Anil Starch Products Ltd. vs Income-Tax Officer, Companies ... on 19 February, 1980
The facts which we have narrated above show on the contrary that in the case before the Delhi High Court in Vashist Bhargava v. ITO [1975] 99 ITR 148, the ITO, on the prior occasion, at the time of original assessment, had not got information regarding the fact that the payment of interest was to go to the account of the assessee. He got that information subsequently. Consequently, it cannot be said that the ITO in that case was proceeding on a mere change of opinion. The facts of the case before the Delhi High Court were not the same as they exist in the present case. On the contrary, the facts in the present case are squarely covered by the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society Ltd. [1979] 119 ITR 996. It is, therefore, clear that the ITO was possessed of all the relevant facts at the time of the original assessment. The directors' report was also before him. But it is only because the audit dept. tried to read the directors' report in a different way that they took a different view and only because the audit dept. had felt that the ITO was not justified in granting deduction of the legal fees that they wanted the ITO to reopen the proceedings. This type of difference of opinion between the ITO and the audit dept. on the question of law can never amount to information within the meaning of s. 147(b) of the Act. Hence it must be held that on the second ground also the ITO had no jurisdiction to reopen the previous proceedings, merely because in the light of the audit objection he felt in retrospect that he had erred earlier in granting deduction pertaining to legal fees of the advocates who had appeared before the Company Law Board and the M.R.T.P. Commission. Whether the concerned expenditure was revenue expenditure or capital expenditure would be a question of law and on that question of law if the ITO had taken one view only because the audit dept. does not agree with that view, there is no ground to enable the ITO to reopen the assessment proceedings under s. 147(b) on the supposition that there was any information received by him from the audit dept. In fact, such information would, at the highest, amount to information regarding opinion on the point of law formed by the audit dept. as it felt that the ITO's view on that legal aspect was not palatable to the audit dept. In any case, such situation can never result in information within the meaning of s. 147(b) so far as the ITO is concerned so as to permit him to issue the impugned notice seeking to reopen the reassessment proceedings. Consequently, even on the second ground which is mentioned in para. 5 of the affidavit-in-reply, the respondent had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice.