Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 160 (1.17 seconds)
Documents citing Belsund Sugar Co.Ltd vs State Of Bihar & Ors. Etc on 10 August, 1999

Ntpc Limited & Another vs State Of U.P. & Others on 11 November, 2011

In Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar and others (1999) 9 SCC 620 it was held that where the entire trade of sugarcane was regulated, there was no object to be achieved by invoking the provisions of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 on sugarcane and molasses. In paragraph-104 of this judgment it was held that where sale and purchase of sugarcane and mollases was regulated by the detailed statutory scheme of control of sale and purchase the general provisions of the Market Act, therefore, will give way to the special provisions. The State Government was fully conscious of this legal position, in providing in the note at the bottom of the notification dated 4.6.2011, notify the 5th Amendment to the Rules of 1978, as follows:- "In respect of resin and resin products,- the provisions of the U.P. Resin and other Forest Produce (Regulation and Trade) Act, 1976, and the Rules framed thereunder will apply.
Allahabad High Court Cites 171 - Cited by 23 - S Ambwani - Full Document

Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. vs State Of M.P. And Ors. [Alongwith Writ ... on 6 July, 2006

It will be clear from the aforesaid observations of Rankin, C.J., that the object of doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten upon the parties special principles of law applicable to them inter se. One we have held, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Belsund Sugar Company Limited (supra), that the provisions of the Market Act do not apply to the transactions of sale and purchase of sugar cane between the occupiers of factories and the sugar cane growers or sugar cane growers' co-operative societies and accordingly no market fee is leviable under the Market Act on such transactions of sale and purchase of sugar cane between the occupiers of factories and the sugar cane growers or sugar cane growers' co-operative societies, this will be the law according to which the rights of the litigating parties have to be determined and by the doctrine of res judicata, a different law will not determine the rights of Gwalior Sugar Company Limited, vis-a-vis the Market Committees. That apart, the earlier order dated 20-7-94 of this Court in Misc. Petition No. 2250 of 1990 was based upon a particular cause of action that had arisen then and the order passed by the Court is final with regard to the said cause of action but cannot constitute a bar for this Court to entertain a writ petition filed before this Court on the basis of a fresh cause of action.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 3 - A K Patnaik - Full Document

Lipton India Ltd. vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 12 September, 2003

7. At the time of hearing of the case, when it was pointed to the counsel that vide S.O. No. 1002 dated 21st August, 1984, only 'Liquid Milk' was deleted, but any 'Milk product consisting of solidified milk, like 'Milk Powder' is contemplated, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Belsund Sugar Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1999 SC 3125 (Paragraph '133'), the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the 'Skimmed Milk Powder' is not even a solidified milk. It is a 'Milk Product' like Butter; Ghee; Cream; Chhena; Khowa and is different than Milk.
Jharkhand High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 1 - S J Mukhopadhaya - Full Document

Parle Biscuits P.Ltd. vs Uoi & Ors. on 9 September, 2008

14. The last judgment cited by Mr. Valmiki Mehta is in the case of Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (supra). In that case, the submission on behalf of the State Government was that the various Control Orders regulating sugar have been issued with the objective of maintaining and ensuring availability of the same. The object of Sugar (Control) Orders was thus different from the various objects of the Market Act. The various provisions of the Market Act for regulating sale, purchase and storage of free sugar would, therefore, be available and there is no repugnancy between the provisions of the Sugar (Control) Orders and the Market Act. While rejecting this submission, the Supreme Court observed in para 86 of the decision that it is the ultimate sale of the manufactured article, namely, sugar by way of levy sugar or in free market that is sought to be controlled by the Control Orders which cannot effectively operate save and except in harmony with the provisions enacted for the control of raw material, namely, sugarcane as envisaged by the Sugarcane Orders as well as the Sugarcane Act and, therefore, they together provided a complete [LPA 393/2007] Page 13 of 15 machinery for controlling the production, sale and purchase not only of the raw material, i.e. sugarcane, but also the finished product, i.e. sugar and consequently, the entire regulatory machinery and the infrastructural facilities to be made available by the Market Committees for regulating the sale and purchase of such an "agricultural produce" would get totally excluded. We see no relevance of the observations made in paragraph 86 of the above cited judgment to the issue which is involved in the instant case. In our opinion, the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the appellant was involved in the business of manufacturing of sugar and hence was squarely covered by Section 3(3E), is correct and therefore we reject the first contention of the appellant.
Delhi High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - S Muralidhar - Full Document

Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 7 April, 2000

In paragraph No. 107 of the said judgment of the apex Court, it has been clearly stated that where the amount has not been deposited because of any stay order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the market fee not collected in past shall not be collected hereafter. No doubt, there is no mention about the fact with regard to civil suit wherein stay has been granted, but the same principle will apply and with regard to the payment of remaining amount of market fee and penalty, which has not been paid prior to the said judgment of the apex Court, now no direction can be given to the petitioner to make payment of the remaining amount of market fee and penalty as assessed by the impugned assessment orders.
Patna High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - D P Choudhary - Full Document

I. T. C. Ltd vs Agricultural Produce Market Committee ... on 24 January, 2002

In Belsund Sugar (supra), one of the controversies raised related to a conflict between the provisions of the Markets Act and the Tea Act, 1953. There too, the Tea Act envisaged that an order might be passed under Section 30 relating to the sale and purchase of tea. The contention that the mere possibility of issuance of such a control order under Section 30 of the Tea Act was sufficient to oust the State Legislature from the field, was negatived in the following words:
Supreme Court of India Cites 68 - Cited by 0 - R Pal - Full Document

I.T.C. Limited vs Agricultural Produce Market Committee ... on 24 January, 2002

It is unnecessary to multiply instances of the numerous decisions which have followed the logic of Tika Ramji and accepted its conclusion that for the purposes of Entry 24 of List II and consequently Entry 52 of List I, 'industry' means "manufacture or production" and nothing more. It is sufficient to note that Tika Ramji's definition of industry has been affirmed and applied recently by a Constitution Bench in Belsund Sugar Company v. State of Bihar (supra) and is still good law. Harak Chand Banthia's case does not strike a discordant note.
Supreme Court of India Cites 131 - Cited by 218 - Full Document

Shree Prakash Singh vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 11 July, 2003

38. The Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted that the similar products, namely, Lactodex and Raptakos SIF (special infant food) of another Company have been held to be non agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act by the Apex Court in Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd, (supra) and the products of the petitioner be also held to be not covered by the provisions of the Act.
Patna High Court Cites 51 - Cited by 1 - R S Garg - Full Document
1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next