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Loonkaran Parakh vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Anr. on 3 May, 1975

Similarly in State of Maharashtra v. Salvation Army (supra) 62% of the amount of fee was spent for rendering services and the Court held that requirement of correlation was satisfied- Having regard to these cases it has to be held that what is necessary is only an approximate correlation which is present in the instant case. Moreover, the learned Deputy Advocate-General lias stated before us that the Corporation will not in future re-cover the fee at a higher rate for buildings to be used as business premises and that the fee for these buildings also will be recovered at the normal rate. This stand is consistent with justice because the purpose for which a building is constructed makes no difference to the Corporation on the question of expenses in rendering the services for which the fee is charged. This equation of rate of fee will further reduce the difference between the amount of fee and the expenditure for rendering services. The necessary correlation, therefore, is fully established.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 36 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Shivani Enclaves Pvt. Ltd. And Another vs State Of Rajasthan And Others on 10 December, 1999

In the case of State of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. Salvation Army (supra) it was held that two elements are essential in order to determine that the payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accept either willingly or unwillingly and in the second place, the amount collected must be earmarked to meet the expenses of rendering these services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ramchandra Pande vs The State Of West Bengal on 9 January, 1976

25. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, let us examine the said Ordinance to ascertain whether the levy imposed by Section 4 is a tax or a fee. Mere use of the expression 'fee' in the Ordinance is not conclusive. Now the main object of the said Ordinance is to take measures with a view to safeguarding the health, safety and welfare of the pilgrims attending the said Mela. Taking of such measures is provided by Section 3 of the said Ordinance. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 provides for a declaration of the whole or any portion of the area within the Sagar Islands to be a notified area if the State Government is satisfied that as a result of the influx of too many pilgrims at a time, at the Sagar Islands on the occasion of the Gangasagar Mela, the health, safety and welfare of these pilgrims are likely to be endangered. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 the State Government is authorised, after publication of a notification under Sub-section (1), to take such measures for safeguarding the health, safety and welfare of the pilgrims as the State Government thinks necessary. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 provides that the details of the measures to be taken and the manner in which they shall be executed shall be laid down by the State Government by rules made in this behalf. These are the main provisions. The only other relevant section is Section 4 which empowers the State Government to impose fees upon the pilgrims visiting the Gangasagar Mela. Sections 3 and 4 are the main substantive sections. Though it is not so specifically mentioned, it is clear from the said Ordinance that the imposition is in connection with the measures taken under Section 4. It is incidental to the measures to be taken and it is connected therewith. This levy is correlated to the services rendered to the pilgrims by way of measures taken under Section 3. This imposition is not for public purposes or to meet all general expenses of the State. This is for some specific services or some special work done for the benefit of the pilgrims visiting the said Mela, There is an element of quid pro quo. As pointed out earlier it is not necessary to show that the fees collected approximate to the expenses incurred by the State in rendering such services. From the Ordinance itself it is clear that it is earmarked to meet the expenses of rendering those services. It is impossible to have an exact correlation-ship. The 'statement of facts' submitted by Mr. Sen Gupta also established the same. The measures are taken and fees collected for the 'benefit of the pilgrims concerned. There is a quid pro quo. These fees are levied under Sec. 4 for services rendered under Section 3. The 'statement' categorically records that the amount realised by imposition of fees @ Rs. 2 per person would go absolutely for such measures being taken. It is stated that some more amount was to be spent 'by the Government for the said purpose. In this connection it may be pointed out that admitted position is that the number of pilgrims would be about 5 lakhs. Fees are @ Rs. 2 per pilgrim and the total amount collected would be about Rs. 10 lakhs. It is stated in 'statement of facts' that the total costs for the. measures to be taken would be more than 10 lakhs. Mr. Acharya did not dispute the facts contained in the said 'statement of facts', but he merely submitted that these arrangements are meant for all persons and not confined only to the pilgrims. In my opinion, that does not make any difference. Moreover, all persons who attend the Mela are treated as pilgrims. The measures are taken in respect of all. For the aforesaid reasons I hold that the levy imposed under Section 4 is a fee and not a tax. Accordingly, I reject this contention of Mr. Acharya.
Calcutta High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

