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Documents citing Queen-Empress vs Sitanath Mandal on 16 July, 1895

Emperor vs Krishnaji Prabhakar Khadilkar on 26 February, 1929

The Government Pleader has relied also on the ruling in Queen-Empress v. Kaysmullah Mandal (1897) I.L.R. 24 Cal. 429 which lays down that there is nothing in Section 254 of the Criminal Procedure Code which would prevent a Magistrate from committing a case under Section 257, Indian Penal Code, to the Court of Session provided he finds that the accused has committed an offence which in his opinion cannot be adequately punished by him. The accused in that case were charged with an offence under Section 147, Indian Penal Code the maximum punishment for which is imprisonment of either description for two years, or fine, or both. The offence is triable in the first instance exclusively by a Magistrate. The limit of the Magistrate's power in respect of the sentence of fine is Rs. 1,000. The sentence of fine for an offence under Section 147, Indian Penal Code, is not limited to that amount but may exceed it to any extent provided it is not excessive, The Magistrate would, be justified in committing the case for trial to the Court of Session if he is of opinion that the sentence he is empowered by law to pass would be inadequate. There was no question in this case of the alternative jurisdiction of the Court of Session to try the case. The committal to the Court of Session was quashed merely on the ground as stated in the judgment, that the Magistrate's reason for the committal was not based on the inadequacy of the sentence of fine he was empowered to impose.
Bombay High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Muthukumarsawmi Pillai And Ors. vs Emperor on 17 April, 1912

The observations of the Bombay High Court in Queen-Empress v. Maganlal 14 B. 115 and Queen-Empress v. Chagan Dayaram 14 B. 331 of Phear, J., in Queen v. Sadhu Mandal 21 W.R. 69 Cr. and of Bashyam Iyenger, J., in Ramasami Gounden v. Emperor 27 M. 271 at p. 290 : 14 M.L.J. 226 : 1 Cr. L.J. 641 are authorities for the position that it would be right to require that a Judge should ordinarily presume the untrustworthiness of an accomplice. When a case is tried without a Jury, the judgment should contain certain materials to show to a Court of Appeal or revision that this presumption was borne in mind by the Judge and the reasons that weighed with him for not making the presumption. I would not put it, as suggested in the Advocate-General's certificate, that the presumption of untrustworthiness should be made in all cases and that a conviction without independent corroboration can be sustained only where the presumption is rebutted by special circumstances. I do not think that there is really anything in the judgment of the majority of the Special Bench to show that the learned Judges really took a different view though they do not consider the question whether special reasons should be exhibited for not requiring corroboration. Their Lordships say that it should be borne in mind that the evidence of the approvers is tainted evidence. Scrutinized with the utmost care and accepted with the greatest caution and considered in the light of the circumstances in which it is given and in the light of all other circumstances in the case of which evidence is legally admissible, then, if it is found to be trustworthy, it must be acted on. As I have already pointed out, the certificate of the Advocate-General on the question does not raise any question of practical importance in the case. The learned Judges have in fact given plenty of reasons which in their opinion were sufficient for considering the evidence of the approvers in the case generally trustworthy. This Court dealing, as a Court of review, with the question whether there is any error of law in the view taken by the majority, is not concerned to consider whether those reasons wee, as a matter of fact, sufficient to justify the acceptance of the approver's evidence as generally true. That is entirely a question of fact and we have not, at this stage of the case, at any rate, to deal with it further.
Madras High Court Cites 117 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

The State vs Ramprasad Singh And Ors. on 1 April, 1953

In my opinion,! this contention is wholly without substance. There is no doubt that the offence under Section 452, Penal Code, is a minor offence within the meaning of Section 238, Criminal P. C., and the jury, if properly directed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, could have convicted the accused persons of the offence under Section 452, Penal Code, on the charge framed and placed before them; therefore, it is open to this Court to convict the accused persons of the offence under Section 452, Penal Code. If authority be needed for this view, such authority will be found in the decision of -- 'Queen-Empress v. Sitanath', 22 Gal 1005 (H), where the accused persons were tried by a jury on charges under Sections 366 and 377, Penal Code; the Judge made a reference to the High Court under Section 307, Criminal P. C., and the High Court found the accused persons guilty of the offence under Section 365, Penal Code. As in that case, so also in the present case, no prejudice has been caused to the accused persons by the failure to frame a charge under Section 452, Penal Code. Baoierjee J. observed in that case:
Patna High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Rex vs Arumugam on 16 April, 1943

215 and Queen-Empress v. Sitanath Mandal (1895) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 1006. Those are clear cases in which the facts justify the application of Section 238. They do not deal with facts similar to those with which I have to deal to-day, and therefore are of very little guidance in the decision of this particular question. As I have already said, that decision seems to me to depend almost entirely upon an analysis of the facts in this case. On that analysis it seems to me quite clear that the language of Section 403(1) must be deemed to apply to the present case, however anomalous it may seem that the accused should be protected from further trial for an offence of which, according to the opinion of five out of nine jurymen, he was actually proved guilty.
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

In Re: Arumugham vs Unknown on 16 April, 1943

215 and Queen-Empress v. Sitanath Mandal ('95) 22 Cal. 1006. Those are clear cases in which the facts justify the application of Section 238. They do not deal with facts similar to those with which I have to deal to day, and therefore are of very little guidance in the decision of this particular question. As I have already said, that decision seems to me to depend almost entirely upon an analysis of the facts in this case. On that analysis it seems to me quite clear that the language of Section 403(1) must be deemed to apply to the present case, however, anomalous it may seem that the accused should be protected from further trial for an offence of which according to the opinion of five out of nine jurymen, he was actually proved guilty. In the result, then, I sustain the preliminary objection and hold that it is not open to me to try the accused upon this charge. I accordingly acquit him.
Madras High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Pramatha Bhusan Roy And Ors. vs Emperor on 22 February, 1933

2. The Sub-Deputy Magistrate however stated that he was of opinion that the attachment and seizure of the moveables were nevertheless legal; and on this report, the Magistrate rejected the petition filed by the five brothers. The learned Sessions Judge states that he considers the order of the Magistrate rejecting the petition to be erroneous. To decide the question raised by the letter of reference, it is necessary to consider the provisions of Section 386(1)(a), Criminal P.C. That section gives power to a Court passing a sentence of fine to take steps for recovering the amount of fine by, among other things, issuing a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any moveable property belonging to the offender. The first point to consider is whether these words entitle an officer executing such a warrant to attach by seizure and to sell moveable property in which the offender has only an undivided fractional share. Prior to the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of 1923, the section authorized the Court to issue a warrant for the levy of the fine by distress and sale of any moveable property belonging to the offender. It was held as long ago as 1892 by this Court in the case of Queen-Empress v. Sitanath Mitra (1893) 20 Cal 478 that under the section, as it then stood, a Magistrate could only attach moveables of which the delinquent was the sole owner. The Court in laying this down must be held to have meant by "attachment" "attachment by seizure," because as the section then stood, that was the only form of attachment contemplated by it, In my opinion, the case is still an authority for the proposition that moveable property in which the offender, has only an undivided fractional interest, is not liable to attachment by seizure and subsequent sale.
Calcutta High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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