd on 16 April, 1991

Section 16 of the Mysore Order, 1948, thus specifically allows the institution of a civil suit for eviction of a tenant, although a decree passed by such a court for eviction cannot be executed without a certificate to that effect from the Controller. Jurisdiction of the civil court is thus not only not barred but specifically preserved, except for the restriction imposed on the execution of decrees in matters of eviction. On the other hand, such a provision is significantly absent in the enactment in question, The provisions of the Mysore Order considered by this court in B.V. Patankar & Ors. v. C.S.Sastry, [1961] 1 SCR 591 and those of the Act in question here are not in pari materia. The observations of this Court relied on by Dr. Chitale are not, therefore, helpful in understanding the provisions in question in the instant case.
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 67 - T K Thommen - Full Document

Ramvilas Bajaj vs Ashok Kumar And Anr. on 30 April, 2007

62. It is not necessary for us to examine whether or not Section 32(c) is retrospective in its application, to determine the questions referred to us. In the cases before us, the suits were instituted long before the amended Section 32(c) came into force on 28-5-2005. We shall proceed on the premise that Section 32(c) applies prospectively. Section 10(1) of Act 15 of 1960 prohibits eviction of a tenant, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, subject, of course, to the statutory exceptions prescribed therein. The distinction, between the existence of jurisdiction in the civil Court to pass a decree for execution and the executability of such a decree, must be borne in mine (B.V. Patankar's case (supra)). The point of time when Section 10(1) of Act 15 of 1960 comes into operation is when the decree for eviction is sought to be executed. The amendment operates in future in the sense that it governs cases where a decree is sought to be executed after Section 32(c) came into force on 28-5-2005. As noted above, the definition of a "tenant" under Section 2(ix) includes a person who continues in possession of the building after termination of the tenancy. After 28-5-2005 a person, by whom the rent payable for a building does not exceed Rs. 3,500/- p.m. in areas within Municipal Corporations and Rs. 2,000/- within other areas, comes within the definition of a "tenant" under Section 2(ix) of the Act. Where a decree for eviction is sought to be executed against such a person after 28-5-2005 he, being a "tenant" under Section 2(ix) of Act 15 of 1960, is entitled to claim protection under Section 10(1) of the Act. The legislative command in Section 10(1), in effect, deprives the civil Court of its jurisdiction to evict such a tenant in execution of a decree. It is true that when the decree was passed the Court possessed such jurisdiction, but it was divested of that jurisdiction when the amendment was brought into force with effect from 28-5-2005. None of the cases before us relate to matters where decrees for eviction have already been executed. If a decree for eviction of a tenant of such a building is sought to be executed, after the amendment came into force on 28-5-2005, the amendment applies, and such application must necessarily be characterized as prospective. It would be wrong to characterize the operation of Section 32(c) as retrospective merely for the reason that suits were filed and decrees passed prior to its coming into force on 28-5-2005. Even if Section 32(c) is held to be prospective in its application the amendment applies equally both to appeals pending when the amendment came into force, and to suits filed subsequently, since they both relate to a period prior to the decree being executed. The contention that the operation of amended Section 32(c) is limited to suits filed, and decrees passed, after the amendment must, therefore, fail.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 152 - Cited by 9 - G S Singhvi - Full Document

Indhumathi vs Senathi Na.Venkitasalapathi Ayyer on 14 August, 2014

10.Considering the above judgments, especially, the Judgment in B.V.Patankar and Others Vs. C.G.Sastry [AIR 1961 SC 272], the decree obtained by the respondent is not executable. There cannot be any waiver or estoppel against the statute as held by the Apex Court in the judgment referred to above. As the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is made applicable to the Paramakudi Town and the impugned order is liable to be set aside to re-deliver the petition premises to the petitioners.
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - V M Velumani - Full Document

Smt. Usha Ghosh vs Rabindra Nath Das And Others on 19 April, 1991

In this connection, reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maria Ramanna v. Nalappa Raju wherein the Supreme Court held that when a sale in execution of a decree is impugned on the ground that it is not warranted by the terms thereof, that question could be agitated, when it arises between parties to the decree, only by application under S. 47 and not in a separate suit", Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. V. Patankar v. C. G. Sastri . In this case, it was held that "Where the executing court ignores the provisions of the Rent Control order prohibiting eviction of tenants and passes an order of delivery of possession in execution of a decree, the order can be set aside and an order of redelivery to the tenant can be passed on an application under S. 47 read with S. 151 of Civil Procedure Code."
Calcutta High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 11 - Full Document

Bhawesh Mishra vs The President Of Board Of Secondary ... on 20 May, 1970

however, on behalf of respondents 5 and 6, contended that every court has inherent power to recall its own order to do right and undo wrong in the interest of justice He referred to various cases, namely, B. V. Patankar v. C. G. Sastry, AIR 1961 SC 272; Konathala Sriramulu v. Board oi Revenue, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 395 and Muthialpet Benefit Fund Ltd. v. Deva-rajulu Chetty, AIR 1955 Mad 455. In my view, these decisions relate to cases where the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable or where a statute or a rule made thereunder confers power on the authority to review its own previous order. Hence those decisions are not pertinent to the instant case where the moot question involved is as to whether the president could review his own previous order passed under Annexure 4 in the absence of any such power conferred on him by the Act and the Rules.
Patna High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Darshan Lal vs State Of Punjab on 7 November, 1978

24. As to whether the expression 'other' occurring in Art. 372 of the Constitution of India refers to Art. 254 thereof,-the doubts in this regard were dispelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court much earlier in B. V. Patankar v. C. G. Sastry, AIR 1961 SC 272, when dealing with the validity of the Mysore House Rent Control Order of 1948 an the ground of repugnancy with the provisions of the T. P. Act, as would be clear from the following (at p. 274):
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 39 - Cited by 21 - Full Document
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