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Documents citing Moti Ram S/O Atma Ram And Ors. vs Bakhwant Singh And Ors. on 29 September, 1967

Tikam Ram vs Mangtu And Ors. on 17 June, 1970

(17) As our own view of section 15 in so far as it is relevant for the decision of this appeal coincides with what was said in that case, we feel no apology is needed if we quote from the above judgment in extenso. It was there said :- "SECTION15 only enumerates the persons in whom the right of pre-emption vests and does not deal with the question of the extent to which each of such persons shall have a right. Under clause (b) of subsection ( 1 ) of this section, where the sale is of a share out of joint land and is not made by all the co-sharers jointly, the right vests "in the other co-sharers". There can be a case where the vendor owns property in two or three Khatas and he has different co-sharers in these Khatas. If 'A' is a co-sharer in the first Khata, 'B' a co-sharer in the second Khata and 'C' a cosharer in the third Khata, then obviously 'A' being only a co-sharer in the first Khata can pre-empt the sale to the extent of that Khata and no more. Being a co-sharer in a part of the property sold he is qualified to pre-empt and can therefore, bring a suit for preemption of sale, but he can pre-empt only to the extent of the Khata in which he is a co-sharer. It is well established that where there is a bargain of distinct properties, by a person having preferential rights only to a portion of such bargain, that does not give him a right of pre-emption as regards the other portions simultaneously sold. (See inter alia in this connectionP.R. 87 of 1895 P.R. 16 of 1905 and P.R. 112 of 1907). Similarly, i.f in a sale a vendor includes properties in different villages it will be fantastic to hold that simply because a tenant holds under tenancy of the vendor of some property situated in one village, which forms part of the sale, he would be either entitled to or is bound to pre-empt the whole sale. If the law is interpreted in the manner in which the Courts below have done, the result would be that the very object of the legislature to benefit the tenants and to give them security of tenure of the land held by them may be frustrated. A tenant may be holding tenancy, say over 20 Kanals of land, and the vendor sells 100 acres of land, including the 20 Kanals so held by the tenant; according to this view of the law the tenant would be bound to pre-empt the entire sale. because otherwise he will be non-suited on account of partial pre-emption. Obviously a tenant holding tenancy over such a small area would be incapable of finding finances to pre-empt the whole sale. Thus if the provision is interpreted in that manner, it may not necessarily, in all cases, work for the benefit of the tenant. Furthermore there may be 100 tenants over this area of 100 acres sold by the vendor. If everyone of the tenants is entitled to pre-empt only the land held by him, the matter will be quite simple. But to hold that everyone of these tenants must necessarily pre-empt the whole sale is likely to lead to fantastic results."
Delhi High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Rakesh Kumar And Others vs State Of Haryana And Others on 6 November, 2019

"5. If the above discussion is kept in viedw there is no difficulty in attributing a retroactive intention to the legislature when the Amendment Act of 1964 was enacted. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declares the previous law retroactive operation would be more rightly ascribed to it than the legislation which may prejudicially affect past rights and transactions. We are in entire agreement with the following view expressed in a recent full bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Moti Ram v. Bakhwant Singh & Ors., I.L.R. 1968 (1) Punj. 104 at p.120, in which a similar point came up for consideration:
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 13 - R Bahri - Full Document

Teekam Ram vs Mangtu And Ors. on 17 June, 1970

In Moti Ram v. Bakhwant Singh a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court had occasion to deal with the sale of land under sub-clause secondly of clause (c) of sub-sec.(1) of Section 15 of the Act 1 of 1913 as amended by Act 10 of 1960. The sale was made by joint owners Ind Kaur and her two sons Balkar Singh and nachhatar Singh (.........) from Tarlok Singh) to Moti Ram (.....) Ram and was sought to be pre-emptor by Bakhwant Singh and Mohinder Singh minor sons of Tarlok Singh through their mother Karam Kaur, also a widow of Tarlok Singh, the pre-emptors claimed their rights both as co-sharers with the vendors in the Khatas of the land sold and as brothers of Balkar Singh and Nachhatar Singh. The trial Court found that the pre-emptors were not entitled to succeed on the first ground as it had not been established that they were co-sharers in the disputed land. On the second ground, however, the trial Court found in favor of the plaintiffs and it was held that though they were step brothers of Balkar Singh and Nachhatar Singh they were nevertheless entitled to rank in parity with them under the relevant provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. In the result, a decree was granted in favor of the pre-emptors in respect of two-thirds of the land sold on payment of the proportionate price of Rupees 3,200/-, it having been held that they could not pre-empt the share of Ind Kaur, not being her sons.
Delhi High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Shri Chaman Singh And Anr. vs Srimathi Jaikaur on 11 August, 1969

5. If the above discussion is kept in view there is no difficulty in attributing a retroactive intention to the legislature when the Amendment Act of 1964 was enacted. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declares the previous law retroactive operation would be more rightly ascribed to it than the legislation which may prejudicially affect past rights and transactions. We are in entire agreement with the following view expressed in a recent full bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Moti Ram v. Bakhwant Singh and Ors. I.L.R. [1968] 1 Punjab 104, 120 in which a similar point came up for consideration :
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 8 - A N Grover - Full Document

Chanan Singh & Another vs Jai Kaur on 11 August, 1969

statute is curative or merely declares the previous law retroactive operation would be more rightly ascribed to it than the legislation which may prejudicially affect past rights and transactions. We are in entire agreement with the following view expressed in a recent full bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Moti Ram v. Bakhwant Singh & Ors. (1) in which a similar point came up ,for consideration:
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 11 - A N Grover - Full Document

Thoilu vs Krishan Gopal And Anr. on 11 November, 1983

The facts of the case of Moti Ram (supra), show that one Tarlok Singh had two wives Ind Kaur and Karam Kaur. He had sons from both these wives. On his death his property was inherited by his two widows named above and his sons from either of these wives. One of the widows, namely, Ind Kaur and his two sons from this widow sold the property which they had inherited from Tarlok Singh. This sale was sought to be pre-empted by the sons of Tarlok Singh from his other wife Karam Kaur. It was on these facts that the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that for the purpose of Section 15(2)(b) of the Act, son included a stepson so as to entitle him to pre-empt the sale made by, his stepmother. This was done in view of the explicit language of Section 15(2)(b) which confers the right of pre-emption not on the son of the female vendor but on the son of her husband through whom she had succeeded to the property forming, subject matter of the sale. Section 15(2)(b) governs the sale by a female of the land or property to which she has succeeded: through her husband, or through her son and the right to pre-empt such sale is conferred on the son or daughter of such husband of the female. Section 15 (1)(a) which has been invoked by the plaintiff in support of his claim would on the other hand be attracted where the vendor is the sole owner. Now a vendor may be a male or a female. In either case the right of pre emption has been conferred on the son or daughter or son's son or daughter's son of the vendor. In case of a daughter's son of the vendor. In case of a female vendor this provision would apply only when the case does not attract either Section 15 (2)(a) or Section 15 (2)(b). In any case Section 15 (1)(a) would be applic-
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Karta Ram Mansa Ram And Anr. vs Om Parkash Hirda Ram on 26 October, 1970

3. The plaintiffs then filed a Letters Patent Appeal and it came up for hearing before Mehar Singh, C. J. and B. R. Tuli, J. During the course of arguments before the Bench, one of the questions that was canvassed was that Mula plaintiff was entitled to pre-empt the entire sale and not only the half share belonging to his mother Ashrafi Devi. There was, however a decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported as Moti Ram v. Bakhwant Singh, (1967) 69 Pun LR 1041 = (AIR 1968 Punj 141 (FB) ) wherein it was held -
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Jhanua vs Dharam Dass on 27 November, 1968

(6) The only question therefore, that is left to be decided is whether as a father's brtoher of Jodha and Bhauni and husband's brtoher of Mt. Shivju, the appellant could claim pre-emption under section 15( l )(c). Thirdly, and section 15(2)(b), Secondly, of the said Act. The appellant claims that this question is now concluded by a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case the decision of which is reported in 1967 ( Lxix ) Punjab Law Reporter 1041 ( Mtoi Ram v. Bakhwant Singh) where it has been held that a step brtoher is a brtoher nto having been excluded by the Legislature from exercising his right of pre-emption.
Delhi High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Doomamu vs Mehar Chand on 18 June, 1968