I.T.C. Ltd. Etc vs State Of Karnataka & Ors on 3 May, 1985

This Court in Salvation Army's case reiterated that in might not however be possible to prove in every case that the fees collected always approximated to the expenses that were incurred in rendering the particular kind of services or in performing any particular work for the benefit of certain individuals. In that case, the Court found that revenue expenditure was about 62 per cent of the amount of revenue receipts from 1953 to 1970 and this was considered approximate correlation and the Court held that the levy was in the nature of a fee. The Court dealt with the question of G capital expenditure and observed that the expenditure in constructing buildings for locating the head offices and regional offices and the increase in allowances or other amenities to the staff had also to be (1) Civil Appeal Nos. 4500 and 4501 of 1984-(judgment delivered by 19.1 1.1984).
Supreme Court of India Cites 92 - Cited by 161 - S M Ali - Full Document

Mohammad Rustom Ali And Another vs The Administrator, Corporation Of ... on 27 March, 1992

14. Apart from the above two decisions upon which both the petitioners and the respondents relied heavily and tried to twist the decisions in their favour, respectively, the petitioners have also relied upon a few more which are as under:-- (a) The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, ; (b) The State of Maharashtra v. The Salvation Army, Western Indian Territory, (c) Kewal Krishna v. State of Punjab, ; (d) Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, ; and (e) G. K. Sheygoor v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore, . From the aforesaid decisions the petitioners want to emphasize that there should be a reasonable relationship between levy of fee and service rendered and the element of quid pro quo must be established between the payer of the fee and the authority charging it and the authority collecting the fee must show that the services which they are rendering in lieu of fee is for some special benefit for the payer of the fee. Even in the decision of Karnataka High Court, as referred to hereinbefore, the Supreme Court allowed the Corporation of City of Bangalore to levy fee on parking of vehicles in the places vested in the Corporation and the levy was declared not without jurisdiction. It was only declared that the picking up of only a few areas and allowing other areas to be used as free parking places is discriminatory. The reliance of the petitioners on the following extract from (supra) paragraph 5 to the effect that "two elements are essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee in the first place, it must be lieved in consideration of certain services which the individuals accept either willingly or unwillingly and in the second place, the amount collected must be earmarked to meet the expenses of rendering these services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes."
Calcutta High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai vs Special Area Development Authority, ... on 7 February, 1991

In State of Maharashtra v. Salvation Army AIR 1975 SC 846, the observations are that a tax is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for a public purpose enforceable by law and is not a payment for any specific service rendered. The tax is for the purpose of general revenue which after collection becomes part of public revenue and an element of quid pro quo between the tax payer and the public authority need not exist.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

M.P. Lime Manufacturers' Association, ... vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Anr. on 5 May, 1989

In (The State of Maharashtra v. The Salvation Army Western India Territory), AIR 1975 SC 846, the Supreme Court has held that two elements are essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place, it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accept either willingly or unwillingly, and in the second place, the amount collected must be earmarked to make the expenses of rendering these services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general purposes.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 12 - Faizanuddin - Full Document

Mahalaxmi Fibres And Industries Ltd. vs The State Of Bihar And Ors. on 6 May, 1976

In the earlier paragraphs of this decision, the learned Judge also pointed out the distinction between a tax and a fee. No decision was brought to our notice in which a view different from one taken in the aforesaid decision has been taken on the question what is fee. Rather the same view has been reiterated in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Salvation Army Western India Territory (AIR 1975 SC 846). However, on the question whether the special contribution payable by an employer under Section 73-A of the Act is a fee or not there has been a divergence of judicial opinion amongst different High Courts of the country. The High Courts of Assam, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa have taken the view that it is fee On the other hand, the High Courts of Allahabad, Calcutta, Gujarat and Kerala have given decisions supporting the view that it is not a fee but tax or some special assessment. So far there has been no pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the question.
Patna High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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