In the case of K.V.Muhammed Kunhi (supra) the cheque was dated
17.11.1994 and that was presented on 17.5.1995, and in this background the
Court observed as follows:
13. Our attention has furthermore been drawn to a decision of the Kerala
High Court in K.V. Muhammed Kunhi v. P. Janardhanan [1998 Crl. L.J.
4330], wherein construing proviso (a) appended to Section 138 of the Act, a
learned Single Judge held:
14. Our attention has furthermore been drawn to a decision
of the Kerala High Court in K.V. Muhammed Kunhi v. P.
Janardhanan, 1998 Cri LJ 4330 (Ker), wherein construing
clause (a) of the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Act, a
learned Single Judge held: (Cri LJ p. 4331, para 3)
"3. ... A comparative study of both the sections in the Act
and the General Clauses Act significantly indicate that the
period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date on which
the cheque or instrument was drawn. The words „from‟ and
„to‟ employed in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act are
Crl.M.C. No. 3426/2011 Page 9 of 10
evidently clear that in cases where there is an ambiguity or
suspicion with reference to the date of commencement of
period of limitation in any Act or special enactment, the words
„from‟ and „to‟ employed in Section 9 of the General Clauses
Act can be pressed into service."
“3………….But in the instant case before me, Section 138 proviso (a)
is involved which is so clear (as extracted above) that the date of
limitation will commence only from the date found in the cheque or
the instrument.”
In the case of K.V.Muhammed Kunhi (supra) the cheque was dated
17.11.1994 and that was presented on 17.5.1995, and in this background the
Court observed as follows:
12. Ld. Counsel for the complainant also relied upon judgment
cited as "Malwa Cotton & Spinning Mills Vs Virsa Singh Sidhu
(2008) 17 SCC 147; "Karthikeva Vs. Sarabhai Vs. TVS Net
Technologies Ltd. Crl.O.P. No. 20185, 20186 and 20489 of 2010
dated 28.03.2011, High Court of Chennai; "Manjula Vs. M/s
Colgate Palmolive (India) on 12 October, 2006" Madras High Court
whereas Ld. Counsel for the accused also relied upon the judgment
cited as 1998 Cr.L.J. 4330 Kerela High Court - KV Muhammad
Kunhi Vs P. Janardhan; 1997 Cr.L.J. 2122 Madras High Court "M/s.
Pritostick & another Vs. M.L. Oswal; 1998 BC 581 Madras High
Court "K. Govind Raj Vs. Ashwin Barai"; III[2006] BC 482 Delhi
High Court - BPDL Investment Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Maple Leaf Trading -
Section 87 N.I. Act; 2002 Cr.L.J. 203 (S.C.)
13. Our attention has furthermore been drawn to a decision of the Kerala High Court
in K.V. Muhammed Kunhi v. P. Janardhanan [1998 Crl. L.J. 4330], wherein construing
proviso (a) appended to Section 138 of the Act, a learned Single Judge held:
14. Our attention has furthermore been drawn to a
decision of the Kerala High Court in K.V. Muhammed
Kunhi v. P. Janardhanan [1998 Cri LJ 4330 (Ker)],
wherein construing clause (a) of the proviso appended to
Section 138 of the Act, a learned Single Judge held: (Cri LJ
p. 4331, para 3)
"3. ... A comparative study of both the sections in
the Act and the General Clauses Act significantly
indicates that the period of limitation has to be
reckoned from the date on which the cheque or
instrument was drawn. The words 'from' and 'to'
employed in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act
are evidently clear that in cases where there is an
ambiguity or suspicion with reference to the date of
commencement of the period of limitation in any
Act or special enactment, the words 'from' and 'to'
employed in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act
can be pressed into service."
14. Our attention has furthermore been drawn to a decision
of the Kerala High Court in K.V. Muhammed Kunhi v. P.
Janardhanan [1998 Cri LJ 4330 (Ker)], wherein construing
clause (a) of the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Act,
a learned Single Judge held: (Cri LJ p. 4331, para 3)
"3. ... A comparative study of both the sections in the
Act and the General Clauses Act significantly indicates
that the period of limitation has to be reckoned from
the date on which the cheque or instrument was
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( 2025:HHC:24723 )
drawn. The words 'from' and 'to' employed in Section
9 of the General Clauses Act are evidently clear that in
cases where there is an ambiguity or suspicion with
.
14. Our attention has furthermore been drawn to a decision
of the Kerala High Court in K.V. Muhammed Kunhi v. P.
Janardhanan [1998 Cri LJ 4330 (Ker)], wherein construing
clause (a) of the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Act,
a learned Single Judge held: (Cri LJ p. 4331, para 3)
"3. ... A comparative study of both the sections in the
Act and the General Clauses Act significantly indicates
that the period of limitation has to be reckoned from
the date on which the cheque or instrument was
drawn. The words 'from' and 'to' employed in Section
9 of the General Clauses Act are evidently clear that in
cases where there is an ambiguity or suspicion with
reference to the date of commencement of period of
limitation in any Act or special enactment, the words
'from' and 'to' employed in Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act can be pressed into service."
38.It is argued by the Accused Persons that cheque no.599629
dated 31.07.2017 is stale, having been presented after three
months of its date and so is invalid. Since the present
complaint pertains to three cheques, and naturally the
statutory notice also demands a composite amount of all
three cheques, the entire complaint needs to be dismissed.
Reliance is placed on K.V. Muhammed Kunhi vs. P.
Janardhanan, 1998(2) ALT(CRI) 431.