The Bench deciding Mtoi Ram's case was of course conscious of the fact that the Statement of Objects and Reasons is nto a permissible aid in construing the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the statute, but such a statement was considered to furnish valuable historical material in ascertaining the reasons which induced the Legislature to enact a statute. From this, it was concluded that there was a lacuna in Paragraph (First) of clause (b) of sub section (2) of section 15 and that the amending Act was intended to cure or remedy that defect. The submission which found favor with that Court may be reproduced in the words of the judgment : - "It is submitted that though there is no express provision about the retrospective operation of Punjab Act 13 of 1964, it has to be construed by necessary and distinct implication. It is submitted that Punjab Act 13 of 1964 is remedial or a curative Act as is apparent from its objects and reasons, to which I would shortly advert. A curative Act is a statute passed to cure defects in a prior law and it is submitted that as the words 'in the son or daughter of such female' were capable of some uncertainty the words 'husband of the' were inserted between the words 'such' and 'female'. There is undoubtedly force and cogency in this argument". A little lower down, the judgment proceeds :- "A close analysis of paragraphs (First) and (Secondly) of clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 15 before the amendment introduced by Punjab Act No. 13 of 1964 would demonstrate that a son of the husband of a female vendor, though nto born from her womb, would be entitled to pre-empt, particularly when the husband's brtoher and even the son of the husband's brtoher of that female aie accorded the right of pre-emption. To reiterate, the right of "pre-emption is accorded manifestly on the the principle of consanguinity, the property of the female vendor being that of her husband, and there is no reason why the step son should be excluded and the nephew of the husband included. From this alone it must be inferred that the Legislature had intended to include a step-son and consequently retrospective operation had to be given to the amending Act as such a construction appears to be in consonance and harmony with the purpose and purport of the Act." With all doe respect, we find it somewhat difficult to adopt this line of reasoning. The Statement of Object and Reasons accompanying a Bill, when introduced in any Parliament or Legislative Assembly, cannto be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the statute and they can be used only for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading; up to the legislation. Such statement cannto be used as an and to the construction of the enactment. This is perhaps all the more so when the Bill is a private member's Bill. A statute, as passed by the Legislature, is the expression of the collective intention ' of the Legislature as a whole and any statement made by an individual member of the Legislature about the intention and Objects of the Act cannto be legitimately used to render that Act retrospective it the plain reading of the statutory language does nto support retrospective operation. This would perhaps be still more so when such a statement is contained in a private member's Bill after fresh elections to the Legislature concerned. Now, it has to be kept in view that the Legislature, when intending to prejudicially affect existing titles or to invalidate lawful contracts and nullify valid transactions by retrospective operation of a statute, dealing with substantive rights, is always expected to take good care to express its intention in clear, unambiguous and plain language and if it purports to cure or rectify an existing ambiguiry or, which has the effect of violating contractual obligations or disturbing vested lights, it, as a rule. takes effective precautions nto to leave the retrospective intent to mere implication, to be gathered by the nto too certain process of construction. Laws of this type must nto serve as traps for the honest purchasers of property acting bona fide on the plain and unambiguous statutory phraseology. Absence of clear expression of retrospective operation in regard to the amendment of 1964, seems to us to be almost conclusive against retrospective intendmEnt in this case.
Delhi High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 0 - I D Dua - Full Document

Molu Ram Amar Singh vs Saroj Kumari on 8 September, 1972

4. It is true that this point was not argued before me when I decided this case. But the error pointed out by the applicant seems to the quite apparent on the record. Previously, a Division Bench of this Court had taken the view that if a pre-emptor had a right to pre-emption even qua a share in the property sold, he or she could pre-empt the entire bargain. This view was, however, reversed by a Full Bench of this Court in Moti Ram v. Bakhwant Singh, (1967) 69 Pun LR 1041=(AIR 1968 Punj 141)(FB), wherein it was held that the right of pre-emption was limited to the extent of the pre-emptor's right. he could not claim the entire property sold on the basis of his relationship, when it was found that he was not related to all the vendors. He could pre-empt only that portion of the property regarding which his right of pre-emption existed. In the instant case, five persons as already mentioned above, had sold the land in dispute and Ram Parkash owned 1/5th share therein. Saroj Kumari, who was his minor daughter had a right of pre-emption qua her father's share in the property, that is 1/5th. Thus, under Section 15(1)(c) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, she could pre-empt only 1/5th Share in the land sold and no more. This, in my opinion, is a sufficient ground for reviewing my earlier judgment dated 3rd February, 1972.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 3 - Full Document
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