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Documents citing Ram Narain Joshy vs Parmeswar Narain Mahta And Ors. on 20 July, 1897

Chhotelal vs Jamnadas on 31 March, 1962

5. Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply in terms because it governs only suits and applications. Even the principle of section 14 does not apply to this case because the review application was not dismissed for any defect of jurisdiction or any cause of like nature. The further question whether the period spent in pursuing the remedy by way of review unsuccessfully can at all be taken into account or not is not necessary to be gone into in this case because, even assuming that it could be, we could only condone the delay up to. 21-3-1960 (when the review application was decided). In the present case 'there is nothing to show why the appellant did not file the present appeal without any further delay. It is for the appellant to explain the delay but he has not said a word in his application why he did not file the appeal between 21-3-1960 and 2-5-1960 when this Court closed for the summer vacation. Their Lordships have laid down the scope of sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act and have also considered the Privy Council decisions in Ram Narain Joshi v. Parmeshwar Narain Mahta, 30 Ind App 20 (PC) and 44 Ind App 218 : (AIR 1917 PC 156).
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Harnandan Singh And Ors. vs Maharani Kuar And Ors. on 22 July, 1968

He has also cited before us the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ram Narain Joshi v. Parmeshwar Narain Mahtha I.L.R. 30 Cal. 309. The appeal was filed before the Judicial Committee against an order of the Calcutta High Court rejecting an application under Section 5 of the Act. In that case after the appellant became aware of the fact that his appeal was not within time on 9th of August, 1895, he made no application to the court until the 16th of September of that year. No reasons whatever were given as to why the application could not have been made within a few days of the discovery of the mistake. The High Court refused to condone the delay and the decision was upheld by the Judicial Committee.
Patna High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Devi Das vs Bushahr Sangh on 18 May, 1953

11. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent cited a number of rulings in support of what he contended was the opposite view. The first was the Privy Council ruling reported as 'Ram Narain Joshi v. Parmeswar Narain Mahta', 30 Ind App 20 (PC) (Q). The plaintiff in that case filed two suits against different defendants in respect of the same property under Section 283, C. P. C, 1882, corresponding to Order 21, Rule 63 of the present Code. The suits were tried together and dismissed by the trial Court on 25-6-1894. In one suit he valued the appeal as above Rs. 5,000/- and filed it in the High Court, while in the other he valued it at less than Rs.5,000/- and filed it before the District Judge on 3-9-1894. The appellant applied to the High Court for transfer to that Court of the appeal pending before the District Judge so that both the appeals might be disposed of together by the High Court. This application was allowed on 9-8-1895, but in the course of its disposal it was pointed out by the pleader for the respondent that the appeal had been wrongly preferred to the District Judge since the property in both the suits being the same the proper valuation of the appeal should have been above Rs. 5,000/-. Thereafter on 16-9-1895 the appellant applied to the High Court conceding that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal that was filed before him and praying that it be treated as an appeal filed in the High Court. The High Court dismissed that application and also the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 20 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

J.B. Advani And Co. (P.) Ltd. vs R.D. Shah, Commissioner Of Income-Tax, ... on 22 August, 1968

It cannot be disputed that, in dealing with the question of condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the party has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed time, and this has always been understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole of the period of delay (vide Ram Narain Joshi v. Parameshwar Narain Mehta, [1903] I.L.R. 30 Cal. 309). Therefore, the finding recorded by the authority that the appellants have failed to establish sufficient cause for their inaction between May 2, 1952, and the respective dates on which they filed their present applications is fatal to their claim."
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 36 - A N Grover - Full Document

Sitaram Ramcharan Etc. vs M.N. Nagarshana And Ors. on 25 September, 1959

It cannot be disputed that in dealing which the question of condoning delay under s. 5 of the Limitation Act the party has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed time, and this has always been understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole of the period of delay (Vide Ram Narain Joshi v. Parameswar Narain Mehta [[1903] I.L.R. 30 Cal. 309]). Therefore the finding recorded by the authority that the appellants have failed to establish sufficient cause for their inaction between May 2, 1952, and the respective dates on which they filed their present applications is fatal to their claim.
Supreme Court of India Cites 29 - Cited by 16 - Full Document

Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961

In Ram Narain Joshi v. Parmeshwar Narain Mehta (5), the Privy Council was dealing with a case where on August 9, 1895 the High Court bad made an order that the appeal in question should be transferred to the High. Court under s. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure and heard along with another appeal already pending there. In making this order the High Court had given liberty to the respondent to make his objections, if any, to the said transfer. On September 16, 1895 a petition was filed on behalf of the appellant objecting to the said transfer; and the' question arose whether sufficient cause had been shown for the delay made by the party, between August 9, 1895 to September 16, 1895. The decree under appeal had been passed on June 25, 1894 and the appeal against the said decree had been presented to the District Judge on September 1894. It would thus be seen that the question which arose was very different from the question with which we are concerned; and it is in regard to the delay made between August 9, 1895 to September 16, 1895 that the Privy Council approved of the view taken by the High Court that the said delay had not been satisfactorily explained. We do not see how this decision can assist us in interpreting the provisions of s. 5.
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 816 - P B Gajendragadkar - Full Document

State Of West Bengal vs Administrator, Howrah Municipality & ... on 14 December, 1971

2 to 4 invited our attention to the decision of the Judicial committee in Ram Narain Joshi v. Parmeshwar Narain Mahta and, others(1), where the Judicial Committee declined to interfere with the order of the High Court declining to excuse the delay in filing an appeal under s. 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown by the party concerned. The judgment of the High Court, which was under appeal before the Judicial Committee, is contained in the report. The High Court had considered the reasons given by the party for filing the appeal out of time. After a full and detailed consideration of the reasons given by the party, the High Court had come to the conclusion that the party had not shown due diligence in the matter of filing appeal and, therefore, if was further held that no sufficient cause had been shown for not having filed the appeal within time. The Judicial Committee after a consideration of the reasons given by the High Court declined to interfere on the ground that they were satisfied that the refusal by the High Court to admit the appeal after the period of limitation was over, was justified. This decision does not help the respondents in view of the fact that there has been no such proper consideration by the High Court in the case before us. We have already stated that the High Court has neither adverted to the reasons given by the appellant; nor has the High Court expressed its views on them.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 827 - C A Vaidyialingam - Full Document

Secretary Of State For India In Council vs British India Steam Navigation Company ... on 4 January, 1911

L.R. 566 which followed Sunder Koer v. Chandishwar Prasad 30 C. 679 is an authority merely for the proposition that an order refusing to admit an appeal after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, is not an order made on appeal; whether this view is defensible on principle and may be reconciled with the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ram Narain v. Parmeswar Narain 30 C. 309 : 30 I.A. 20 it is unnecessary to consider for our present purposes; possibly the actual decision in the case before the learned judges of the Bombay High Court may be supported on the ground that such an order is not a judgment at all as ruled in Gobinda Lal Das v. Shiba Das Chatterjee 33 C. 1323 : 3 C.L.J. 545 : 10 C.W.N. 986.
Calcutta High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 49 - Full Document

Shivamma (Dead) By Lrs vs Karnataka Housing Board on 12 September, 2025

It cannot be disputed that in dealing which the question of condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the party has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed time, and this has always been understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole of the period of delay (vide Ram Narain Joshi v. Parameswar Narain Mehta. Therefore the finding recorded by the authority that the appellants have failed to establish sufficient cause for their inaction between May 2, 1952, and the respective dates on which they filed their present applications is fatal to their claim. That is why we think it unnecessary to consider the larger question of law which Mr Phadke sought to raise before us.
Supreme Court of India Cites 68 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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