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Documents citing Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Maheshwari Saran Singh on 4 October, 1950

Raja Mohan Raja Bahadur vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U. P. on 10 March, 1962

It follows that there could be no change of any opinion. One further fact may now be stated. The original assessment was made on March, 21, 1951. The ruling in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maheshwari Saran Singh was given only in October, 1950. It was published in the Income Tax Reports only in 1951. There is no evidence that this ruling had been published before the completion of the assessment on March 21, 1951. There is also no evidence that the Income-tax Officer was aware of this ruling. It looks highly unlikely that is he was aware of this ruling then on precisely the same point he would have omitted to apply the ruling the taxability of a very large amount of interest income and would have allowed that income to escape assessment. On all these materials it appears to be clear that the Income-tax Officer was entirely oblivious to the question of the taxability of the amount entered in the "accrued" interest account. The successor Income-tax Officer issued notice under section 34 on January 29, 1953. By that time this ruling must have become very well known to all officers of the department. The assessment proceedings in the succeeding year were before him. In the course of those assessment proceedings part of the sale proceeds of the bonds representing interest income was offered for tax. The question of taxability of the interest and of the year in which it should be taxed arose directly before him. In view of the state of the law as contained in the ruling he formed the opinion that the interest income had escaped assessment in the preceding year. It follows that the condition in section 34(1)(b) was fully satisfied, viz., that now there was before him information as to the true state of the law contained in the ruling. In consequence of that information by reference to the facts of the case he came to the conclusion that income had escaped assessment. The order under section 34 could, therefore, be justified under section 34(1)(b) also. It only remains to say that the notice under section 34 having been issued on January 29, 1953, and the assessment under that section having been completed within one year thereof, viz., on January 25, 1954, the assessment was made within the limitation prescribed under section 34(3).
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Seth Kishori Lal Babulal vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U. P. on 10 March, 1962

That is why it has been said that mere change of opinion does not justify a proceeding under section 34(1)(b) or that the information must be a new information not possession at the time of the escape of the income from assessment. Information is knowledge of a fact (the existence of a law is a fact); a fact can exist without its existence being known to all persons or to some persons. A person may not be aware of a fact even though it exists and can certainly obtain information of its existence later. It is, therefore, not correct to say that an Income-tax Officer cannot act on a fact if it had existed before he passed the original assessment order; if he had no knowledge of it when he getting information of it. Therefore, even if the decision in Maheshwari Saran Singhs case existed at the time when the original assessment order was passed, if the Income-tax Officer was not aware of it when he passed it and became aware of it later and realised that certain income had escaped assessment, he could proceed under section 34(1)(b). The law that receipt of the Encumbered Estates Act Bonds in lieu of interest is actual receipt of interest existed when the original assessment order was passed, but the Income-tax Officer was not aware of it and he did not assess this income. When he or his successor later came to know of the decision, it amounts to his receiving information in possession; when he read it or was told about it by some one, he became acquainted with the fact that the income was assessable. It did not amount to a mere change of opinion. He certainly changed his opinion about the assessability of the income, but it was on the basis of information that this court had declared the income to be assessable. He could proceed even if he did not change his own opinion in the matter and did not agree with the decision of this court; since he felt that he was bound by it he could form the belief that the income had escaped assessment.
Allahabad High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 16 - Full Document

Jagannath Mahadeo Prasad vs Commissioner Of Income Tax on 14 April, 1964

In view of the construction which, we think, can fairly be placed upon the proviso, we find ourselves, with respect, unable to agree with the view expressed by the Bombay High Court. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court did not consider that the profits and gains falling under the head "profits and gains of business, profession or vocation" could be required to be computed for two distinct purposes, one for the purpose of determining the taxable profits and gains under Section 10 and the other for the purpose of applying the rule of set off incorporated in Section 24(1). It was open to the Legislature to provide different modes of computing the profits and gains for the two separate purposes. The mode of computing the profits and gains contained in the proviso under consideration is specially intended for the purpose of determining the limitations within which the rule of set off should be applied This aspect of the proviso did not receive the consideration of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court Learned counsel also relied upon Commissioner of Income Tax, Nagpur and Bhandara v. Ram Gopal Kaniyalal, 1960-38 ITR 193: (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 106) but that decision proceeded almost entirely on the reasoning underlying Keshav Lal Premcdand's case, 1957-31 ITR 7; (AIR 1957 Bom 20) (supra) We were then referred to Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ram Saran, 1962-45 ITR 248 (AIR 19R2 Punj 318 (FB) '' where a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court took the same view The considerations which prevailed with the learned judges appear to out mind to be identical with those upon which the decision in Keshan Lal Premchand's case.
Allahabad High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 8 - R S Pathak - Full Document

S. Zoiraster & Co. vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Delhi, ... on 21 February, 1967

Reference in this connection may also be made to the decisions in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kameshwar Singh; Raghunandan Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax; and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maheshwari Saran Singh. Learned Solicitor-General does nto dispute this proposition but he argues that, in the absence of any agreement, express or implied, to the contrary, a payment by a negtoiable instrument is always understood to be conditional.
Delhi High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay ... vs Messrs Ogale Glass Works Ltd., Ogale ... on 19 April, 1954

Reference in this connection may also be made to the decisions in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kameshwar Singh (2), Raghunandan prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax (3) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maheswari Saran Singh (4). Learned Solicitor-General does not dispute this proposition but he argues that, in the absence of any agreement, express or implied, to the contrary, a payment by a negotiable instrument is always understood to be conditional.
Supreme Court of India Cites 19 - Cited by 212 - Full Document

Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay ... on 17 September, 1951

10. There is also another decision to which attention may be usefully drawn, and that is a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maheshwari Saran Sing. The Allahabad High Court held that the receipt of U.P. Government Bonds in lieu of interest due was a receipt of income and was assessable to income-tax. And in the judgment, at page 95, the test their Lordships apply is as follows :-
Bombay High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - B P Sinha - Full Document

Marwar Hotels Ltd., Ahmedabad vs Assessee on 24 July, 2015

13. Before us, the issue is whether the issuance of equity shares of the assessee-company to the financial institutions amounts to actual payment of interest liability or not. According to the assessee the liability of Rs.60,79,265/- being the interest on term loan from IDBI and LIC has been shown as paid. It is no more outstanding in the accounts of the assessee. The amount is not due to IDBI and the LIC as per their account. The liability has not been waived by these institutions. The payment has been actually made by way of giving equity shares of the equal amount to these financial institutions. The payment is not by way of converting the interest liability in fresh loan, therefore, the Explanation-3C appended to Section 43B does not apply on the facts of the present case. The learned counsel for the assessee has relied upon ITA No.890/Ahd/2011 5 the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raja Mohan Raja Bahaddur Vs. CIT, 66 ITR 378 (SC), CIT Vs. Maheshwari Saran Singh, 191 ITR 83 (Allh.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Ahmedabad Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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