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Pandit Sushil Chander Chaturvedi vs Wali Ullah And Ors. on 28 November, 1940

In our view the law laid down in Mt. Bibbo v. Gokaran Singh ('37) 24 A.I.R. 1937 All. 101 is not in any way affected by the two pronouncements of their Lordships mentioned above. There remains to notice two other arguments of Mr. Chaturvedi. He contends that the reference to the pre-existing accounts in the promissory note makes the liability stated therein to be a contingent one. We do not agree with this contention. In our view, the reference to account was with a view to state the consideration of the promissory note and such a statement of consideration does not make the liability in the promissory note a contingent one, nor does it make the instrument any the less a promissory note. It is further contended that the promissory note was not in favour of a person 'certain' within the meaning of the statute. This point was not raised in the Courts below and is not noticed in their judgment but we have permitted it to be. canvassed and in our view there is no substance in this contention either. The. promissory note is in the name of the Glass. Works which is a trading name of the plaintiff. The transactions between the parties took place under that trading name and Section 5, Negotiable Instruments Act, provides as follows:
Allahabad High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Nookala Krishnaiah And Anr. vs Nookala Dakshina Murthy And Ors. on 18 June, 2007

"Collateral matter", on the other hand, is something, which is total divorced, and different from the transaction, evidenced by a document. The document may contain certain recitals, which are totally unrelated to the transaction, which it intends to bring about. For example, the age of the vendor, as on the date of the execution of the document, is shown at a particular figure. The recital in that regard cannot be said to be collateral to the transaction, by any stretch of imagination. If a dispute arises in a different set of proceedings, as to the age of the said vendor, reliance upon the said document for the limited purpose of enlightening the Court, on the said aspect; cannot attract the prohibition contained under Section 35. The reason is that, the purpose for which reliance is placed on the document is related neither to the main transaction, nor to collateral purposes, and its utility is pressed into service in a collateral matter. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Mt. Bibbo v. Rai Saheb Gokaran Singh AIR 1937 All. 101, analyzed Section 35 of the Act, before and after its amendment. After referring to the requirement under Section 35, the Court observed as under:
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 21 - Cited by 3 - B S Reddy - Full Document

Sheo Nath Prasad vs Sarjoo Nonia And Anr. on 12 March, 1943

7. When the promissory note is properly stamped it is immaterial whether it came into existence because the intention was to reduce the terms of a contract to the form of a document or because the intention was to create a negotiable instrument. If, however, the document alleged to be a pronote is inadmissible in evidence because it is insufficiently stamped or not stamped at all the position is different under Section 35, Stamp Act, no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped. It was held in Mt. Bibbo v. Gokaran Singh, ('37) 24 A.I.R. 1937 All 101 that a promissory note insufficiently stamped was inadmissible in evidence for any purpose. When a document relied on as evidence by either party is considered by a Court to be inadmissible in evidence, under o. 13, B. 6, Civil P. C., a certain endorsement has to be made on it together with a statement of its having been rejected and under Rule 7(2) documents not admitted in evidence shall not form "part of the record and shall be returned to the persons respectively producing them. Under Section 64, Evidence Act, documents must be proved by primary evidence. When therefore, a plaintiff alleges a loan and files with his plaint a document which he alleges to be a promissory note and it is found to be unstamped or insufficiently stamped there can be no proof of the contents of the document, whether of the fact that it is signed by someone or of the identity of the person who has signed it, supposing there be a signature, or of the terms of any transaction recorded in that document and the document should be returned. A suit on the pronote, when the document is alleged to be a pronote, must consequently fail. If the pronote was, however, executed in connation with a loan the question remains whether a suit on the loan can be maintained. If it is alleged that the pronote was given in full satisfaction of the loan the suit must fail but as has been pointed out in Maung Chitv. Boshan N.M.A. Kareem Oomer & Co. ('34) 21 A.I.R. 1934 Rang.
Allahabad High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Sanjeeva Reddi vs Johanputra Reddi on 30 August, 1971

The words 'for any purpose' were construed by the Allahabad High Court in Mt. Biboo v. Rai Saheb Gakaran Singh AIR 1937 All 101 as undoubtedly implying "for each and every purpose whatsoever, without any exception" and it matters little whether the purpose is the main purpose or is a collateral one. The decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1946 PC 51 sets at rest the conflicting vires expressed by the High Courts. As pointed out by Sir John Beaumont, the words "for any purpose" should be given their natural meaning and effect and would include a collateral purpose.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 8 - Cited by 33 - Full Document

Sukhdev Singh vs Baxis Singh And Anr. on 24 January, 2006

The learned Trial Court has held that the portion of unstamped document requiring no stamp duty can be read in evidence and has relied upon (3) . It may be mentioned here that question regarding the admissibility of a document for want of registration was involved in it and it was held that unregistered document can be used for collateral purpose as provided under Section 49, Registration Act. The words "for any purpose" appearing in Section 35 Stamp Act were construed by the Allahabad High Court in (4) Mst. Bibo v. Rai Sahib Gokaran AIR 1937 Allahabad 101, as undoubtedly implying for each and every purpose whatsoever without any exception and it matters little whether the purpose is the main purpose or a collateral one. It is thus clear that the learned Trial Court has acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction in holding that no stamp duty is payable on the said entry of the Bahi of Phoola Ram DW 3, in allowing the defendant's application paper No. B-37, and admitting the Photostat copy paper No. 36C/2-3. If the order dated 28.8.1987 is not set aside, the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 45 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Firm Chuni Lal Tukki Mal vs Firm Mukat Lal Ram Chandra And Ors. on 19 January, 1967

11. So far as the main point is concerned, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that originally an acknowledgement could be stamped by an one anna stamp and the amendment which was made in the year 1952 just before the time when the document came into existence could not be accepted to be in the knowledge of the parties Therefore, by affixing four annas stamp the intention of the parties appeared to be that they treated this document to be a promissory note on demand and affixed four annas stamp. But since document shows that this was not a promissory note of demand but a promissory note to be paid by instalments the document was deficiently stamped. Further reliance was placed by the learned counsel on three decisions of this Court, Lakhmi Das v. Lakho Ram, 1935 All LJ 651 : (AIR 1935 All 410), Bibbo v. Gokaran Singh, 1936 All LJ 1391 : (AIR 1937 All 101) and Sushil Chandra Chaturvedi v. Wali-Ullah, 1941 All LJ 36 : (AIR 1941 All 158).
Allahabad High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 15 - Full Document

Firm Ratanji Bhagwanji And Co. vs Prem Shanker on 12 August, 1938

5. In this view of the matter no further question arises about the non-admissibility of the document. It is properly stamped and saves limitation. If however the document is treated as a promissory note, the question arises whether it was open to the learned Munsif to split it up in two parts, the first part containing an admission of liability and the second part containing an undertaking to pay. There is clear authority of this Court that the document cannot be so split up, vide the case in Mt. Bibbo v. Gokaran Singh (1937) 24 A.I.R. A;ll. 101, where it was held that the; document must be considered as a whole, and if it is an instrument insufficiently stamped as required by the Stamp Act, then it should not be admitted in evidence for any purpose.
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 6 - Full Document
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