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Documents citing Sneh Gupta vs Devi Sarup & Ors on 17 February, 2009

The Kerala Hindi Prachar Sabha vs R.Joseph on 29 September, 2010

Thus, decision is clear that any agreement or compromise to be binding on the parties must be in writing and signed by the parties and as the decision in Sneh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup and Ors (supra) says atleast by the counsel concerned on behalf of the parties. It is not sufficient that while hearing objection of parties to the proceeding, learned Additional District Judge has recorded that counsel (for petitioners and respondent Nos.1 to 5 and 7) have agreed to the modification to the bye-law agreed to by petitioners and respondent Nos.1 to 5 and 7. That modification being a variation from the settlement entered into between petitioners and respondent Nos.1 to 5 and 7, had to be in compliance with Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code. Admittedly modifications made to the bye law agreed between petitioners and respondent Nos.1 to 5 and 7 (appended to I.A.No.1832 and W.P(C).Nos23185 and 24440 of 2010 : 24 : 1833 of 2009) was not made in writing and signed by petitioners and respondent Nos.1 to 5 and 7. Hence the modifications made by learned Additional District Judge cannot stand and is liable to set aside.
Kerala High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - T Joseph - Full Document

R/O House No. 149 vs Sh. Nem Chand (Deceased) on 2 March, 2022

45. The factual matrix of the present case is a notch higher that the factual matrix of the judgment referred above as the present Defendants were not only non­party to the compromise agreement, but were also not party to the suit or appeal. The non­applicability of the compromise decree is exacerbated manifold when it is taken into perspective that the impugned judgment also held that the suit of the Plaintiff was hit by non­joinder of now Late Sh. Ujagar Singh (Defendant No. 1 herein), as he was a necessary party in that suit. The Plaintiff, even upon having cognizance of the said fact, entered into a compromise decree with the defendants (in the previous suit) thereby trying to oust the Defendants herein from the suit property.
Delhi District Court Cites 21 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Narender Singh And Ors vs Paramjit Kaur And Ors on 20 August, 2024

"8. Shri Acharya, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of F the respondents tried to argue on the basis of Article 123 of the Limitation Act. However, in our opinion, Article 123 cannot be, in the facts of this case persuade us to take the view that the limitation actually started from the date of knowledge, as the appellants/defendants had no notice of the decree or the proceedings which the respondents had promised to terminate. Shri Acharya then tried to persuade us by suggesting that unless the application was filed for condonation of delay, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for setting aside the decree. He has based this contention on the basis of a reported decision of this Court in Sneh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup & Ors. [2009 (6) SCC 194 and more particularly, the observations made in para 70 therein. In our opinion, the facts of this case were entirely different, as it was held in that case that the appellant had knowledge of passing of the compromise decree and yet she had not filed the application for condonation of delay. That is not the situation here Even in this case, there is a clear cut Page 21 of 23 21 of 23 ::: Downloaded on - 22-08-2024 03:47:19 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:106122 SAO No.14 of 2014 2024:PHHC: 106122 observation in para 57, as follows: -
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ravi Shankar Mishra vs Rambhadra Mishra on 5 November, 2024

13. Now in the light of aforesaid settled position by the Apex Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHALINI LANDGE Signing time: 13-11-2024 4:04:48 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54532 7 MP-4913-2023 Court and Full Bench of this Court, the first question referred by the Division Bench may be examined. When the plaintiff makes an allegation that the instrument is void and hence not binding upon him, and if a declaration simplicitor is prayed then he is not required to pay ad valorem court fee and a fixed court-fee under Article 17, Schedule-II of the Court Fees Act will be payable. This position is well settled by the Apex Court in Ningawwa (supra) and continued till the decision in Sneh Gupta (supra). The void document which is not binding upon the plaintiff needs to be avoided and in this regard a declaration is sufficient.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - V Mishra - Full Document
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